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A NEED FOR CARING
Judith Areen*
AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC. Edited by Harlon
L. Dalton, Scott Burris, and the Yale AIDS Law Project. New Haven:
Yale University Press. 1987. Pp. vii, 382. $7.95.
And I looked, and behold, a pale horse: and his name that sat on him
was Death, and Hell followed with him. And power was given unto
them over the fourth part of the earth, to kill with sword, and with hunger, and with death, and with the beasts of the earth.
Revelation 6:8
AIDS is the modem day equivalent of leprosy. AIDS, or a suspicion of
AIDS, can lead to discrimination in employment, education, housing
and even medical treatment.
South Florida Blood Service, Inc. v. Rasmussen
[O]n this earth there are pestilences and there are victims, and it's up to
us, so far as possible, not to join forces with the pestilences.
Albert Camus, The Plague
Professor Harlon Dalton explains at the outset that this book,
AIDS and the Law: A Guidefor the Public, grew out of the desire of
several law students and faculty members at the Yale Law School to
"do something" about Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) (p. xi). The result is a distinguished compendium of essays by
knowledgeable authors that addresses significant legal issues raised by
AIDS. One of the real achievements of the book is that even complicated technical matters are discussed in language that is admirably
free of jargon, in keeping with the espoused goal of reaching readers
who are not "steeped in the law" (p. xi).
The scope of the overall project is refreshingly ambitious. There
are the essays one would expect on such practical matters as AIDS in
the Workplace and Schoolchildren with AIDS, but there are also essays
that put the matter in a broader context, including a particularly illuminating chapter entitled A Historical Perspective by Allan Brandt,
and a thoughtful look at professional differences, Physicians versus
Lawyers: A Conflict of Cultures, by Daniel Fox. There is also a
ground-breaking section on groups specially affected by AIDS that in* Professor of Law and Professor of Community and Family Medicine, Georgetown University. A.B. 1966, Cornell University; J.D. 1969, Yale Law School. - Ed. I am grateful to Richard Cooper, Lisa Granik, Louis Michael Seidman, Emily Van Tassel, and Wendy W. Williams
for the very helpful comments they provided on earlier versions of this review.
1. 467 So. 2d 798, 802 (1985).
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cludes separate essays on intravenous drug users, on the black community, and on the lesbian and gay community.
The decision to isolate these last essays as a separate section, however, underscores one weakness of the collection - the absence of a
unifying theme or commentary. In the end, the volume remains a collection of partial solutions rather than an integrated whole. This is,
perhaps, understandable given the inconsistencies and discontinuities
that have characterized our nation's response to the AIDS epidemic
from the very beginning. But even if our society is not yet ready to
resolve the myriad public policy issues raised by AIDS, it is unfortunate that this volume did not better integrate the individual essays or,
failing that, generate some conversation among the invited authors.
Donald Hermann, in the chapter, Torts: PrivateLawsuits aboutAIDS,
for example, catalogues the various legal doctrines that might be employed to make one person liable for transmitting the AIDS virus to
another. No effort is made to reconcile this approach with the caution, voiced by Larry Gostin in his chapter, TraditionalPublic Health
Strategies, that such legal strategies may "deter people vulnerable to
HIV infection from being tested, seeking advice and treatment, and
cooperating with public health programs" (p. 65).
The silence between chapters forces the reader (and reviewer) to
grope for linkages, for an integrated perspective, for a sense of what we
can do.
I.

THE DISEASE

The facts about AIDS that bombard us almost daily are sobering.
First recognized as a new disease in 1981, the number of AIDS cases
initially doubled every six months. 2 By 1986, cases were doubling
only every thirteen months, but as Dr. June Osborn, Dean of the
School of Public Health at the University of Michigan, observes, this
was of small comfort because more new cases of AIDS were diagnosed
in that same year (28,000) than in the prior five years combined (p.
19). By the end of 1987, 49,793 cases of AIDS had been reported in
the United States to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), of whom
27,909 (56 percent) had died. 3 The mortality rate is almost 80 percent
for people in whom AIDS was diagnosed more than two years ago,
and most experts assume it will approach 100 percent over time (p.
19).
2. A damning account of the many unnecessary delays that occurred prior to acknowledging
the epidemic or warning potential victims is R. SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS,
PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC (1987).
3. Curran, Jafl'e, Hardy, Morgan, Selik & Dondero, Epidemiology ofHIVInfection and AIDS
in the United States, 239 SCIENCE 610 (1988) [hereinafter Curran]. The Public Health Service
has projected that by 1991, there may be 323,000 reported patients with AIDS and that as many
as 200,000 may be dead. Board of Trustees Report, Prevention and Control of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 258 J. AM. MED. ASSN. 2097 (1987).
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Not everyone who has caught the AIDS virus, or Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) as it has come to be called, has developed
AIDS. 4 Researchers still do not know how many of the people who
carry HIV will ultimately develop AIDS. In the book, it is suggested
that only 20 percent of gay men with HIV, and an even lower percentage of hemophiliacs, will ultimately develop AIDS (p. 24). Already,
those statistics have been overtaken by far more pessimistic projections. The San Francisco City Clinic Cohort Study found that, as of
S-ptember 30, 1987, after 88 months of infection, 36 percent of the
men had developed AIDS, another group of more than 40 percent had
other signs or symptoms of infection, and only 20 percent remained
completely asymptomatic. 5 Eyster, Gail, Ballard, Al-Mondhiry and
Goedert have estimated that approximately 30 percent of adult
hemophiliacs develop AIDS within six years after infection. 6 Recently, Dr. M. Roy Schwarz, head 6f the AIDS task force of the
American Medical Association, stated, "I see nothing in the immunol'' 7
ogy of this virus which indicates less than 100 percent expressivity.
Researchers are also challenging the validity of drawing firm distinctions between having HIV and having AIDS. Many HIV carriers
develop AIDS-related complex (ARC). ARC has made tens of
thousands of Americans seriously ill, and killed many others; but, because the Centers for Disease Control does not include ARC within its
definition of "AIDS," those who die from ARC are not normally included in the count of AIDS deaths. 8 Other studies suggest that HIV
causes a loss of mental function long before other symptoms of AIDS
surface, and that most HIV carriers show immune system damage
within five years of infection even if they have not developed other
symptoms of ARC or AIDS. 9
AIDS is not an easy way to die:
The clinical illness itself typically starts with vague, debilitating symptoms including drenching night sweats, sustained fevers, chronic diarrhea, and weight loss, sometimes associated with generalized
enlargement of lymph nodes .... Some, but not all, of the individuals
who start with that set of symptoms then experience oral "thrush" (yeast
4. HIV was the name chosen as a compromise by an international committee of virologists
when Dr. Luc Montagnier of the Pasteur Institute and Dr. Robert Gallo of the National Cancer
Institute, who were both claiming to have discovered the virus that causes AIDS, could not agree
on a name. For an account that emphasizes the role played by two American lawyers, together
with Dr. Jonas Salk, in negotiating a settlement of claims between the French and American
researchers, see Judge, Anatomy of a Settlement, THE AM. LAW., June 1987, at 88.
5. Curran, supra note 3, at 615.
6. Eyster, Gail, Ballard, Al-Mondhiry & Goedert, Natural History of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infections in Hemophiliacs, 107 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 1 (1987).
7. SpecialReport: AMA Forum Told That HIVMay Always Lead to AIDS, AIDS POLICY &
LAW, May 6, 1987, at 6.
8. Specter, View ofAIDS Too Narrow, Scientists Say, Wash. Post, Jan. 13, 1988, at Al, col. 6.

9. Id. at A16, col. 1.
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infection of the mouth) or develop the purplish skin lesions of a previously rare kind of malignancy called Kaposi's sarcoma. Alternatively or as well - strange chronic pneumonias develop, caused by microorganisms rarely seen and resistant to treatment. Over time, some AIDS
patients also develop confusion and other signs of progressive neurologic
degeneration. . . . [F]ull-blown AIDS means a relentlessly downhill
clinical course .... 10

Some people have reacted to these facts with panic and draconian

proposals that reflect both fear of disease and hostility to gays. For
once, however, more and better information can rebut some of the

most offensive reactions."1 Indeed, about the only good news concerning HIV is that it is not transmitted through casual contact. Not only
is HIV spread exclusively through blood or semen, but the virus is
fragile enough to be destroyed by standard solutions of almost all common disinfectants, such as hydrogen peroxide, bleach, Lysol, or alcohol (p. 33). The most comprehensive study of families of people with
AIDS involved ninety-four people who had lived at least three months
with a clinically ill AIDS patient, sharing toothbrushes, towels, eating

utensils, dishes, drinking glasses, beds, toilets, baths, showers, and
kitchens. Seventeen percent of the subjects kissed on the lips. Not one
adult contracted the virus. One five-year-old child became ill, but she

appeared to have contracted the virus from her mother during pregnancy (pp. 34-35).
These facts should put to rest the unwarranted fears of most coworkers, and of parents of children who have a classmate with HIV,
unless the child with HIV is too young to avoid posing a risk of expo12
sure to bodily fluids.

One of the most important chapters in the book is Education as
Prevention. As long as there is no vaccine or cure for AIDS, education
will remain the primary weapon against the disease. There are now
encouraging data that show that the virus has stopped spreading as
10. P. 19. One of the most devastating types of pneumonia is Pneumocystiscarinji pneumonia (often confusingly abbreviated as PCP). Pneumocystis is caused by a microscopic protozoa
normally held in check by people's immune systems. An average person has 300 million air
pockets in his lungs where oxygen from inhaled breath eases into the blood stream. For some
AIDS victims, these air pockets offer a warm, even tropical climate for the protozoa to grow by
the millions, slowly suffocating the patient. R. SHrLTS, supra note 2, at 34.
11. See, eg., Hilts, When FearofAIDS Freezesan Agency, Wash. Post, Feb. 4, 1988, at A21,
col 3. This article explains that the turning point for General Accounting Office AIDS task
force members was reading the Surgeon General's report that made clear that casual contact
would not spread the disease. Consensus soon followed on a policy that states: (1) being AIDSfree is not required for hiring or continued employment; (2) an employee with AIDS is not
required to disclose his or her condition to a supervisor or other employees; and (3) efforts to
help an employee with AIDS should be the same as efforts to help those with other life-threatening diseases.
12. Guidelines issued by the Centers for Disease Control in 1985 recommend that children
with HIV should be permitted to attend school unless the children are preschool-aged, are neurologically handicapped and lacking control of bodily secretions, display behavior such as biting, or
have uncoverable, oozing lesions. Pp. 69-70.
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rapidly among gay men, although this change has come too late to
prevent a substantial proportion of the male homosexual population in
some areas from being exposed to the virus. Thus, unless a cure is
found, thousands more Americans will become ill and die in the next
13
few years.
Nonetheless, some public officials are expressing cautious optimism on the ground that AIDS will not become an epidemic among
the general population. In early 1988, for example, Dr. Otis R.
Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services, in a striking shift in
view, announced that "we do not expect any explosion into the heterosexual population." 14 Only a year before, Dr. Bowen had warned that
AIDS would make the Black Plague, which wiped out a third of the
population in Western Europe in the fourteenth century, seem "pale
15
by comparison."'
But HIV continues to infect black and Hispanic drug addicts, their
sex partners, and their babies, at tragically high rates.16 Intravenous
drug addicts are likely to be harder to reach and are less likely to
change their behavior in response to education than the gay community has been. Worse, as the general public focuses on the new demographic projections for the disease, animosity toward drug users and
gays may lessen public support for additional funding for the battle
against AIDS.
Law has played an important role in protecting some HIV sufferers
from the additional burden of losing a job, of being denied admission
to a public school, or of becoming uninsurable (pp. 74-78, 120-21, 19093). But, as Professor Dalton acknowledges in the introduction to the
book, there is no guarantee that in the future law will not come to rest
most heavily upon those who already suffer the most (p. xiv), particularly if some of the proposals for large-scale mandatory screening or
quarantine of HIV carriers are enacted. He calls for a massive, purposeful, and broadly-supported effort by the whole society to rein.in its
worst impulses:
Such an effort requires healthy doses of what my former colleague
Charles Black has labeled "humane imagination," the ability to comprehend, however dimly, how life is lived by people very different from ourselves. We must struggle to see through the eyes and feel with the hearts
of those whom AIDS is most likely to fell. [p. xiv]
13. Boffey, Spread of AIDS Abating, But Deaths Will Still Soar, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1988,
at Al, col. 3.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases,
has described the epidemic as "catastrophic" in the male homosexual population and among
intravenous drug users. Id. at A36, col. 3. AIDS is now the leading cause of death in New York
among men 24 to 44 years old and among women 25 to 34. Id. at A36, col. 2. One in every 61
babies born in New York City now has the AIDS virus. Lambert, Study Finds Antibodies for
AIDS in I in 61 Babies in New York City, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1988, at Al, col. 2.
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In a secular society whose central organizing political and economic
image is that of a competitive struggle for survival in a marketplace,
what ground can be found for such a set of public and private attitudes
and policies? There is a place to turn. It begins with the family.

II.

THE CARE PERSPECTIVE

The law's rationale for why (or when) the state is entitled to intrude on family relationships has long been inadequate. The absence
of a rationale has particularly serious consequences for parents who
must try to defend against having their children taken away by the
courts on the basis of an allegation no more specific than parental "neglect" - whatever that means. Moral philosophy, until recently, has
paid little attention to the parent-child relationship. Indeed, as Professor Seyla Benhabib has noted, the imaginary world of most moral philosophers is a strange world "in which individuals are grown up before
they have been born; in which boys are men before they have been
' 17
children; a world where neither mother, nor sister, nor wife exist."
Perhaps the starkest formulation is that of Thomas Hobbes, who proclaimed: "Let us... consider men as if but even now sprung out of
the earth, and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity, without all kind of engagement to each other." 18
Contemporary criticism of philosophy for ignoring the family is
not completely unprecedented. David Hume, in the mid-eighteenth
century, criticized Hobbes's state-of-nature hypothesis for ignoring the
fact that "[m]en are necessarily born in a family-society ... and are
trained up by their parents to some rule of conduct or behaviour."' 19
Yet the lack of concern with family or with the nurturing of children
has continued in the writings of the principal moral and political philosophers of our time. John Rawls, for example, reserves the "original
position" that is central to his theory of justice for fully grown, rational beings. 20 As Alasdair MacIntyre has noted, it is "as though we
had been shipwrecked on an uninhabited island with a group of other
'2 1
individuals, each of whom is a stranger to me and to all the others.
The moral disposition to be just presupposes not only that the
agent is adult and rational and attached to certain abstract concepts or
ideals, but, as Flanagan and Jackson have observed, also that
the agent ... is attached to and cares for his community, and that he has
17. Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete Other, in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY
154, 162 (E. Kittay & D. Meyers eds. 1987).
18. T. HOBBES, PhilosophicalRudiments ConcerningGovernment andSociety, in 2 THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES 108-09 (Molesworth ed. 1966).
19. D. HUME, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in HUME'S MORAL AND
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 190 (H. Aiken ed. 1948).
20. J. RAwIs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19 (1971).
21. A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THECRY 250 (2d ed. 1984).
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a sense that his own good and that of those he cares for most is associated with general adherence to these ideals. Without such cares and at-

tachments, first to those one loves and secondarily to some wider
joined,
community to which one's projects and prospects are intimately
22

the moral disposition to justice ... has no place to take root.
These cares and attachments do not develop without a consider-

able investment of both time and care by parents or others in loco
parentis. Thus, paradoxically, even the theory of a contractarian like
Rawls rests to a considerable, albeit unacknowledged, extent on good
parenting. Nonetheless, there has been almost no attention paid by
Rawls or most moral or political philosophers to the nature of good
parenting.
One probable explanation for the omission is that parenting has

traditionally been viewed as women's work. But that is hardly an adequate justification for ignoring parenting. Annette Baier makes the

for its stabilpoint more bluntly: "A decent morality will not depend
'23
ity on forces to which it gives no moral recognition.

The possibility that there is another approach to moral issues, one
that uses the parent-child relationship rather than the arm's length
transactions of strangers as its fundamental paradigm is gaining currency among philosophers, in large part due to the work of psycholo-

gist Carol Gilligan.24 In her studies of the relationship between moral
judgment and action, Professor Gilligan found that men more often
than women conceive of morality as substantively constituted by obligations and rights and as procedurally constituted by the demands of

fairness and impartiality. Women more often than men see moral requirements as emerging from the particular needs of others in the con-

text of particular relationships. Gilligan named the latter orientation
the "care perspective" to contrast it with the more rights-oriented ap'25
proach of the "justice perspective."
Attention to the parent-child bond has also focused renewed inter22. Flanagan & Jackson, Justice, Careand Gender: The Kohlberg-GilliganDebate Revisited,
97 ETHIcs 622, 630 (1987).
23. Id. at 631.
24. See generally C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). The most comprehensive
exploration of the implications of Gilligan's work for moral philosophy is WOMEN AND MORAL
THEORY, supra note 17.
25. Critics have complained that Gilligan's data do not support the assertion that caring is
biologically determined, see, eg., Kerber, Some Cautionary Words for Historians, 11 SiGNs 304,
305 (1986), and have cautioned that, although women have a greater reputation for altruism and
empathy than men, studies do not show that women are any more likely than men to offer help
to strangers when given the opportunity. Greeno & Maccoby, How Different is the "Different
Voice"?, 11 SIGNs 310, 313 (1986) (Whether there is a sex difference with respect to helpful acts
directed toward friends and intimates "can be neither confirmed nor refuted."). Id at 314. Gilligan has answered that her intent was to highlight different modes of thought rather than to
generalize about either sex. Gilligan, Reply, 11 SIGNs 324, 327 (1986).
Women may well be more likely to exhibit a care perspective than men, but this phenomenon
is probably due to the fact that society assigns women more of the caring roles, rather than
because of differences between the x and y chromosomes. Indeed, Joan Tronto may well be right

1074

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 86:1067

est in Hume, who criticized what he termed the "selfish system of
morals" of Hobbes and Locke26 by invoking the parent-child relationship:
Tenderness to their offspring, in all sensible beings, is commonly able
alone to counterbalance the strongest motives of self-love, and has no
manner of dependence on that affection. What interest can a fond
mother have in view, who loses her health by assiduous attendance on
of grief when freed by
her sick child, and afterwards languishes and dies
27
its death from the slavery of that attendance?
Hume proceeded to use the parent-child bond as a paradigm for the
benevolent feelings and acts we should extend not only to friends, but
to humanity.
The parent-child relationship is an appealing relationship on which
to ground a general moral theory because it is familiar to virtually all
human beings. More importantly, it may be a useful model for reconciling dependence and autonomy because parents traditionally care for
and about their children in a way that respects and even fosters autonomy inthe children.
Consider the list of virtues Sara Ruddick has developed to characterize parenting: 28 "A responsiveness to growth (and acceptance of
change) along with a... learning that recognizes change, development
and the uniqueness of particular individuals and situations; resilient
good humor and cheerfulness, even in the face of conflict, the fragility
of life and the dangers inherent in the precesses of physical and mental
growth; attentive love, which is responsive to the reality of the child,
and is also prepared to give up, let grow, accept detachment; and
humility, a selfless respect for reality, a practical realism which involves understanding the child and respecting it as a person, without
'
One drawback of the Ruddick list is
either 'seizing' or 'using' it."29
that it would be impossible for any parent to exemplify the listed virto suggest that the care perspective is a product of social oppression rather than of gender.
Tronto, Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care, 12 SIGNS 644, 649 (1987).
26. D. HUME, supra note 19, at 271.

27. Id. at 274.
28. Ruddick describes them as maternal virtues, but they are virtues that parents of both
sexes can, and do, exemplify.
29. J. GRIMSHAW, PHILOSOPHY AND FEMINIST THINKING, 240-41 (1986) (paraphrasing

Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, 6 FEMINIST STUD. 342 (1980)) (emphasis in original); cf the view
of mothering offered by Julian of Norwich in the fourteenth century. Dame Julian was a recluse,
or anchoress in St. Julian's Church, Norwich who was praising God by attributing to Him maternal virtues:
To the property of motherhood belong nature, love, wisdom and knowledge .... The kind,
loving mother who knows and sees the need of her child guards it very tenderly, as the
nature and condition of motherhood will have. And always as the child grows in age and in
stature, she acts differently, but she does not change her love. And when it is even older, she
allows it to be chastised to destroy its faults, so as to make the child receive virtues and
grace.
THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF LITERATURE BY WOMEN 16, 18 (S.Gilbert & S. Gubar eds.

1985).
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tues in every interaction with a child. Indeed, to spend all of one's
time caring for another in this way is likely to lead to exhaustion and
even resentment of the one cared for. Ruddick, herself, had second
thoughts about her initial list:
[A]ttentive love calls for a realistic self-preservation on the part of the
mother, a mother-self that can be seen and identified by the child who is
itself learning attentive love.... Maternal thinking identifies attentive
love as the fulcrum, the foundation of maternal practice; at the same
time it identifies chronic self-denial in its many forms as the characteris30
tic temptation of mothers and the besetting vice of maternal work.
Caring thus has several central characteristics. First, a caring person is responsive to the reality of the person receiving care. 31 Care is
provided at such times and in such a way that the person cared for is
assisted without being demeaned. Indeed, a central goal of caring is to
respect and foster the autonomy of the person cared for. By contrast,
altruism (or charity, its theological cousin) may be satisfied simply on
the basis of what the actor believes is good for the other. Caring,
properly understood, should avoid the potentially oppressive aspects
of such paternalism.
Second, a caring person also cares about herself sufficiently to sustain the physical, mental, and emotional resources needed to care for
others. Self-love is not a sufficient end from the care perspective, but
neither should self be sacrificed to excessive self-denial. A corollary of
this principle is that caring cannot be universalized; it is not
possible to
32
care for everyone as a parent cares for his or her child.
Third, caring does not always begin or end by choice. Adults in
our society may choose when to marry or to divorce and thus begin or
end this caring relationship, but parents normally cannot end their
caring relationships with their children. Conversely, adult children
may be obliged to care for their parents despite the fact that they never
voluntarily assumed the obligation. 33 From the care perspective, one
should be a good samaritan to a stranger in need if no other assistance
30. Ruddick, PreservativeLove and MilitaryDestruction: Some Reflections on Mothering and

Peace, in MOTHERING, ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 238 (Trebilcot ed. 1984) (emphasis in
original).
31. Cf N. NODDINGS, CARING, A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION 16 (1984) ("Apprehending the other's reality, feeling what he feels as nearly as possible, is
the essential part of caring .... ).
32. Virginia Held has suggested that caring may provide a new way to resolve the tension
between universal obligation and egoism:
Moral theories must pay attention to the neglected realm of particular others in actual
contexts. In doing so, problems of egoism vs. the universal moral point of view appear very
different, and may recede to the region of background insolubility or relative unimportance.
The important problems may then be seen to be how we ought to guide or maintain or
reshape the relationships, both close and more distant, that we have or might have with
actual human beings.
Held, Feminism and Moral Theory, in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY, supra note 17, at 118.
33. An excellent discussion of the obligations of adult children to their parents is Sommers,
FilialMorality, in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY, supra note 17, at 69.
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is available and if the care provided will not be an undue burden. 34
Critics of the care perspective have derided it as mere sentimentality. Neuchterlein has also objected that caring (he uses the term
"compassion") has no place in politics because it carries "the unmistakable implication of dependence and piteousness on the part of those
on the receiving end of the sentiment. '35 His criticism is unfounded if
caring is understood to be directed toward producing autonomy, not
dependence. Even Neuchterlein concedes, moreover, that caring is a
"noble" force and "those who do not participate in it on a community
36
as well as individual basis are morally tone deaf."
Another common criticism of caring is that it is simply a weak
version of virtue theory. This is a devastating criticism in the eyes of
those philosophers who have consigned the entire notion of "virtue,"
and with it the notion of a virtue-based theory, to the scrap pile of
outmoded concepts. Aristotle may have been comfortable with the
notion that a virtuous actor will know what constitutes right action,
but many modem philosophers consider his theory naive; they contend that the morality of particular acts can be determined only by
reasoning from moral principles.
The philosophic analysis of caring is in its early stages, so this is
not the time or place for a detailed reply. Caring, like justice, may
prove to be not merely a virtue, but a source of principles. 37 Alternatively, even if caring is a virtue, the philosophic debate about the role
of virtues in moral theory is by no means over. Alasdair MacIntyre,
for example, one of the modem philosophers interested in revitalizing
virtue theory, has defined "virtue" as an acquired human quality
which enables us to achieve goods that are internal to practices. 38 By
a "practice," he means a "complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of
activity are realized. '39 For MacIntyre, throwing a football is not a
practice, but the game of football is; bricklaying is not a practice, but
architecture is. Of most relevance, he believes that the sustaining of
human communities - including households, cities and nations - is
a practice. Caring may well be understood as a virtue as MacIntyre
uses the term; indeed it may be the central virtue for sustaining human
relationships and communities.
What, then, is the relationship between the caring perspective and
34. Accord Prentice, Expanding the Duty to Rescue, 19 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 15 (1985);
Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980).
35. See, eg., Neuchterlein, The Feminization of the American Left, COMMENTARY, Nov.
1987, at 46 (quoting Kaus, Up From Altruism, NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 15, 1986, at 17).
36. Id at 46 (emphasis omitted).
37. Cf J. RAWLS, supra note 20.
38. A. MACINTYRE, supra note 21, at 191.
39. Id at 187.
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the justice perspective? Their potential incompatibility is an ancient
theme. Consider the exchange between Antigone, who wants to fulfill
her obligation to care for her family (by burying her brother, Polynices) and Creon, King of Thebes, who has ordered that Polynices not
be buried because he was killed attacking Thebes:
Antigone: Even so, we have a duty to the dead.
Creon: Not to give equal honour to good and bad.
Antigone: Who knows? In the country of the dead that may be the
law.
Creon: An enemy can't be a friend, even when dead.
Antigone: My way is to share my love, not share my hate.
Creon: Go then, and share your love among the dead. We'll have not
woman's law here, while I live.40
Gilligan, by contrast, has written that there may be a role for both
caring and justice in morality:
Theoretically, the distinction between justice and care cuts across the
familiar divisions between thinking and feeling, egoism and altruism,
theoretical and practical reasoning. It calls attention to the fact that all
human relationships, public and private, can be characterized both in
terms of equality and in terms of attachment, and that both inequality
and detachment constitute grounds for moral concern. Since everyone is
vulnerable both to oppression and to abandonment, two moral visions one of justice and one of care - recur in human experience. The moral
injunctions, not to act unfairly toward others, and not
to turn away from
41
someone in need, capture these different concerns.
A traditional way to resolve the relationship between justice and
caring has been to confine caring to the family. Charles Dickens illustrated the dangers of a family life without caring in Bleak House
through the character of Mrs. Jellyby, the mother who devoted all of
her energy to the rights of the foreign poor. When her own son was
injured falling down the stairs, "Mrs. Jellyby merely added, with the
serene composure with which she said everything, 'Go along, you
naughty Peepy!' and fixed her fine eyes on Africa again." 42
Excluding justice concerns from the family also creates problems,
particularly for women. Women today perform most of the daily caring - for children, for the household, and for'the elderly 4 3 despite the
fact that more than 50 percent of the mothers with young children
also work outside the home. A recent study of men and women between the ages of twenty-five and sixty-four found that the total hours
worked by women has increased during the past quarter-century while
40. SOPHOCLES, Antigone, in THE THEBAN PLAYS 140 (E.F. Watling trans. 1947).
41. Gilligan, Moral Orientationand Moral Development, in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY

supra note 17, at 20 (emphasis in original).
42. C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 38 (Oxford Univ. Press 1948).
43. "More than 70 percent of those who provide free home care to disabled elderly people are
women, usually wives or daughters .. " Rich, Study Says Women ProvideMost Home Carefor
Elderly, Wash. Post, Aug. 4, 1986, at A3, col. 5.
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the total hours worked by men fell. In 1959, women on average spent

572 hours in market work, 1,423 hours on housework, and 266 hours
on child care, for a total of 2,261 hours annually. By 1983, the hours
spent in each category were 929, 1,252, and 201, for a total of 2,383.
Men, by contrast, in 1983 spent 1,667 hours in market work, but only
560 on housework, and 59 on child care (down from 76 in 1959), for a
total of 2286. 44 This imbalance is likely to change only when it is
accepted that men as well as women can provide caring in the family.

If family life without caring seems impoverished, should we not be
equally wary of a society without caring, a nation in which individuals
feel no moral duty to one another other than to avoid harming each
other? If a justice perspective might usefully supplement caring within

the family, 45 might not caring be an important complement to justice
outside of it? Caring and justice are best understood as mutually rein-

forcing perspectives. Each compensates for weaknesses in the other.
It is one thing to conclude that caring should be extended beyond
family relationships, and quite another to know how to apply the caring perspective in the public sphere. A natural extension would encompass friendship. 46 Many of the ways we relate to friends parallel
our family relationships. Indeed, friendship may be a particularly important context in which to develop a more complete account of car-

ing because it is not characterized by the inequality which lies at the
heart of the parent-child relationship. It is more difficult to know how
to apply the care perspective beyond family and friends to issues in the
larger community, 47 but AIDS presents an important reason to learn.

AIDS
As Professor Dalton has suggested, society needs to find a way to
III.

CARING AND

44. Fuchs, Sex Differences in Economic Well-Being, 232 SCIENCE 459 (1986).
45. Seasoning caring with justice within the family challenges the notion that caring should
only be done by women; and, by emphasizing that self and other are equal, it enables care givers
to avoid excessive self-sacrifice. Cf C. GILLIGAN, supra note 24, at 149:
Among college students in the 1970s, the concept of rights entered into their thinking to
challenge a morality of self-sacrificing and self-abnegation.... [Tihe notion of care expands
from the paralyzing injunction not to hurt others to an injunction to act responsively toward
self and others and thus to sustain connection.
46. See generally L. BLUM, FRIENDSHIP, ALTRUISM, AND MORALITY (1980).
47. There has been a resurgence of interest in public virtue theory. See generally M.
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE

(1982); Gutmann, CommunitarianCriticsof

Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 308 (1985). As Professor Seidman has cautioned, however,
there is a tension between the particularist ideal of relationships characterized by caring and
intimacy and the universalist ideal of equal beneficence toward all members of a community.
Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary Maintenance
Theory of ConstitutionalLaw, 96 YALE L.J. 1006, 1007 (1987). It is true that governments and
institutions are by nature impersonal, and, therefore, incapable of caring in the way that members of families do, but public policies can be designed so as to foster caring human relationships.
The deeper moral tension between any individual's duties to humanity in general and his or her
duties toward those with whom he or she stands in a special relationship may well be a permanently unresolvable feature of the moral life.
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rein in its worst impulses if the battle against AIDS is not to become a
war against the people infected (p. xiv). In other words, what is
needed is a change in attitude or perspective. Public policies, rules of
law, patterns of institutional and group behavior will reflect the fundamental perspective adopted by society. Here is where the adoption of
the care perspective can make a difference.
According to the care perspective, people who might have HIV
ought to care enough for and about those not infected to ascertain
their HIV status and, if it is positive, avoid transmitting it to others.
Governments could assist them by providing voluntary screening and
education programs. Conversely, people without HIV ought to care
enough about those with HIV to protect them from discrimination (in
housing, employment, insurance, etc.) and to provide adequate care
(medical, financial, and emotional) when they become ill. There is a
mutuality to the care analysis: people with HIV are most likely to be
responsible enough to ascertain their HIV status if they know they will
be cared for and about by those without HIV.
A care perspective does not mean that people without HIV must
rely only on the altruism of those with HIV. Caring includes caring
for oneself. Accordingly, anyone who has not been exposed to HIV
should avoid unprotected encounters with HIV-contaminated bodily
fluids. What is to be avoided, however, is the virus, not people infected with the virus. Here, too, governmental education programs
can play an important role in facilitating the care perspective.
A justice perspective, by contrast, would ignore the need of people
with HIV for care, beyond ensuring that they are not discriminated
against in the provision of medical services or in other ways. 48 The
focus would be on deterring such individuals from harming others by
transmitting the virus. Public policy founded on a justice perspective,
therefore, would emphasize punishing the knowing transmission of
HIV. Repeat offenders might even be quarantined.
A major problem with a public policy preoccupied with punishing
the deliberate transmission of HIV is that such a policy would probably discourage individuals at high risk for HIV from determining their
antibody status. In response, the government might impose
mandatory screening requirements, but such a step would likely be
48. The attribution of particular characteristics to the justice perspective is a risky endeavor
because there are numerous accounts of what constitutes "justice." I have chosen to focus on
equal treatment as the central characteristic of the justice perspective for purpose of comparing it
to the care perspective. Supporters of particular versions of justice might well contend that their
approach to justice demands more. A strict egalitarian like Robert Veatch, for example, argues
that society ought to provide the retarded and others who have "lost in the natural lottery"
(presumably including many of those with AIDS) with enough compensation to get them to the
point that they have an opportunity for equality of outcomes; subject to the constraint that the
compensation provided should not exceed "the point where others would be reduced to a level of

well-being equal to the one being compensated." R.

VEATCH, THE FOUNDATIONS OF JUSTICE:
WHY THE RETARDED AND THE REST OF Us HAVE CLAIMS TO EQUALITY 158-59 (1986).
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both prohibitively expensive 49 and involve unacceptably intrusive governmental regulation of private conduct for a democratic society that
has traditionally placed a high value on individual liberty.
Although critics have charged that the care perspective has no role
outside the intimate confines of family relationships, a comparison of
the care perspective and the justice perspective on AIDS reveals that
the caring approach is likely to be the more effective of the two at
stemming the spread of this deadly virus, as well as the more humane

approach for those who do contract HIV.
The inadequacies of relying on a justice perspective without atten-

tion to caring can also be seen within the medical professions. When
growing numbers of physicians, nurses, and other health care personnel began to refuse to care for AIDS patients, the deans of several
major medical schools announced that, henceforth, offenders would be

dismissed.50 Their goal might be laudable from a care perspective, but
punitive enforcement of caring policies is not the most effective way to
encourage caring - particularly when the caring burden is not shared

equitably because it falls more heavily on health care professionals
than on other individuals, and more on some areas of the country than
others. The apparent result of the punitive approach embraced by the
deans has been a decrease in applications for internships and residen-

cies at institutions in areas with a significant number of AIDS patients.5 1 Fear of contracting AIDS may also be contributing to the

49. See Cleary, Barry, Mayer, Brandt, Gostin & Fineberg, Compulsory PremaritalScreening
for the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 258 J. AM. MED. ASSN. 1757 (1987) ("[M]andatory
premarital screening in a population with a low prevalence of infection is a relatively ineffective
and inefficient use of resources.").
50. Sullivan, 13 Medical Colleges Say Staffs Must Treat AIDS, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1987, at
B2, col. 1. Physician refusal to treat is not a new phenomenon. When the bubonic plague arrived in Europe in 1347, "writer after writer lamented the avarice and cowardice of doctors in
times of plague.... Some of the doctors who did not actually leave the city locked themselves in
their houses and refused to come out." Zugar & Miles, Physicians,AIDS and Occupational Risk,
258 J. AM. MED. ASSN. 1924 (1987) (footnotes omitted). When yellow fever broke out in Philadelphia in the summer of 1793, three of the city's best known physicians fled to the countryside.
Id. at 1925.'
Some are now arguing that although physicians today have no legal obligation to begin to
treat any patient (unless they are employed in emergency departments or in public hospitals),
they have a professional obligation that grows out of their commitment to the profession of healig. See, eg., id. at 1927; Pellegrino, Altruism, Self-interest, and Medical Ethics, 258 J. AM.
MED. ASSN. 1939 (1987); cf Walters, Ethical Issues in the Prevention and Treatment of HIV
Infection and AIDS, 239 SCIENCE 597, 600 (1988):
A reasonable ethic for health care workers will not require of them heroic self-sacrifice or
works of supererogation.... On the other hand, a reasonable ethic will not allow people
who are in need of care to be refused treatment or abandoned solely because they are infectious. Such refusal and abandonment would violate the principle of beneficence.
51. Avoidance of AIDS has been cited as the reason why some of the best physician training
programs in the country failed to fill all their positions in 1987. Specter, Medical Profession
ConfrontsNew Generation'sFears of AIDS, Wash. Post, Jan. 20, 1988, at Al, col. 1. One doctor
in a Bronx hospital stated, "People will tell you it's the quality of life in New York, or the long
hours, or the facilities, but that's not it at all. It's just AIDS." Id. at A6, col. 2.
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52
continuing decline in applications to medical schools, generally.
A second problem with the justice perspective can be seen in physicians' attitudes toward patients with AIDS. Physicians have come to
expect success in their battle against disease. Paradoxically, it is the
enormous success that medicine has experienced in this century in
fighting contagious disease (through the introduction of antibiotics
and the development of vaccines to protect against such major childhood killers as whooping cough and polio) that has bred an expectation of success that approached hubris. Even for those health care
professionals ready and willing to care for AIDS patients, the absence
of a cure, or even of effective palliatives, has led many physicians to
feel they are of no use to the patients.
It is time for them to remember that for most of history, physicians
have provided more care than cure. Lewis Thomas in his autobiography documents how recently medicine developed the ability to cure
that we now take for granted.5 3 He recalls, for example, accompanying his physician father on house calls in 1918 when about the only
thing a physician could do was to diagnose. 54 But his father, and
many other dedicated physicians understood that they still provided
something of great value to patients and their families:
[W]hen I was on the faculty at Tulane Medical School and totally in-

volved in the science of medicine,

. .

. I [was] asked to come to the an-

nual meeting of a county medical society in the center of Mississippi, to
deliver on address on antibiotics ....

[M]y host was the newly elected

president of the society, a general practitioner in his forties, a successful
physician whose career was to be capped that evening, after the banquet,
by his inauguration; to be the president of the county medical society
was a major honor in that part of the world. During the dinner he was
called to the telephone and came back to the head table a few minutes
later to apologize; he had an emergency call to make. The dinner
progressed, the ceremony of his induction as president was conducted
awkwardly in his absence, I made my speech, the evening ended, and
just as people were going out the door he reappeared, looking harassed
and tired. I asked him what the call had been. It was an old woman, he
said, a patient he'd looked after for years; early that evening she had
died, that was the telephone call. He knew the family was in distress and
52. In 1974 there were more than three applications for every space in an American medical
school. Now the ratio is less than two to one. Id. at Al, col. 1.
53. L. THOMAS, THE YOUNGEST SCIENCE: NOTES OF A MEDICINE-WATCHER (1983).
54. I'm quite sure my father always hoped I would want to become a doctor, and that,
must have been part of the reason for taking me along on his visits. But the general drift of
his conversation was intended to make clear to me, early on, the aspect of medicine that
troubled him most all through his professional life; there were so many people needing help,
and so little that he could do for any of them. It was necessary for him to be available, and
to make all these calls at their homes, but I was not to have the idea that he could do
anything much to change the course of their illnesses. It was important to my father that I
understand this; it was a central feature of the profession, and a doctor should not only be
prepared for it but be even more prepared to be honest with himself about it.
Id. at 13.
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needed him, he said, so he had to go. He was sorry to have missed the
evening, he had looked forward to it all year, but some things can't be
helped, he said.
That was in the early 1950s, when 55medicine was turning into a science, but the old art was still in place.
Tens of thousands have already died of AIDS. Hundreds of thousands
more will die in the United States alone. 56 The dying need justice, but
they also need caring, both from physicians and other health care
workers, and from the community.
One possible future was chosen in Arcadia, Florida, where the
home of three boys with the AIDS virus was burned, presumably by
frightened neighbors. Another has been pioneered in Denton, Maryland, population just under 2000, where the single mother of a boy
with hemophilia learned that her son had been exposed to HIV by a
blood transfusion. After she sent him to kindergarten at Denton Elementary School, rumors began to spread. When a PTA meeting was
arranged to discuss the situation, almost five-hundred people showed
up. The county health officer explained why school officials had decided it was safe to have the boy attend school. Others suggested that
the assembled parents should think about how they would feel if the
boy were their own child. In the end, reason and calm have prevailed
57
in Denton.
AIDS, like the plagues of the past, presents an opportunity for heroism or for scapegoating. As we decide whether Arcadia or Denton
will serve as our national model, the need for caring as well as justice
is clear.

55.
56.
AIDS:
57.

Id. at 10-11.
For an estimate of world incidence see Pio, Plummer, Mhalu, Lamboray, Chin & Mann,
An InternationalPerspective, 239 SCIENCE 573 (1988).
Kastor, The Town That Wouldn't Give in to Fear,Wash. Post, Dec. 21, 1987, at B1, col.

THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST
SEGREGATED EDUCATION
Robert L. Carter*
THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950. By Mark Tushnet. Chapel Hill: University of

North Carolina Press. 1987. Pp. ix, 222. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $9.95.
It may be doing Professor Tushnet a disservice for me to review his
book since I was one of the lawyers involved in the planning and execution of the "strategy" he seeks to explore. Yet, I suppose that one in
my position should be able to appraise more closely the accuracy, if
not the merits, of such an examination.'
Much of the historical ground covered by Professor Tushnet's
study has been plowed rather thoroughly. Richard Kluger's Simple
Justice2 and Robert Rabin's Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives
on PublicInterest Law3 are prime examples. Since Kluger's study narrated many of the events that Tushnet covers, and Rabin used the
NAACP staff as a model for public interest law activity, any author
would be somewhat pressed to add much of anything new.
Professor Tushnet seems, in particular, to be constantly looking
over his shoulder at Kluger's Simple Justice in an attempt to stake out
a territory of his own. He states:
[M]y narrative has a narrower scope than [Kluger's Simple Justice] in
regard to both the period of time covered and the subject matter discussed. It is informed by a concern for the constraints placed on the
litigation strategy by organizational needs, and for the significance of the
NAACP campaign as it applies to the theory and practice of public interest law in general. It is, therefore, an interpretation as well as a narrative of events. [p. xi]
While I appreciate the extent to which one's present personal recollection of events long past is suspect, I am convinced that in this
instance the written record does not provide a full picture of the events
* Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
1. I am somewhat troubled by one thing which I did not recall and do not now recall even
after learning from a reference in the book that it occurred. P. 191, n.12. Professor Tushnet
interviewed me in 1980 in the course of preparing this treatise. I have no recollection of it or
him, and as far as I can tell, he uses the interview only to support the written record of my firm
commitment to a direct attack on school segregation. It seems evident, therefore, that the interview did not influence the writing of the book or its review.
2. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975).
3. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV.
207 (1970).

1083

1084

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 86:1083

and decisions forming the legal strategy about which Tushnet writes. 4
Tushnet sometimes reaches conclusions that are at odds with what I

believe took place. This is most notably true in his reliance, for example, on letters exchanged among Thurgood Marshall, William Hastie
and others, in apparent support of Tushnet's conclusion5 as to how
and why "strategy" was affected or modified. Unfortunately, there is

no record of oral staff discussions, debates, or determinations. While
Marshall solicited advice and comments from a great many people, I

know of no decision on legal strategy in the school cases, or indeed in
any other area, that he made during my tenure (and I was on the staff
from the mid-forties through the period covered here) that was at odds

with the staff's view. Even when his chief outside advisors (Hastie,
Robert Ming, and William Coleman) favored a course opposed by his
staff, Marshall allowed his staff's view to prevail.
Professor Tushnet's narrative traces the NAACP's program to

outlaw segregation in education from its origin pursuant to a 1930
grant from the American Fund for Public Service, founded by Charles
Garland ("The Garland Fund"), to the institution of the school-segregation litigation in Kansas and South Carolina in 1950. The Garland

Fund pledged $100,000 to 'the NAACP. Only about $20,000 of that
grant was actually disbursed. Nonetheless, upon obtaining the money

in 1930, the NAACP was able to hire Nathan Margold, a prominent
New York lawyer, for a three-month period. Margold's contribution
was the submission of a proposed plan of attack on "segregation irremediably coupled with discrimination" in the public schools (p. 27).
Margold, did not remain involved long enough, however, to do anything other than devise the proposal. The NAACP lacked funds to
pay him beyond the three-month period.

Thereafter, Charles Houston became the NAACP's chief counsel.
Houston put Margold's plan into operation, but not at the public
school level. Rather, Houston's strategy was to have qualified blacks
4. For his historical data, Professor Tushnet seems to rely almost wholly on the written
record - documents (correspondence, memoranda) in the files of the NAACP and Legal Defense Fund now in the Library of Congress. When the manuscript was being written, Tushnet
notes, many of the documents of the Legal Defense Fund were inaccessible. They had not been
sorted and were stored in boxes piled from floor to ceiling without any labelling. I do not know
whether a review of these documents would have added anything to his narrative or conclusions.
The documents he was able to study were those available to Kluger, and additional material
donated to the Library of Congress subsequent to Kluger's study.
5. Pp. 105-37. Tushnet gives the impression that the sudden constraints of trial preparation
in the Sweatt case, Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) affected the NAACP's strategy. Pp.
126-29. I do not believe that observation is correct. The all-out-attack position had been articulated in the Mendez case, Westminster School Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1947).
The national staff had been at work in researching historical materials, legal and otherwise, supporting the invalidity of enforced segregation. Moreover, the sociological approach had been
decided upon and we were waiting for a case that would enable us to make a record of our
sociological thesis. The Sweatt trial provided that opportunity. Thus, all we needed when Sweatt
was being readied for trial was to secure the necessary expert witnesses.

May 1988]

NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregation

1085

apply for graduate and professional training in the states where blacks
were barred from existing state graduate and professional institutions
and in which no "separate but equal" facility for blacks had been established. 6 Houston's aim was to undermine segregation by forcing
states that practiced segregation to establish graduate and professional
schools for blacks, with the expectation that the economic costs would
be such that state authorities would themselves decide to desegregate
the existing facilities. Thurgood Marshall followed Houston as the organization's chief counsel, and under his stewardship the program
culminated in the United States Supreme Court's historic decision in
Brown v. Board of Education.7 While Margold focused on the public
schools, Houston on the full equalization of facilities at the graduate
school level, and Marshall on the desegregation of law schools, graduate schools and finally public schools, the ultimate goal of all three was
to have the enforced separation of black and white students in public
institutions declared unconstitutional. Viewed in this light, the
NAACP's legal strategy to outlaw segregated education followed a cohesive, unitary course from Margold to Marshall.
Professor Tushnet has done a service, I believe, in illuminating the
politics surrounding the Garland Fund grant to the NAACP. That
grant could be said to mark the genesis of the NAACP's paid national
legal staff. Controversy raged between Roger Baldwin, subsequently
the long-time director of the American Civil Liberties Union, and
Walter White, Executive Director of the NAACP, over the use of the
Garland Fund grant. Tushnet cites W.E.B. DuBois' disapproval of
the NAACP's proposed use of the grant to attack segregated education. He points out that DuBois at the time believed that discrimination in education, rather than segregation, should be fought.8 The
author proceeds to address the Margold proposal and Houston's and
Marshall's subsequent activities. The general outline of all of these
6. See, ag., Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Bluford v. Canada, 32 F.
Supp. 707 (W.D. Mo. 1940). Charles Houston left the NAACP staff in 1940, and never had any
official connection with it during my tenure, which began in 1945.
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), affd. on rehearing,349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II).
8. However, I believe that Tushnet, at pages 8-10, provides a misleading impression of DuBois' views. One would conclude from the quoted material and discussion that DuBois favored a
legal strategy seeking equal educational facilities only, leaving Plessy v. Ferguson'sseparate-butequal doctrine undisturbed. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). My own understanding is that his views were more complex. Despite the quotes from DuBois' editorial in the January 1934 issue of the Crisis (pp. 8-9), DuBois' primary point was that blacks needed "neither
segregated schools nor mixed schools. What [blacks need] is Education." DuBois, Does the
Negro Need Separate Schools, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328, 335 (1935) reprintedin 2 THE SEVENTH
SON, THE THOUGHTS AND WRITINGS OF W.E.B. DuBois 408 (J. Lester ed. 1971). DuBois'
eventual break with the NAACP came about because he felt the organization's basic emphasis
was solely on integration. His belief was that the goal should be equal education however it
could be achieved - without segregation, if possible, but if not, with segregation as long as the
black child was educated.
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events is known; the details that Tushnet describes, however, are much
less familiar and are of considerable interest.
The interpretive prong of Professor Tushnet's thesis - less successful than the narrative one - attempts to show that the NAACP's
legal strategy for desegregation was ad hoc, pragmatic, and subject to
shifts and modifications influenced by organizational needs. I am not
persuaded by this thesis, principally for two reasons. The first is that
Professor Tushnet couples the university and public school cases,
which sought to undermine the constitutionality of segregation in education, with litigation that sought to secure equal pay for black teachers. He therefore treats these two independent litigation programs as
if they were one. The second source of my dissatisfaction is Professor
Tushnet's failure to account for or to understand the reasons that led
the NAACP's national legal staff not simply to advocate "separate but
equal" facilities, but to press relentlessly for a direct attack on Plessy v.
Ferguson.9
Tushnet's emphasis on the teachers'-salary litigation and the initial
failure of litigation in North Carolina and Tennessee to redress university segregation does not make his intended point.' 0 The teachers'salary litigation and the university and school cases were a breed
apart. The litigation to equalize the pay of black teachers was not an
attack on segregation in education. Nor was it an effort to integrate
teaching staffs. It simply sought to upgrade the pay scale of black
teachers to that of white teachers. The only justification I can discern
for lumping the school segregation and teacher-pay litigation together
is that the teachers'-salary cases advance the book's thesis that the
NAACP's legal strategy was subject to mutation as demanded by organizational requisites.
In the teachers'-salary litigation, the named teacher-plaintiff was
exposed and vulnerable. No such vulnerability was present for the
university-plaintiff. Admittedly, she or he might have faced mob attack upon seeking to enter school after a victory in court. This was
the case at the Universities of Georgia 1 and Alabama. 12 But a student's economic base was not threatened. Moreover, the teacherplaintiff did not necessarily come to the NAACP through its local
units. At the time, there were black teacher organizations in each
state. Their members had a paramount interest in the issue of equal
9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
10. See pp. 52-55. Despite the decision in Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 A. 590
(1936), the separate-but-equal doctrine was still firmly entrenched. No court insisted on equal
facilities as requisite to enforcement of the doctrine until 1938, when the Supreme Court decided
Missouri ex reL Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337. Therefore, I am not certain that the result
would have made a difference even absent the deficiencies the author points out.
11. See, eg., Holmes v. Danner, 191 F. Supp. 394 (M.D. Ga. 1961).
12. See, e.g., Lucy v. Adams, 350 U.S. 1 (1955), affg. per curiam, 134 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. La.

1955).
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pay. Usually, such organizations found a teacher willing to take the
risk of becoming a plaintiff. The organization would agree to insure
the teacher a year's salary if fired. Then, the teachers' group would

ask the NAACP to take on the litigation. After 1945, with the one
exception cited below, none of these cases was handled by the national
13
legal staff.

When I came to the NAACP after the war, the focus had already
shifted to securing the admission of blacks to law schools and graduate

schools in the South. Teachers'-salary litigation as an NAACP enterprise was then winding down. Litigation had been instituted in most
states; the NAACP, at the request of the teachers, had sponsored suits
in states where none had been filed. Constance Motley and I tried one
such case in Jackson, Mississippi, for example, the only such case
either of us ever handled, as I recall. It was, I am certain, the last such

case sponsored by the national legal staff. During my tenure we were

primarily engaged in attacking segregation in housing, 14 transporta-

tion, 15 and education.'

6

The key point that must be grasped concerning the relationship

between organizational needs and legal strategy is not, as Professor
Tushnet would have it, that NAACP litigators and local branches
conformed their approach to the short-term desires of black Southern
communities in order to increase the Association's organizational base
among that constituency. Rather, the organization's staff took the

lead in setting an agenda at the local level. If organizational needs
13. See, ag., Bates v. Batte, 187 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1951) (handled by national staff); Cook v.
Davis, 178 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1950) (handled by A.T. Walden of Atlanta, Georgia, and Oliver
W. Hill of Richmond, Virginia); Reynolds v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 148 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.
1945) (handled by Florida counsel); Carter v. School Bd., 87 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Va. 1949)
(handled by Hill, Martin & Robinson of Richmond, Virginia); Butler v. Wilemon, 86 F. Supp.
397 (N.D. Tex. 1949) (handled by Dallas counsel); Pitts v. Board of Trustees, 84 F. Supp. 975
(E.D. Ark. 1949) (handled by Arkansas counsel); Freeman v. County School Bd., 82 F. Supp.
167 (E.D. Va. 1948) (handled by Hill, Martin & Robinson); Whitmyer v. Lillian Parish School
Bd., 75 F. Supp. 686 (W.D. La. 1948) (handled by A.P. Tureaud and Louis Berry of New Orleans and Thurgood Marshall of New York City).
14. See, ag., Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (restrictive covenant); Birmingham v.
Monk, 185 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1951); Detroit Hous. Commn. v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir.
1955); Heywood v. Public Hous. Admin., 135 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Ga. 1955); Johnson v. Levitt &
Sons, 131 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1955); Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87
N.E.2d 541 (1949); Northwest Civic Assn. v. Sheldon, 217 Mich. 416, 27 N.W.2d 36 (1947)
(restrictive covenant).
15. See, eg., Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946); Westside v. Southern Bus Lines, 177
F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1949); Flemming v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir.
1955), revd. on rehg., 239 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1956), appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 901 (1956).
16. See, eg., Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948), petitionfor writ of mandamus
denied sub nom. Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147 (1948); see also, e.g., McKissick v. Carmichael,
187 F.2d 949 (4th Cir. 1951); Gray v. Board of Trustees, 97 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Tenn. 1951),
affd., 100 F. Supp. 113 (E.D. Tenn. 1951), vacated and dismissed as moot, 342 U.S. 517 (1952).
Compare Westminster School Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947), where the
NAACP's amicus brief was the forerunner of its brief in Brown v. Board of Education arguing
that segregation per se violated due process and equal protection guarantees.
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dictated legal strategy, that was because the legal strategy was ab initio
the product of institutional necessities. After all, the organizational
purpose of the NAACP was to secure equal citizenship rights for
blacks, and among those rights was the right to equal educational opportunity. That litigation thus fulfilled one of the organization's most
basic functions.
Thus, the education cases, at both the university and grade school
levels were the products of local NAACP efforts to implement national policy. Local branches stimulated opposition to school segregation and encouraged their members to challenge segregation in
schools, housing, and transportation in accord with national NAACP
policy. Such local efforts encouraged members of the branches, or the
friends or acquaintances of members, to come forward as plaintiffs to
prosecute the litigation. It is true that economic pressure was placed
on the parents of children involved in South Carolina and Virginia
school desegregation cases in an attempt to derail the litigation. However, in those cases, so many plaintiffs were enlisted that opponents
were never able to frighten off all of them in any case.
The NAACP certainly sought followers, money, and influence, but
the hope was that success in the courts would bring them to bear.
That Professor Tushnet has inverted the true relationship between national strategy and local organizational needs is best illustrated by the
decision in 1950 to pursue a "direct attack" on school segregation, the
strategy that culminated in Brown v. Board of Education. I believe
that the Association could have held back on its all-out attack on segregation without adverse organizational effect. While the national
staff was committed to an attack on segregation per se, there was no
compelling demand from the local units that such an attack be
launched. Local units would have been satisfied at the time if the organization had opted for litigation merely to upgrade the black
schools. Indeed, black teachers and principals were very wary about
an attack on segregation, and with good reason. Our success cost a
number of them their jobs, 17 even if they benefited in the long run.
Tushnet gives considerable attention to Carter Wesley's18 dispute
with Marshall over the merits of a direct challenge to segregation as
opposed to an effort to obtain equal school facilities. The black community was divided on the issue. Some felt very strongly that a direct
17. See, e.g., Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968); Wall v. Stanley
County Bd. of Educ., 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967); Smith v. Board of Educ., 365 F.2d 770 (8th
Cir. 1966); Chambers v. Hendersonville Bd. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966); see also N.
DORSEN, P. BENDER, B. NEUBORNE & S. LAW, 2 EMERSON, HABER & DORSEN'S POLITICAL

AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 754 (4th ed. 1979) (reporting that HEW data from
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas showed that the number of black
teachers declined by 5% between 1968 and 1970, and the ratio of black to white teachers dedined by 69% during the same period).
18. Wesley was editor of an influential black newspaper published in Houston and was one of
the most influential men in the Texas black community. See pp. 107-09.
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attack on segregation would be irresponsible because of the possibility
of failure, while others were convinced that such an attack was the
only prudent course. I believe that the majority sentiment in the black
community was a desire to secure for blacks all of the educational
nurturing available to whites. If ending school segregation was the
way to that objective, fine; if, on the other hand, securing equal facilities was the way, that too was fine.
Far from being preordained by organizational considerations, the
direct-attack strategy actually cost the Association, for a time, the
services of some of our best-trained lawyers in the South. These lawyers refused to continue working with us when we determined that no
more equal facilities cases would be brought under NAACP auspices.1 9 Indeed, as late as the announcement by the Supreme Court
that it would hear argument in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Rights20
2 1 opposition to the NAACP's strategy of an alland Sweatt v. Painter,
out attack on segregation was so strong that Thurgood Marshall felt
the need to hold a conference at Howard University in Washington,
D.C., to afford advocates of the strategy an opportunity to make their
case and counter the opposing sentiment. Interestingly enough,
W.E.B. DuBois' presentation at the conference was among the most
influential in gaining support for the all-out attack. (His presence
lends support to my challenge of Tushnet's interpretation of DuBois'
views.)2 2 While he did not address himself to the merits of the controversy, DuBois spoke eloquently about the economic exploitation and
degradation of blacks and advised the audience that blacks had to become knowledgeable about the ways and means of such exploitation in
order to free themselves from bondage. He certainly understood the
purpose of the conference, and his participation in it indicated to the
conferees and the public his support for a direct attack on segregation.
It is true that in all but the last of its briefs filed in the United
States Supreme Court in the cases grouped together as Brown v. Board
of Education, the NAACP straddled the issue - arguing that segregation was, itself, invalid and arguing as well that the state had failed to
provide equal facilities. Nonetheless, the NAACP's public posture
from 1950 onward was that an all-out attack on segregation was being
waged. The equal-facilities arguments were retained only out of the
lawyers' sense of caution, not because of any need to appease local
organizational sentiment. On the contrary, my perception is that the
19. Lewis Hill and Martin Martin of the Hill, Martin, Robinson firm in Richmond refused to
abide by the NAACP policy adopted by the Board in 1950, providing that the organization
would thereafter handle cases attacking segregation per se. After about a year or two, however,
those and other lawyers resumed their cooperation with the NAACP.
20. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
21. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
22. See note 8 supra
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national office took a stand against any form of segregation and led its
local constituency to accept that view.
When the NAACP made its commitment in 1930 to an attack on
segregation in education, Charles Houston stood alone as its legal
staff. Later he was assisted and then succeeded by Thurgood Marshall. Marshall began to build a paid legal staff during World War II.
He hired Milton Konvitz23 and Edward Dudley24 as full-time assistants in the early 1940s. Konvitz left in mid-1940 and I joined the staff.
25
By 1950, the staff had grown to about ten lawyers.
Houston and Marshall were extraordinary men - brilliant lawyers, charismatic, and politically astute. They had help from the
Howard University Law Faculty, principally William Hastie and Leon
Ransom, also extraordinary men. Indeed, while Hastie and Marshall
are generally acknowledged as being among the best legal minds of
their generation, until recently only insiders recognized the brilliance
of Houston and Ransom. Despite such formidable talent on the national level, there was no cadre of reliable local talent to turn to in the
South. Therefore, the litigation effort was, of necessity, severely circumscribed. Moreover, Hastie and Ransom had other full-time employment and could devote only part of their time to NAACP causes.
This situation did not begin to change until early 1940, as a national staff began to form. However, finding competent local counsel
remained a problem. Except for cases brought in Virginia (which were
handled by the firm of Hill, Martin & Robinson) and Delaware (where
Lewis Redding supervised the cases locally), local counsel required
close supervision from New York until late in my tenure on the staff.
In short, the NAACP's commitment to a direct attack on segregated
education did not get off the ground until 1945 or 1946, when, as I
have indicated, the equal-pay teacher cases were no longer part of the
national staff's agenda.
The book's theoretical agenda is grander than suggested by the
foregoing discussion, however, for in his conclusion, Professor
Tushnet offers some general speculations on the practice of public-in23. Konvitz, subsequent to leaving the NAACP, taught at the Cornell School for Industrial
and Labor Relations and the Cornell Law School.
24. Edward Dudley left the staff to serve as Ambassador to Liberia during President Truman's administration. Thereafter, he returned to the staff for a brief period, was appointed to
New York City Family Court, became President of the Borough of Manhattan, and was subsequently elected to the New York State Supreme Court.
25. Among those on the staff were Constance Baker Motley, who became President of the
Borough of Manhattan, and subsequently Chief Judge of the Southern District of New York
until taking senior status in 1987; Franklin H. Williams, who subsequently was assistant to the
first director of the Peace Corps, United States Ambassador to the United Nations, then to
Ghana, and is now president of the Phelps Stokes Fund; Jack Greenberg, who became Director
of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund after Marshall and is now teaching at Columbia Law
School; and Marian Wyn Perry, who later married and became a housewife. Other lawyers were
also hired, all after 1950.

May 1988]

NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregation

1091

terest law. Since I discerned no deeper unity in his conclusions than
that of a series of unlinked observations, I will limit myself to addressing the particular ones with which I take issue.
Professor Tushnet seems to believe that if the NAACP had lowered its sights and pressed for equal facilities, whites might have been
more sympathetic and success more likely. But what is there in our
experience to validate that supposition? While residential patterns of
segregation and the neighborhood-school policy have produced more
segregated schools today than existed before Brown, little effort at
equalization seems to have been made. So vast is the economic cost of
equalization that there is no public will to expend such money, particularly when the funds are viewed as benefiting chiefly blacks, Hispanics and poor children. Thus far, efforts to equalize facilities or to
provide equal education have been meager throughout the country.
The assumption appears to have been that less rigorous educational
training is needed in the schools that are predominantly black. The
belief that an equal-facilities strategy would have produced greater rewards for black children in the upper South by 1970 is myth. I can
understand the impulse to retreat to fantasy when one faces the studied indifference of the white majority to the educational neglect of
black children and a callousness which justifies that neglect with the
racist notion that black children are uneducable. Still, residential segregation in the urban North produces segregated and unequal schools
as relentlessly as did the dual-school system in the South. The Public
Education Association conducted a study of New York City schools in
1955 and found the predominantly black schools unequal to the
predominantly white schools in the three R's, as measured by standardized achievement tests. A follow-up
study in 1965 found no im26
provement over the ten-year interval.
Perhaps an even firmer rejection of Tushnet's conjecture results
from a reading of Hobson v. Hansen.27 Judge Skelly Wright's opinion
in that case is a thorough expos6 of the methodology utilized in urban
school districts to maintain white school enclosures, to restrict highquality educational offerings to those schools, and deliberately to insure low-quality educational offerings in predominantly black schools.
In Hobson, a neighborhood school policy insured racial segregation
26. The Public Education Association assisted by the New York University Research Center
for Human Relations prepared two reports in 1955: The Status of the Public School Educationof
Negro and PuertoRican Childrenin New York City and Quality of Education Offered to Majority
and Minority (Negro, Puerto Rican) Children in New York City's Public Schools. The latter
study, at pages 35-37, showed that based on the results of standardized achievement tests,
schools which were predominantly black and Puerto Rican were behind predominantly white
schools by a half year in reading and arithmetic at the third grade level, one and one-third years
behind at the sixth grade level, and two years behind at the eighth grade level.
27. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), cert. dismissed, 308 U.S. 801 (1968), affd. sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc). There were many other decisions
published in this case, but the one cited is for our purposes of primary interest.
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in the system, but various options enabled white children to avoid attending their neighborhood schools if they were predominantly black.
Moreover, the students were educated on a track system which had
the effect of resegregating the races within individual schools based on

ability groupings. There were four tracks -

a track for gifted stu-

dents, a college preparatory track, a general track for those who did

not plan to go to college, and a basic track for slow learners and the
academically retarded. Judge Wright found a socioeconomic correla-

tion between the percentage of children in a given track and the income level of the neighborhood served. The higher the median

income, the greater the percentage of children in the high tracks. The
percentage of blacks enrolled in the "basic track" exceeded their proportionate representation in the student body. Moreover, Judge

Wright found that at every level of comparison - in terms of physical
adequacy, quality of the faculty, textbooks, supplies, curricula and
special programs - the predominantly black schools were
shortchanged.
At another point Tushnet notes that equalization would not have
been compatible with the ideal of equality embodied in Brown, but

claims that "there was no relatively fixed ideal of equality with which
racial discrimination was incompatible" (p. 160). He describes as arbitrary the Supreme Court's rejection of out-of-state scholarships for
blacks in compliance with the states' requirement to provide equality
for blacks.2 8 Unless one is prepared to perpetuate an abstraction on
the order of Plessy v. Ferguson, equality in a Constitutional sense can

only have a meaning that effectuates equality in real life.
28. See pp. 160-61, citing Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). The
Gaines Court stated:
Manifestly, the obligation of the State to give the protection of equal laws can be performed
only where its laws operate, that is, within its own jurisdiction. It is there that the equality
of legal right must be maintained. That obligation is imposed by the Constitution upon the
States severally as governmental entities - each responsible for its own laws establishing the
rights and duties of persons within its borders. It is an obligation the burden of which
cannot be cast by one State upon another, and no State can be excused from performance by
what another State may do or fail to do. That separate responsibility of each State within its
own sphere is of the essence of statehood maintained under our dual system. It seems to be
implicit in respondents' argument that if other States did not provide courses for legal education, it would nevertheless be the constitutional duty of Missouri when it supplied such
courses for white students to make equivalent provision for negroes [sic]. But the plain duty
would exist because it rested upon the State independently of the action of other States. We
find it impossible to conclude that what otherwise would be an unconstitutional discrimination, with respect to the legal right to the enjoyment of opportunities within the State, can be
justified by requiring resort to opportunities elsewhere. That resort may mitigate the inconvenience of the discrimination but cannot serve to validate it.
305 U.S. at 350. The above is a reasoned argument, clearly setting out the basis for the Court's
holding that out-of-state scholarships do not satisfy the states' obligation to provide equal treatment for blacks. The dissent does not make a reasoned argument to the contrary. Justice McReynolds merely makes a conclusory statement that the problem "obviously is a difficult and
highly practical one. A fair effort to solve it has been made by offering adequate opportunity for
study when sought in good faith. The State should not be unduly hampered through the theorization inadequately restrained by experience." 305 U.S. at 354 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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A state builds a university with tax funds to which blacks contribute, yet Tushnet implies that barring blacks from their home-state university and giving them scholarships to secure their education
elsewhere need not be in absolute conflict with equality. For the Court
to hold that a state could not condition its own constitutional obligations on what another state might do - in this instance, erect no barriers to admissions of blacks to institutions of higher learning within
its borders - seems entirely principled. The text from Chief Justice
Hughes' opinion in Gaines29 provides powerful justification in support
of the thesis that "out of state scholarships" were constitutionally insufficient. "Arbitrariness" more aptly describes Tushnet's unusual notion that out-of-state scholarships could fulfill the state's obligation to
provide equal treatment for its black citizenry.
He chides the Court for its emphasis in Sweatt and McLaurin on
the intangibles rather than on the finite facilities in determining educational equality. 30 But what makes a university great are undoubtedly
the intangibles - its reputation, the success and power of its alumni,
the prestige of its faculty, and the public perception of its institutional
quality. To be sure, material endowments may, over time, upgrade an
institution to the highest rank. In the process, however, the intangibles are upgraded as well. Professor Tushnet, in suggesting that
intangibles might be disregarded as part of the equation which defines
educational equality, is again giving equality an abstract, sterile and
enfeebled connotation.
In the final analysis, what I find most troubling about the treatise is
Tushnet's argument that such a sterile and abstract approach to equal
educational opportunity by the Court in 1954 could have satisfied
fourteenth amendment guarantees (pp. 160-61) admittedly designed,
at a minimum, to bar state-ordered discrimination. The Court, on the
other hand, rightfully sought to give the clause a twentieth-century
dimension with pragmatic effect.
Tushnet also speculates that the attack on segregation undermined
some of the institutions within the black community (pp. 164-65), but
he gives no examples of this. I do not know of any viable black community institution that Brown leveled. Perhaps the black teacher organizations constitute the exception. Some black public and private
colleges are indeed under severe stress today, but that stress results
29. See note 28 supra.
30. P. 161. Tushnet states that "accepting the NAACP's sociological argument was an innovation," and that the sociological evidence was used to challenge legislative policy as being inconsistent with "a higher norm of equality." P. 161. I do not understand what that means. He says
this argument could have been resisted and the intangibles stressed in Sweatt and McLaurin
could have been seen as the result of economies of scale in education. It is true that economies of
scale could have led to a determination that the low level of demand at the university level was
the basis for the gap in intangibles. But at the grade school level where compulsory schooling is
enforced, that argument would not work. Indeed, if the basis is economies of scale, racially
separate schooling would be doomed. The cost would outweigh the benefit.
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from a lack of financial support. We do not know whether the strictures which some of the black institutions now suffer would have occurred in any event. The 1964 Civil Rights Act did much to enlarge a
black middle class that had heretofore been virtually static. This
greatly enlarged group would have sought to secure admission to colleges and universities with national prestige in the North and West
even if Brown had not been decided. Moreover, affirmative action requirements imposed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act probably did
more to spur white universities to seek more black applicants than did
the Brown decision.
Tushnet seems to believe that some of the new NAACP staff members, having lived in New York before joining the staff, "enthusiastically favored the direct attack" on segregation and may not have fully
appreciated the difficulty the litigation might cause for blacks in the
South (p. 111). There is no basis for that conjecture. The potentially
dire implications for participants in the South Carolina and Virginia
cases were carefully explained to them by national staff lawyers.
Before these cases were filed, the challenge to segregation had intensified in all areas - at the university level, in interstate and intrastate
commerce, and even in regard to recreational facilities. White resistance was also intensifying. The cases were filed at a time when economic pressure was being exerted on blacks to curb their new
militancy. In that climate, it was necessary for national staff lawyers
to meet with the parents of all putative plaintiffs before the complaint
was filed in South Carolina or Virginia to point out the risks being
taken in joining a lawsuit as threatening as one challenging segregation
and to afford them the opportunity to give the matter careful, further
consideration before making a final commitment to join in the litigation. That so few stepped back still astounds me. Undoubtedly, they
felt that the only hope for their children lay in putting themselves at
economic risk.
I believe the treatise is largely accurate in its narrative of the events
that constituted the organization's legal activity in the university and
school cases, the origin of the program and its early developments. It
is also a serious effort to provide a full and fair presentation of the
surrounding events. However, Tushnet's interpretation gives a narrow
and constricted reading of the import and meaning to blacks and to
the country of the long struggle he discusses. Blacks clearly would
have been in no worse position today, in terms of educational benefits
in the public school arena, if we had concentrated on an equal facilities
goal. This is so because Brown, seen solely as a school case, must be
considered a failure. What makes Brown historic, however, is its fallout effect. It transformed and radicalized race relations in this country, removing blacks from the status of supplicants to full citizenship
under law, with entitlement by law to all the rights and privileges of all
other citizens. Equal citizenship is not yet a reality, but blacks can
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now contend that the reality is contrary to the law. 3 1 This is a powerful argument - a potent force that an equal facilities victory could not
have produced.
What for me is the most basic defect in Professor Tushnet's thesis
is his fundamental misunderstanding of the NAACP strategy. True,
the strategy was to attack segregation in education, but the real agenda
was the removal of the basic barrier to full and equal citizenship rights
for blacks in this country. With segregation eliminated, blacks, it was
thought, would have an unrestricted opportunity to function in
America on equal terms with whites. We now know, of course, that
the NAACP lawyers erred. The lawyers did not understand then how
effective white power could be in preventing full implementation of the
law; nor did they realize at the time that the basic barrier to full equality for blacks was not racial segregation, a symptom, but white
supremacy, the disease. Although any thoughtful person might
readily see that fact now, it took the removal of constitutional support
for racial segregation to make clear that black subordination is a national, not a regional, problem. At any rate, NAACP aims, misconceived though they may have been, were far grander than Professor
Tushnet's discussion implies.

31. The same point was made in this publication about 20 years ago. See Carter, The Warren
Court and Desegregation, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 237 (1968).

LAW, SCIENCE, AND HISTORY:
REFLECTIONS UPON IN THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
Peggy C. Davis*
IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD. By Joseph Goldstein, Anna
Freud, Albert J. Solnit, and Sonja Goldstein. New York: The Free
Press. 1986. Pp. xix, 236. Cloth, $15.95; paper, $8.95.

"GoldsteinFreudandSolnit" is a common term in the parlance of
lawyers concerned with child custody and parental rights. It evokes a
familiar set of beliefs about child development and child placement
decisionmaking. The term is regularly intoned in family proceedings
as authority for the view that assuring continuity of care should be the
virtually exclusive criterion for child placement determinations. It is
invoked to urge a process of identifying the adult with whom a child is
primarily bonded - the child's "psychological parent" - and protecting the permanence and autonomy of the psychological parentchild relationship.1
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit have promoted these beliefs in concise, accessible volumes addressed to legal, child welfare, and mental
health professionals. 2 In the legal context, the authors' goal has been
"to provide a basis for critically evaluating and revising [consistently
with their beliefs about psychological parenthood] the procedure and
substance of court decisions, as well as statutes."' 3 In this, they have
had notable success. The theories and recommendations of these
scholars have stimulated a significant, albeit incomplete, restructuring
of statutes and common law governing child placement decisionmaking.4 The effect of psychological parent theory upon legislative
* Professor of Law, New York University Law School. B.A. 1964, Western College for
Women; J.D. 1968, Harvard Law School. - Ed. Support for the preparation of this review and
for research concerning the Civil War Amendments was provided by the Filomen d'Agostine and
Max E. Greenberg Research Fund of New York University School of Law.
1. It is also invoked - rightly, but too infrequently - to urge haste in determining child
placement issues. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLN1T, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD 40-49 (1979) [hereinafter BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS].
2. See BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supranote 1; J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT,
BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979). Sonja Goldstein was not an author of the

earlier works.
3. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 1, at 5.
4. See Davis, "There Is A Book Out.. . '" An Analysis of JudicialAbsorption of Legislative
Facts, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1539 (1987) [hereinafter Davis]; Taub, Assessing the Impact of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's Proposals: An Introductory Overview, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 485 (1983-84).
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schemes has been complex and interesting.5 Its effect upon judicial6
applications and elaborations of law has been more controversial.
Like other conspicuous demonstrations of the power of a scientific theory to influence the law, the impact of psychological parent theory
upon judicial decision making has led - predictably and appropriately - to concern about the processes by which outcomes are determined and changes in law are effected.
Professors Goldstein and Solnit are distinguished legal scholars,
and their view that judge-made law must change in response to psychological parent theory is expressed with an uncommon sophistication about legal process. That sophistication has been enriched by
their frequent participation in child placement litigation. However,
the earlier books of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit were not critiques of
legal process, but works of advocacy. In the course of advocating law
reform, these authors were mindful, but not critical, of the processes
by which scientific theory affects legal decisionmaking. They displayed the legal technician's proficiency at marshalling and characterizing precedent to facilitate a desired result, and spoke eloquently of
the process:
There is in law, as psychoanalysis teaches that there is in man, a rich
residue which each generation preserves from the past, modifies for the
now, and in turn leaves for the future. Law is, after all, a continuous
process for meeting society's need for stability by providing authority
and precedent and, at the same time, meeting its need for flexibility and
change by providing for each authority a counterauthority and for each
precedent a counterprecedent. The living law thus seeks to secure an
7
environment conducive to society's healthy growth and development.
They also argued that, regardless of the availability of controlling
"counterprecedent," judges are justified in providing for "the now" by
modifying rules of law "[o]n the basis of knowledge extrapolated from
[the social sciences]." 8
In the Best Interests of the Child addresses more carefully the
processes by which judges, in collaboration with lawyers and social
scientists, apply and alter law. Its prescription for assuring just and
accurate results in those collaborations is a scrupulous attention to
interdisciplinary boundaries (pp. 120-21). The central message of the
book is that professionals involved in child welfare matters must be
disciplined to work within the limitations of their respective fields.
The book concludes with two appendices: Stephen Gould's scath5. See Davis, supra note 4, at 1569-79; Taub, supranote 4; Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 423, 449-53 (1983).
6. See Davis, supra note 4, at 1593-98.
7. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 1, at 80-81.

8. Id. at 94.
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ing critique of Buck v. Bell,9 and a poignant passage from The Autobiography of Malcolm X. 10 The Gould critique describes a collaboration
between law and social science in which early (and now discredited)
teachings of eugenics informed a Supreme Court decision to deny constitutional protection of a fundamental right of family - the right to
procreate. The Malcolm X passage describes a collaboration between
law and social science in which child welfare and mental health experts informed a lower court decision to sever the legal bonds that
preserved a troubled, but arguably viable, family unit, institutionalize
the mother, and place the children in various foster and adoptive
homes. The appendices receive little attention in the text. These powerful and powerfully told stories are simply offered; their implications
for lawyers and scientists working across disciplinary boundaries are
not probed. Yet, by their independent force, they enrich our understanding of the dimensions of difficulty involved in integrating law and
science without sacrificing justice or oversimplifying notions of
accuracy.
This review essay consists of two parts. Part I examines the
boundary adherence techniques advocated in In the Best Interests of
the Child and discusses their potential as controls against inappropriate judicial incorporation or rejection of scientific knowledge. It argues that when science becomes relevant to lawyering or to judging, it
is wise, but insufficient, to leave the law to the legal professionals and
the science to the scientists. The difficulties of assuring just and accurate results in these interactions require that professionals find objective measures of the reliability and impartiality of scientific judgments
and screen out those judgments that fail to meet the measure.
Part II takes the appendices as a focal point for examining a second dimension of difficulty in law-science interactions. The appendices demonstrate that deference to the teachings of social science can
lead courts to compromise deeply valued rights of family autonomy.
Part II argues that lawyering and judging at the borders of law and
science require recognition of this possibility. It is not sufficient that
scientific judgments be professionally made and screened for accuracy. The shaping and application of law in response to scientific
truths are complex, multidisciplinary processes that require circumspection: for accuracy is elusive, truths are neither timeless nor absolute, and claims of science may be in tension with compelling,
historically based claims of political and legal theory. The excerpt
from The Autobiography of Malcolm X describes the destruction of
9. P. 127, appendix 1 (reprinting Gould, CarrieBuck's Daughter,93 NATuRAL HISTORY 14
(July 1984)) (examining the lives affected by Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)).
10. P. 142, appendix 2 (reprinting MALCOLM X & A. HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
MALCOLM X 12-21 (1965)).

May 1988]

Best Interests of the Child

1099

Malcolm X's family as "modem day slavery." 1 1 The analogy is surprisingly rich. The fourteenth amendment was conceived by people
who regarded slavery's denial of family rights as a uniquely deplorable
usurpation of fundamental human entitlements. Rights of family were
explicitly included among the rights that the fourteenth amendment
was designed to safeguard. Part II draws upon the slavery analogy to
offer a previously unrecognized constitutional basis for cautious judiof scientifically supported infringements upon rights of
cial scrutiny
family. 12

I.

LAW, SCIENCE, AND THE LESSON OF BOUNDARY ADHERENCE

At one level, the maxim, "Thou shalt not lightly cross professional
boundaries," has self-evident merit. Few lawyers and judges are professionally trained in the sciences. With respect to a child welfare issue, humility vis-A-vis the child development specialist is appropriate.
Few scientists are professionally trained in the law. With respect to
questions of law, humility vis-4-vis the legal specialist is appropriate.
The authors enrich this maxim by adding a valuable corollary.
When law and science professionals collaborate to resolve a controversy, it is important that they expose particular sorts of professional
premises that might be relied upon in fashioning a resolution (pp. 5859, 74). This technique of explicating premises is applied differently
with respect to legal and scientific disciplines.
Scientific experts are encouraged to communicate scientific conclusions fully, and to report any reliance upon lay understandings of legal
rules (p. 74). The belief that experts must expose scientific premises to
legal professionals stems from two axioms of legal process. First, scientific judgments may be relevant to the determination of a matter
under existing legal standards. When this is so, the risk of an erroneous determination is reduced to the extent that scientific expertise is
fully available to legal professionals. Second, law may, and should
under some circumstances, change to reflect knowledge gleaned from
the sciences. 13 Expert knowledge that appropriately commands adjustment of legal rules is, therefore, equally necessary to the lawyering
and judging functions.
The authors' insistence that scientists expose reliance upon lay interpretations of the law stems from a wish to avoid inappropriate selfcensorship. The concern is that scientific opinions will be withheld
because of a belief that legal rules or customs require their rejection
(pp. 70-74). Self-censorship of this kind would result in withholding
11. Id. at 146 (reprinting p. 21).
12. The constitutional theory set forth in Part II provides an alternative to the theory of
"penumbral" privacy that served as a basis for the elaboration of family rights in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and subsequent cases.
13. See Davis, supra note 4, at 1540-41.

1100

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 86:1096

from the legal process potentially useful information. An expert in
law may see, where a lay person would fail to see, room for incorporation of scientific knowledge to influence an outcome or to advance
legal doctrine.
The authors impose upon law professionals a more limited obligation to explicate premises. Legal professionals are urged to be explicit
concerning any scientific premises upon which they may rely (pp. 5859). This infrequent but laudable practice is advocated because it exposes lay opinion on scientific questions to critical expert evaluation,
minimizing the risk that legal determinations will be made on the basis
of misinformation or uninformed judgment (pp. 58-59). The authors
do not, however, identify a need to inform scientists of the bases of
legal judgments. Their only expressed concern with respect to the scientist's understanding of law is that communication of scientific
knowledge not be deterred by inexpert determinations
that the legal
14
system cannot, or will not, utilize the information.
The value of these prescriptions of boundary adherence and interdisciplinary communication is not to be gainsaid. The fault of In the
Best Interests of the Child is that its focus and structure result in an
overstatement of that value. The reader is left with an inappropriate
confidence that justice and children will be served if lawyers lawyer,
judges judge, and scientists inform. This occurs because the critique of
interdisciplinary exchanges is compromised by an understandable but
disabling failure to set aside substantive convictions in the interest of
assuring rigor in the analysis of process. As we have seen, the authors
have firm convictions concerning the appropriate disposition of a
broad category of child placement matters.15 In broaching the subjects of interdisciplinary boundary adherence and communication,
they set a goal of objectivity: "We have been careful not to let the
force of our convictions and the temptation to reinforce the proposals
we made in the earlier books lead us to find only good practices in
decisions that we like and only poor practices in decisions we dislike"
(p. 12). The goal proves elusive. In the Best Interests of the Child
consists almost entirely of critical reviews of case histories. Good practices are repeatedly illustrated by decisions that are consistent with the
authors' convictions.1 6 Poor practices are repeatedly illustrated by decisions that are inconsistent with the authors' convictions.' 7
This skewed result flags two artificialities in the sample of cases
14. Pp. 70-74. Part II of this review argues that legal principles require cautious scrutiny of
scientific claims that are offered to justify compromises of fundamental rights. These legal principles should be understood by scientists and taken into account when scientific opinion is marshalled in the service of legal argument. Law professionals relying upon these principles should
therefore assume a duty to explicate legal premises for the benefit of the scientific community.
15. See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text
16. E.g., pp. 44-53, 56-57, 57-62, 62-64, 64-67, 97-98.
17. Eg., pp. 21-28, 31, 34-37, 70-71, 72-74, 74-78.
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reviewed in the book. First, the sample is virtually devoid of expert
evidence that is inconsistent with the authors' positions. 18 Only one of
the cases reviewed involves an expert who holds a professional view
contrary to those expressed in the earlier works of Goldstein, Freud,
and Solnit. 19
Second, professionals who disagree with the authors' child development theories are presumed to act without scientific basis, while
professionals who agree with their theories are presumed to act consistently with scientific wisdom. When legal professionals look beyond
expert witness advice to reach results that are consistent with psychological parent theory, they are described as having crossed professional
boundaries in appropriate ways (pp. 57-67). These legal professionals
are credited with having properly applied principles of child development. 20 Legal professionals who rest their decisions upon independently held scientific theories that are inconsistent with the authors'
positions are condemned for having usurped the clinical role (pp. 2137). The possibility of correct reliance upon independently acquired
expert views that are inconsistent with the views of the authors is not
considered. The legal professionals involved in these cases have violated the rule of explication of scientific premises. Whether they have
silently deferred to extra-record scientific knowledge, we cannot know.
As a result of these artificialities, the authors have created a universe in which law and science interact in only three scenarios:
(1) Law professionals learn from expert witnesses who are almost always right in their scientific judgments; (2) Law professionals learn
from reading or associating over time with scientists who are always
right in their scientific judgments; and (3) As a result of independent
evaluation of scientific matters, law professionals make scientific judgments that are always wrong. In this universe, all is well if professional boundaries are respected and law professionals receive, accept,
and follow the teachings of science. The real world is a different place,
and the differences are telling.
18. Pp. 34-37. There is a body of expert opinion that contradicts the authors' views. See
Davis, supra note 4, at 1545-46.
19. This expert is a case worker who is faulted for her failure to seek the advice of a mental
health professional. Pp. 34-37. All other experts accused of improper practices are doctors and
social workers who adhered to the views of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, but failed to advance
those views on the ground that the law, the participating lawyers or the assigned judge was
hostile to the "right" result. Pp. 70, 72-74, 74-78. These clinicians are criticized for having
misused knowledge of law, such as the fact "that the court 'never' denied fathers the right to visit
unless... there was evidence of physical abuse," (pp. 70-71); that a particular court demanded
clinical assessments even when they were useless and detrimental, (pp. 71-72); or that biological
parents would eventually achieve custody of their children regardless of clinical counterindications, (p. 73).

20. The authors commended, for example, a judge's ability to learn "from their work with
child development experts... that the custody of a child who has thrived in long-term care with
the same foster family cannot be changed without harming him." P. 55.
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Expert Witnesses Are Not Always (or Almost Always) Right

One of the greatest mistakes we can make is to regard as simple what is
complex. If psychiatrists and psychologists knew how to achieve a
child's best interests, deciding child custody cases would be comparable
to diagnosing and treating a known medical condition. But psychiatrists
and psychologists don't know .... 21
The court quoted above rested its assertion of the fallibility of expert
22
judgments upon a record of expert disagreement in the case before it.
When a legal matter involves a battle of experts, it is obvious that
experts can err, and it is inevitable that the legal professionals' approach to expert evidence will be critical, rather than simply deferential. This is desirable. The rights of parties and the development of
law are as easily compromised by deference to mistaken or incomplete
scientific judgments as by ignorance.
Unfortunately, evenly matched expert battles are not an inevitable
feature of the adversary system. This point is particularly telling in
the context in which the authors consider law and science interactions.
Child placement matters are rarely litigated with luxurious legal and
expert resources. Expert evidence is frequently available only to one
side or only to the court, exercising its power to solicit independent
professional evaluations. As a result, the maxim of deference to expert
opinion is not regularly moderated by the reality of conflicting expert
evidence.
To recognize the desirability of moderation and amplification of
the maxim is not to overlook its importance. Deferential and critical
postures can be consistent. Although the mental health professional is
less than perfect in her ability to determine the best course of child
development, her determination is more richly informed than that of a
lay person. Nevertheless, experts are fallible. Legal professionals are
to be sensitive to factors that affect the reliability of
obliged, therefore,
23
expert opinion.
Some of these factors are inherent in adversarial legal process.
When law and science interactions occur in litigation, there is a risk
that expert opinion is biased or shaded by the expert's association with
one of the competing adversaries. There is the additional risk that
resource imbalances will preclude or impede challenges of expert evidence offered by the more richly endowed litigator.
Other risk factors are inherent in the scientific process. The want
of omniscient experts requires sensitivity to the risks that expert opinion is biased for reasons that precede the assumption of an adversarial
21. In re Donna W., 325 Pa. Super. 39, 58, 472 A.2d 635, 645 (1984) (emphasis in original).
22. 325 Pa. Super. at 58, 472 A.2d at 645.
23. This is important when expert opinion shapes the interpretation of facts relevant to application of established rules of law. It is imperative when expert opinion informs the development
or alteration of rules of law. See Davis, supra note 4, at 1600-02.
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position in litigation; is based upon theoretical premises that are unsound; or is based upon factual premises that are inaccurate. The obligation of the legal professional is not automatic deference, but
respectful, critical scrutiny.
B. Nonwitness Experts Are Not Always (or Almost Always) Right
The authors accurately observe that in interpreting and shaping
legal rules legal professionals rely upon information that is extra-judicially acquired. As we have seen, In the Best Interests of the Child
applauds this sort of boundary crossing; other legal scholarship has
24
persuasively established its inevitability.
Of course, scientific information acquired outside the courtroom is
no less fallible than that acquired inside the courtroom. There is a
consequent risk that independently acquired scientific knowledge will
be mistaken or incomplete. There is the further risk that it will be
misused or misunderstood by the legal professional working in an unmastered discipline. The authors find the technique of explicating
premises adequate to address these risks. They offer the case of Ross v.
Hoffman 25 as a model of appropriate judicial use of independently acquired scientific information. The Ross judge is commended for having explicated extra-record scientific premises as he announced his
decision. In awarding custody to a long-term caretaker pitted against
a biological mother, the judge noted the reliance upon scientific information acquired by judicial notice:
[T]here is a book out, which is widely read, by three very well respected
professional doctors, Drs. Goldstein, Freud and Solnick [sic], called 'Beyond the Best Interests of the Child' and in that book they point out that
whether any adult becomes a psychological parent over the child is based
upon a day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences.
And if you
look at it from that view, Mrs. Hoffman has had this
26
advantage.
The judge surmised that this theory was what a trial expert "had in
mind" when he testified that there was risk in moving the child from a
known to an unknown environment. 27 The action of this trial judge
24. It is conventional wisdom today to observe that judges not only are charged to find
what the law is, but must regularly make new law when deciding upon the constitutional
validity of a statute, interpreting a statute, or extending or restricting a common law rule.
The very nature of the judicial process necessitates that judges be guided, as legislators are,
by considerations of expediency and public policy. They must, in the nature of things, act
either upon knowledge already possessed or upon assumptions, or upon investigation of the
pertinent general facts, social, economic, political, or scientific.
E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 928 (3d ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted). See also Davis,
An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402
(1942).
25. 33 Md. App. 333, 364 A.2d 596 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976), affd. as modified, 280 Md.
172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977).
26. 33 Md. App. at 336-36, 364 A.2d at 599 (quoting the Chancellor below).
27. 33 Md. App. at 333, 364 A.2d at 600.
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was affirmed by two appellate courts 28 and is applauded by the authors
as an appropriate crossing of professional boundaries. In the Best Interests of the Child reports that this was a case in which scientific
knowledge not only affected an outcome, but also changed the law:
The precedent established in Ross v. Hoffman incorporates generally accepted and generally applicable knowledge from the field of child development. These precedents, in some cases, enable lawyers to argue
against and qualify courts to overturn, without hearing expert testimony,
the presumption in favor of natural parents. Lawyers and judges on
their own can come to recognize many "parent"-child relationships that
should normally not be disturbed. Thus, through judicial precedent the
borders between the professions are opened and may legitimately be
crossed under certain circumstances. [p. 60]
In supporting the Ross outcome and agreeing with its scientific
premises, the appellate courts and the authors of In the Best Interests
of the Child have confronted a bypass of legal process and chosen to
applaud, rather than correct it. It is laudable that the Ross trial judge
"recogniz[ed] and express[ed] that which helped him to decide."' 29
But the expression came too late. Ms. Ross legitimately complained
that she lacked a pre-decision opportunity to challenge the controversial30 theories upon which her custodial rights ultimately turned. She
was not alerted to the need to seek or offer expert criticism of psychological parent theory. She was not alerted to the need to seek or offer
evidence that it had been misapplied to her situation. If competing
theories were offered in the appellate process, the opinions give no hint
of their consideration. The timing of the explication of scientific premises precluded or compromised use of the mechanisms upon which the
adversarial system relies to promote accuracy and fairness.
After-the-fact admission of professional boundary crossing is preferable to silence, but sound decisionmaking and principled development of the law require more. They require that the parties be alerted
to judicial consideration of extra-record scientific information in time
to refute it. They require inquiry to determine whether the party
against whom the information is to be used has the resources to evaluate and challenge it. They require that extra-record scientific information be tested against a measure of general acceptance within the
relevant discipline. They require attention to the risks that the immediate parties lack the ability or motivation to address the ramifications
of enshrinement in precedent of a principle that may be insufficiently
certain or potent to resolve the range of future cases to which it will be
applied.
28.
29.
30.
(1977)

See note 25 supra.
33 Md. App. at 338, 364 A.2d at 600.
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 n.52
("Beyond the Best Interests of the Child... is indeed controversial.").
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The Sources of Legal Judgments Concerning Scientific Matters
Are Various and Ambiguous

In cases, like Ross, in which boundary crossings by law professionals are approved, the authors applaud after-the-fact explication and
unquestioning acceptance of scientific authority. In cases in which
legal boundary crossings are condemned, the authors identify and denounce an unexplicated result, assuming that full explication would
reveal no scientific authority to which deference has been paid by law
professionals. In fact, unexplained scientific opinions offered by lawyers and judges are often grounded, as the Ross opinion was grounded,
upon a combination of informally acquired scientific knowledge, common sense, and lay speculation. The authors' segregation of these two
categories - appropriately deferential crossing of professional boundaries on the one hand and inappropriate inexpert practice of science on
the other - is misleading. Cases in which judges resort to extra-judicially informed scientific conclusions are more usefully viewed as a
single category as to which the prescriptions of identification, explication, and respectfully critical evaluation of scientific opinion should be
uniformly applied.
The example of inappropriate boundary crossing, identified by the
authors as the case of Lisa Stone, illustrates this point. Counsel for a
child who was the subject of a visitation dispute took the position that
his client's opposition to visitation by a noncustodial parent was pathological (p. 32). Reasoning from their view that psychological parents
must be autonomous, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit have categorically
opposed court-ordered visitation. 3 1 They find the contrary position of
the child's attorney unscientific and wrong (pp. 33-34). The authors
may be right. It may also be that the attorney relied upon independently acquired scientific evidence that maximum contact with noncustodial parents reduces the emotional harm that children suffer as a
result of divorce.3 2 It may be that he relied upon a scientist's belief
that in the bitter aftermath of marital dissolution children are commonly influenced, to their emotional detriment, to resent and reject
the noncustodial parent. 33 These scientific views are differently evaluated and reconciled by different experts. Were the attorney for the
child to adhere to the limited terms of the prescriptions of explication
and deference, he would have only to identify scientific authority for
his views. His obligation is greater. It is to seek out the conflicting
expert opinions that bear upon his client's situation and subject those
views to critical evaluation. The corresponding judicial obligation is
31. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 1, at 116-33.

32. See, eg., GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY No. 106, DIVORCE, CHILD
CUSTODY AND THE FAMILY 882-87 (1980).
33. See, eg., Goodstein, Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Divorce and the PsychologicalDevelopment of Children, in OmECT Loss IN CHILDREN (M. Scharfman ed.) (forthcoming).
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to assure that this process occurs; that it includes adversarial challenge; and that the solicitation, evaluation, and advocacy of competing
expert views is not impeded by resource limitations.
II.

LAW, SCIENCE, AND THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

If lawyers lawyer, judges judge, and scientists inform, then interdisciplinary collaborations may improve case-specific decisionmaking
and the development of law. This result is not, however, inevitable.
As Part I establishes, the principle of boundary adherence wants elaboration. Interdisciplinary collaboration is more likely to improve legal
decisionmaking if information from the sciences is examined critically.
The story of Carrie Buck gives urgency to the appeal for critical evaluation of scientific opinion. The story of Malcolm X evokes a historical
legacy that provides the nucleus of an argument that critical judicial
evaluation of scientific opinion is constitutionally required when
claims of science challenge claims of family integrity and autonomy.
A.

The Stories of CarrieBuck and Malcolm X

Carrie Buck appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States
for protection of her right to bear children. She was the first target of
compulsory sterilization laws enacted in Virginia in 1924 (p. 132).
The Court denied Carrie Buck's appeal. Its opinion was grounded in
scientific evidence that she, her mother, and her only child were
"imbeciles," (p. 134) and in scientific knowledge that imbecility is heritable (p. 134). Declaring that "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are
enough,"' 34 the Court established society's right to "prevent those who
are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind."' 35 It deterred or
defused constitutional challenge of involuntary sterilizations - of
which there were 63,678 between 1907 and 1964.36 It has not been
overruled.
Scientists working five decades later have concluded that "there
were no imbeciles, not a one, among the three generations of Bucks,"
(p. 141) and there is now a scientific consensus that although "[s]ome
forms of mental deficiency are passed by inheritance in family lines,
...most are not" (p. 133). Yet, the science that underlay the Buck
opinion was generally accepted in its day, 37 and the initial diagnoses of
Carrie Buck and of her mother were the product of measurement by
the then relatively new, but altogether respectable Stanford-Binet I.Q.
34.
35.
36.
(1966).
37.

Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
274 U.S. at 207.
Ferster, Eliminatingthe Unfit - Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 591, 632
J. AREEN, FAMILY LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 832-33 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter J.

AREEN] (citing HUMAN BETTERMENT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, SUMMARY OF UNITED
STATES STERILIZATION LAWS (1952)).
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The story of Carrie Buck may teach nothing more than that scientific insights deepen and improve over time. If this is so, then we may
rest content in the hope that law grounded in scientific knowledge will
be altered by reasonably paced responses to scientific advances. Professor Gould's telling of the Buck story offers a different lesson and
calls for a less complacent response:
When we understand why Carrie Buck was committed in January 1924,
we can finally comprehend the hidden meaning of her case and its
message for us today. The silent key, again and as always, is her daughter Vivian ....
Carrie Buck was one of several illegitimate children
borne by her mother, Emma. She grew up with foster parents.., and
continued to live with them, helping out with chores around the house.
She was apparently raped by a relative of her foster parents, then blamed
for her resultant pregnancy. Almost surely, she was (as they used to say)
committed to hide her shame (and her rapist's identity), not because enlightened science had just discovered her true mental status. In short,
she was sent away to have her baby. Her case never was about mental
deficiency; it was always a matter of sexual morality and social deviance.
The annals of her trial and hearing reek with the contempt of the well-off
and well-bred for poor people of "loose morals." Who really cared
whether Vivian was a baby of normal intelligence; she was the illegitimate child of an illegitimate woman. Two generations of bastards are
enough. [An expert witness for the state] began his "family history" of
the Bucks by writing: "These people belong to the shiftless,
ignorant and
39
worthless class of anti-social whites of the South."
If, as Gould believes, social bias infects and hides behind scientific
judgments, 4° then law professionals are obliged to evaluate scientific
knowledge with this possibility in mind. The conclusion that "[t]hree
generations of imbeciles are enough" 4 1 was not simply wrong. It was
both wrong and too lightly made. The Court dealt with a right that is
universally cherished. 4 2 Yet, compromise of the right was easily justi38. See Ferster, supra note 36, at 603-04.
39. P. 137. Attorneys for Carrie Buck offered no challenge of her diagnosis or of the heritability of her alleged condition. Brief for Petitioner, Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (No. 292).
As evidence of the certainty of the scientific underpinnings of the challenged law, Respondent
offered the opinion of Professor East of Harvard University that "[iln a quarter of a century laws
of heredity... [had] been formulated as definite and precise as those of physics and chemistry."
Brief for Respondent at 10, Buck v. Bell, supra.
40. Gould notes in this regard:
Science, since people must do it, is a socially embedded activity. It progresses by hunch,
vision, and intuition. Much of its change through time does not record a closer approach to
absolute truth, but the alteration of cultural contexts that influence it so strongly. Facts are
not pure and unsullied bits of information; culture also influences what we see and how we
see it. Theories, moreover, are not inexorable inductions from facts. The most creative
theories are often imaginative visions imposed upon facts; the source of imagination is also
strongly cultural.
S. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 21-22 (1981).
41. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. at 207.
42. Indeed, the right of procreation was the first right to which the test of strict scrutiny was
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fied because social bias inhibited deference to a basic human entitlement of the affected class and facilitated acceptance of questionable
scientific "truths."
The story of Malcolm X is also the story of state intervention to
affect the lives of members of a disparaged group. It, too, involves
family rights of fundamental character. It, too, may involve scientific
judgments too lightly made. It does not, however, involve a scientific
judgment now "known" to be wrong. It provides, therefore, a more
difficult test of the argument for skeptical scrutiny when science is offered to justify limitation of the fundamental rights of a class that is
the subject of social bias.
Malcolm X describes a childhood prematurely ended and a family
divided by the racially motivated murder of his father and the exercise
of state authority. El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz, as he later came to be
known, spoke with bitterness of the role of the state in the destruction
of his family. After his father's death in 1931, Malcolm's mother was
repeatedly fired as white employers learned that she was the widow of
a "troublemaker." The family was forced to accept welfare payments.
For Malcolm, these payments represented sustenance less than they
represented the beginning of a "psychological deterioration [that] hit
our family circle and began to eat away at our pride."'4 3 We know the
story of the destruction of the family only through the memory of the
man who survived it - to become first a petty criminal and then a
human rights activist of international prominence. It is best told in his
words:
When the state Welfare people began coming to our house ....
[t]hey acted and looked at... [my mother] and at us, and around in our
house, in a way that had about it the feeling - at least for me - that we
were not people.
•.. My mother was, above everything else, a proud woman, and it
took its toll on her that she was accepting charity. And her feelings were
communicated to us.
...She would talk back sharply to the state Welfare people, telling
them that she was a grown woman, able to raise her children, that it
wasn't necessary for them to keep coming around so much, meddling in
our lives. And they didn't like that.
But the monthly Welfare check was their pass. They acted as if they
owned us, as if we were their private property. As much as my mother
would have liked to, she couldn't keep them out. She would get particularly incensed when they began insisting upon drawing us older children
applied. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1941). The Skinner court described procreation as a "basic civil right[ ] of man.... fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race."
43. MALCOLM X & A. HALEY, supra note 10, at 14 (not excerpted in appendix).
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aside, one at a time .... and asking us questions, or telling us things against our mother and against each other.
*. . We really couldn't understand. What I later understood was
that my mother was making a desperate effort to preserve her pride and ours.
.
[T]he
T. state Welfare people kept after my mother. By now she
didn't make it any secret that she hated them, and didn't want them in
her house. But they exerted their right to come ....
I think they felt that getting children into foster homes was a legitimate part of their function, and the result would be less troublesome,
however they went about it.
And when my mother fought them, they went after her ....
I'm not sure just how or when the idea was first dropped by the Welfare workers that our mother was losing her mind.
But I can distinctly remember hearing "crazy" applied to her by
them when they learned that the Negro farmer who was in the next
house down the road from us had offered to give us some butchered pork
*.. and she had refused.... It meant nothing to them even when she
explained that ... it was against her religion as a Seventh Day Adventist.
They were vicious as vultures. They had no feelings, understanding,
compassion, or respect for my mother. They told us, "She's crazy for
refusing food." Right then was when our home, our unity, began to
disintegrate. We were having a hard time, and I wasn't helping. But we
could have made it, we could have stayed together. As bad as I was, as
much trouble and worry as I caused my mother, I loved her.44
A year or so later, Malcolm was placed in a foster home. Eventually,
his mother was committed to a state mental hospital. Malcolm X described the subsequent order making each of her eight children a ward
of the state as "[n]othing but legal, modem slavery - however kindly
45
intentioned."
We have too little information to know whether the intrusion upon
this woman's parental rights was in the best interests of her children.
We do not know her condition, whether it was objectively diagnosed
or whether it was appropriately treated. We do not know what assessments were made by mental health and child welfare professionals or
what theories of child development supported the removal of the children and the termination of her parental rights. We do not know
whether conditions in the household would have been more disabling
to the children than the trauma of family dismemberment. But we can
learn from her extraordinary son to appreciate more deeply the value
of rights lost with the scientific and legal judgments to supplant, rather
than support, the family.

44. Id. at 12-18 (portions excerpted in appendix).
45. Id. at 21.
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The Lessons of the Slavery Analogy

El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz recalls the orders assigning new familial
ties for himself and his siblings and equates them to slavery. This is a
startling insight. It evokes an American historical legacy, a legacy
that is crucial to appreciation of the appropriate scope of constitutional rights of family: It provides guidance, grounded in history and
political theory, for legal professionals who must weigh scientific
claims against fundamental rights of family. It addresses contemporary arguments that certain rights of family are not" 'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition' -46 and that their enforcement
"represent[s] choices that the people have never made." 47 It therefore
warrants detailed presentation.
The relationship between denial of family integrity and slave status
is well recognized in the scholarship of slavery. Indeed, denial of
rights of family is regarded as a hallmark of slavery:
[T]he slave was always a deracinated outsider - an outsider first in the
sense that he originated from outside the society into which he was introduced as a slave, second in the sense that he was denied the most elementary of social bonds, kinship. "Quem patrem, qui servos est?" (Plautus,
Captiva 574). "What father, when he is a slave?" 4 8
American slavery followed this pattern.
The condition of the American slave family was a mixed issue of
law and practice. Descriptions of the relevant law are found in treatises of both uncritical and abolitionist scholars. In the former category, Thomas R.R. Cobb, confessing a bias "by . . . birth and
education in [the] slaveholding State [of Georgia]," '4 9 reported that
the slave had no legally cognizable right of marriage, family inheritance, or parental custody.5 0
46. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 792
(1985) (White, J. dissenting) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
47. 476 U.S. at 787. Justice White's dissent in this abortion case reflects a continuing debate
concerning the validity of the Supreme Court's recognition of unenumerated rights of family
privacy, integrity, and autonomy. See also Bork, NeutralPrinciplesand Some FirstAmendment
Problems, 47 IND. L. REV. 12 (1971); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
48. M. FINLEY, ANCIENT SLAVERY AND MODERN IDEOLOGY 75 (1980) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).

49. 1 T.R.R.

COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA at x (1858).
50. "The inability of the slave to contract extends to the marriage contract, and hence there
is no recognized marriage relation in law between slaves." Id. at 242-43.
The contract of marriage not being recognized among slaves, of course none of its consequences follow from the contubernial state existing between them. Their issue, though
emancipated, have no inheritable blood.
...How far this contubernial relation between slaves may be recognized and protected
by law, is a question of exceeding nicety and difficulty. The unnecessary and wanton separation of persons standing in the relation of husband and wife, though it may rarely, if ever,
occur in actual practice, is an event which, if possible, should be guarded against by the law.
And yet, on the other hand, to fasten upon a master of a female slave, a vicious, corrupting
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William Goodell, writing as an abolitionist, 5 1 saw the matter no
differently with respect to the legal rights of slaves:
"A slave cannot even contract matrimony, the association which
takes place among slaves, and is called marriage, being properly desigwhich has no sanctity, and
nated by the word contubernium, a relation
'5 2
to which no civil rights are attached."
... "[T]hese laws do not recognize the parentalrelation, as belonging
has no more legal authority over his child than a cow
to slaves. A slave '53
has over her calf."
. , * .

"In the slaveholding States, except in Louisiana, no law exists to prevent the violent
separation of parents from their children, or even from
'54
each other."

"Slaves may be sold and transferred from one to another without any
statutory restriction or limitation, as to the separation of parents and
children, [etc.], except in the State of Louisiana." 55
Goodell supports the view that slave family relations were no more
honored in practice than in legal theory.56 Literature of the mid-nineteenth century reflects the prevalence of this view and suggests the
extent to which it influenced abolitionists' understanding of the evils of
slavery and the importance of family rights to the definition of citizenship. Frederick Douglass, for example, had written that upon the
death of a master he was:
immediately sent [forth] to be valued and divided with the other property.... No one could tell amongst which pile of chattels I might be
flung. Thus early, I got a foretaste of that painful uncertainty which in
one form or another was ever obtruding itself in the pathway of the
slave. It furnished me a new insight into the unnaturalpowerto which I
was subjected. Sickness, adversity, and death may interfere with the
negro, sowing discord, and dissatisfaction among all his slaves; or else a thief, or a cutthroat, and to provide no relief against such a nuisance, would be to make the holding of
slaves a curse to the master.

Id. at 245-46 (citations omitted).
51. W. GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 17 (1853)
("We propose.., by an exhibition of the American Slave Code, to test the moral character of
American slaveholding."). The work was published by the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery

Society.
52. Id at 106 (citing G.
original).

STROUD, SKETCH OF THE SLAVE LAWS

61 (1827)) (emphasis in

53. Id. at 113 (citing W. JAY, JAY'S INQUIRY 132 (2d ed. 1835)).
54. Id. at 114 (citing G. STROUD, supra note 52, at 50).
55. Id. (citing J. WHEELER, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF SLAVERY 41 (1837)).
56. Id. at 115-21. Anecdotal accounts portray families separated by sale or distanced by the
demands of servitude. Advertisements from southern newspapers offer rewards for the capture
or killing of slaves reported to have run away in order to join family members. For further
evidence of the frequency of slave family disruption, see authorities cited in J. MCPHERSON,
BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 38 (1988).
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plans and purposes of all, but the slave had the added danger of chang-

ing homes, in the separations unknown to other men.
...One

word of the appraisers, against all preferences and prayers,

could sunder all the ties of friendship and 57affection, even to separating
husbands and wives, parents and children.

This aspect of slave life was "the greatest perceived sin of American slavery."' 58 As such, it was a central concern of abolitionists. Harriet Beecher Stowe wrote in 1853 that "[t]he worst abuse of the system
of slavery is its outrage upon the family; and, as the writer views the
subject, it is one which is more notorious and undeniable than any
other."'59 An anonymous article in the Antislavery Record of 1836 said
that "American slavery, both in theory and practice is nothing but a
system of tearing asunder the family ties," 6 and described the bonds
among family members as manifestations
of "sacred law which slavery
'61
scornfully sets at nought.
Abolitionists believed that the evils of denying slaves the right of
family went beyond the deprivation suffered by the slave.
Families of both races felt the evil effects of slavery;[ 621 but, more
57. F. DOUGLASS, LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 95-96 (1962) (emphasis
added).
58. J. MCPHERSON, supra note 56, at 37.
59. H. STowE, THE KEY TO UNCLE TOM'S CABIN 237 (1853). Stowe writes in response to
charges that family separations depicted in Uncle Tom's Cabin were unrealistic or atypical. Her
evidence of the prevalence of slave family disruption includes eyewitness accounts of family separations resulting from slave auctions and advertisements for the sale of slaves. Id. at 259-67, 26876.
60. The Disruption of Family Ties, ANTISLAVERY RECORD, Mar., 1836, at 9 (emphasis in
original). The author asserts that in slaveholding states, "the principal business by which wealth
is acquired is the breeding of slaves." Observing that "this trade takes off not usually whole
families, but the young and the strong," the author says, "[n]ot a slave mother does there live in
the slave-breeding district, who is not liable to lose her son or her daughter the moment her
master shall think it for his interest to sell." Id.
61. Id. at 11. These and other abolitionist views on the family are collected and discussed in
R. WALTERS, THE ANTISLAVERY APPEAL (1976).

62. Abolitionists took the view that slavery corrupted both white and black family values.
They also argued that slavery inhibited the liberty of whites. Goodell wrote of a slaveholder
without liberty to control the education of his children.
Here is a waiting-maid, discreet and pious; or here is a nurse, whom all her owner's
children call "Mammy." A little knowledge of letters would qualify one or both of them to
teach the little white masters and misses their alphabet.... [W]here is the legal protection
of [the owner's] right to select a teacher of the alphabet to his own children? In Louisiana,
he would be subject to one year's imprisonment for teaching such a slave to readl He enjoys
liberty, does he?
W. GOODELL, supra note 51, at 374. This liberty interest was subsequently recognized as being
embodied in the fourteenth amendment. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In further support of the argument that slavery compromised the
family values of whites, Goodell cited an incident apparently much discussed among his
contemporaries:
Look then at the dying Thomas Jefferson, the penman of the declaration that "all men
are created equal," now penning a clause of his last will and testament, conferring freedom
(as common report says) on his own enslaved offspring, so far as the Slave Code permitted
him to do it, supplying the lack of power by "humbly" imploring the Legislature of Virginia
to confirm the bequests, "with permission to remain in the State, where their families and
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important, so did society. "The Family is the head, the heart, the fountain of society," proclaimed one abolitionist, "and it has not a privilege

that slavery does not nullify, a right that it does not counteract, nor a
hope that it does not put out in darkness."
function as the
Destruction of the home fit with slavery's symbolic
63
exemplar of what could go wrong with society.

The attention abolitionists gave to the slave family paralleled an
attentiveness throughout antebellum America to the institution of the
family. It reflected a belief - held within and without abolitionist
circles - that the family was not only sacred, but also the foundation
of social order and moral development and the source of individual
comfort and satisfaction."4
It was in this context of general concern for the family as a social
institution and particular concern for the deprivation of slave family
rights that Congress addressed the slavery question. Family rights
were an explicit concern when Congress acted, through the thirteenth
amendment, to abolish slavery. Family rights were an explicit concern
when Congress acted, through the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
Freedmens' Bureau Bill, to define the rights of freedmen and other
national citizens. Family rights were therefore encompassed when
rights of national citizenship were given65constitutional status with ratification of the fourteenth amendment.
connections are" - then dying, under the uncertainty whether his requests would be
granted or his children sold into the rice swamps!
W. GOODELL, supra note 51, at 375. The literature of the time also included de Tocqueville's
account of an
old man, in the South of the Union, who had lived in illicit intercourse with one of his
Negresses and had had several children by her, who were born the slaves of their father. He
had, indeed, frequently thought of bequeathing to them at least their liberty; but years had
elapsed before he could surmount the legal obstacles to their emancipation, and meanwhile
his old age had come and he was about to die. He pictured to himself his sons dragged from
market to market and passing from the authority of a parent to the rod of the stranger, until
these horrid anticipations worked his expiring imagination into frenzy.
1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 380 (P. Bradley ed. 1956).
63. R. WALTERS, supra note 61, at 58.
64. It is surprising, but important, that feminists and anti-feminists, abolitionists and antiabolitionists, reformers and anti-reformers all directed their attention to the same institution.
Rather than being a mere sentimental convention, concern for the family was bound up with the
most serious social and cultural debates in antebellum America:
Virtually everybody assumed that, when properly strnctured, the family was crncial to
social stability and to social improvement.... There was ... more unity here than mere
ritual expression of the importance of family life: the family, and relationships usually comprehended within it, were almost uniformly presented as vehicles of social and individual
salvation.
Walters, The Family and Ante-bellum Reform: An Interpretation,3 SOCiETAs 221, 225 (1973).
65. The fourteenth amendment was designed to give constitutional status to the rights conferred by the Civil Rights and Freedmen's Bureau legislation of 1866. This is "[t]he one point
upon which historians of the Fourteenth Amendment all agree, and indeed, which the evidence
places beyond cavil." tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
39 CALIF. L. REV. 171, 200 (1951).
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1. The Thirteenth Amendment Debates
Concerns for the protection of family rights were regularly reflected in the debates concerning the thirteenth amendment. 66 The debates reflected more than concern regarding the condition of the slave
family. They reflected also the conviction that the familial rights denied to the slave were fundamental and inalienable. The remarks of
Congressman Ingersoll are typical: "I believe that the black man has
certain inalienable rights, which are as sacred in the sight of Heaven as
those of any other race.., and no white man has any right to rob him
of or infringe upon any of these blessings."' 67 Senator Sumner asked
that his colleagues imagine an extraterrestrial visitor beholding the
spectacle of slavery:
[A]stonishment ...

would swell to marvel as he learned that in this

republic, which has arrested his admiration, where there was neither
king nor noble, but the schoolmaster instead, there were four million
human beings in abject bondage, degraded to be chattels .... despoiled of
all rights, even the right of knowledge and the sacred right of family; so
that the relation of husband
and wife was impossible and no parent could
68
claim his own child.
Senator Wilson declared that upon ratification of the thirteenth
amendment
The sharp cry of the agonizing hearts of severed families will cease to vex
the weary ear of the nation ....

Then the sacred rights of human na-

ture, the hallowed family relations of husband and wife, parent and
child, will be protected by the guardian spirit of that law which makes
sacred alike the proud homes and lowly cabins of freedom. 69
66. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1865):
The slave could sustain none of those relations which give life all its charms. He could not
say my home, my father, my mother, my wife, my child, my body. It is for God to judge
whether he could say my soul. The law pronounced him a chattel, and these are not the
rights or attributes of chattels.
(statement of Rep. Creswell); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1369 (1864) ("[Slavery] has
destroyed the sanctity of marriage, and sundered and broken the domestic ties.") (statement of
Sen. Clark); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 221 (1865)
It is strange that an appeal should be made to humanity in favor of an institution which
allows the husband to be separated from the wife, that allows the children to be taken from
the mother; ah! that allows the very children of the deceased slaveholder himself to be sold
to satisfy his merciless creditors.
(statement of Rep. Broomall); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 2948 (1864) ("It has been
asserted... that this thing, slavery, was of divine origin.... What divinity [is there] in tearing
from the mother's arms the sucking child, and selling them to different and distant owners?")
(statement of Rep. Shannon); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2984 (1864)
[T]he condition of... slaves has been attended with circumstances which not only deprive
them of the common blessings that they were by nature entitled to, but has cast them into
the deepest afflictions, by an unnatural separation and sale of husband and wife from each
other and from their children .... "
(statement of Rep. Kelly) (quoting the Preamble to an Act for the abolition of Slavery in
Pennsylvania).
67. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 2990 (1864).
68. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1479 (1864).
69. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1864).
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Senator Harlan described and condemned as contrary to natural law
the "incidents of slavery." The first two incidents related to rights of
family. The Senator spoke first of marriage:
Some of the incidents of slavery may be stated as follows: it necessarily
abolishes the conjugal relation.... [I]n none of the slave States was this
relation tolerated in opposition to the will of the slave-owner ....
The existence of this institution therefore requires the existence of a
law that annuls the law of God establishing the relation of man and wife,
which is taught by the churches to be70a sacrament as holy in its nature
and its designs as the eucharist itself.
Senator Harlan spoke next of the parent-child relationship:
Another incident is the abolition practically of the parental relation,
robbing the offspring of the care and attention of his parents, severing a
relation which is universally cited as the emblem of the relation sustained by the Creator to the human family. And yet, according to the
matured judgment of these slave States, this guardianship of the parent
over his7 1own children must be abrogated to secure the perpetuity of
slavery.
For Harlan, and for other abolitionists, the slaveholder's claim of
property rights was illegitimate because it stood in conflict with superior and "inalienable" human rights of the slave - rights that were
"sacred," denied only by laws "shocking to human nature itself,"
rights that were "holy," "necessary to the preservation of virtue in
civil society," and emblematic of the relationship between God and
man. Representative Farnsworth put it in these terms:
What vested rights [are] so high or so sacred as a man's right to himself,
to his wife and children, to his liberty, and to the fruits of his own industry? Did not our fathers declare that those rights were inalienable? And
if a man cannot himself alienate those rights, how can another man
alienate them without being himself a robber of the vested rights of his
72

brother man?

The status attributed to family rights by proponents of the thirteenth
amendment was asserted even more clearly by Congressman Kasson:
[T]here are three great fundamental natural rights of human society
which you cannot take away without striking a vital blow at the rights of
white men as well as black. They are the rights of a husband to his wife
- the marital relation; the right of father to his child - the parental
relation; and the right of a man to the personal liberty with which he was
endowed by nature and by God, and which the best judicial authorities
a hundred years declared he could not alienate even
of England have for 73
by his own consent.
70. CONG. GLOBE, 38th
71. CONG. GLOBE, 38th
72. CONG. GLOBE, 38th
73. CONG. GLOBE, 38th

Cong., Ist Sess. 1439 (1864).
Cong., Ist Sess. 1439 (1864).
Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1865).
Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1865).
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The Debates of the Thirty-Ninth Congress

Congressional debate concerning the reach of the thirteenth
amendment did not end with the amendment's passage.
The congressional battle that raged around... [the Civil Rights Bill
and the Freedmen's Bureau Act] constituted... [an] important debate
over the Thirteenth Amendment. By the Amendment, the principle of
universal liberty had been established. The Freedmen's Bureau and Civil
Rights bills represented the efforts of the Amendment's framers, acting
contemporaneously with its ratification, to implement the Amendment
and define the principle. 74
Implementation of the amendment involved containment of the effects
of the Black Codes, by which Southern states sought to perpetuate
incidents of slavery. These codes included measures that compromised the family rights of former slaves. 75 When Congress acted to
invalidate the Black Codes and to interpret and enforce the thirteenth
amendment guarantee of liberty, family rights were again addressed.
In these debates, as in the thirteenth amendment debates, members of
Congress explicitly recognized the fundamental importance of family
rights to the concept of freedom:
Slavery cannot know a home. Where the wife is the property of the
husband's master, and may be used at will; where children are bred, like
stock, for sale; where man and woman, after twenty years of faithful
service from the time when the priest with the owner's sanction by mock
ceremonies pretended to unite them, are parted and sold at that owner's
will, there can be no such thing as home. Sir, no act of ours can fitly
enforce their freedom that does not contemplate for them the security of
74. tenBroek, supra note 65, at 186.
75. The codes uniformly provided for the legitimization of slave marriages. H.R. EXEC.
Doc. No. 118, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866). However, Senator Windom reported from correspondence describing the Black Codes of Mississippi that "Section third [of the freedmen's bill]
compels all freedmen to marry whomsoever they may now be living with, and to support the
issue of what was in many cases compulsory cohabitation." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1160 (1866) (quoting from letter from Lt. Stewart Eldridge to Maj. Gen. Howard (Nov. 28,
1865)). In some jurisdictions, slavery was effectively continued through the device of making
black children the wards or apprentices of whites. The procedure by which this was done differed from apprenticeship arrangements involving white children in that parental consent was
not required. An example of legislation establishing this device was offered by Senator Sumner to
illustrate the evils of the Black Codes. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 93 (1865). Senator
Donnelly reported that "[t]he black code of Tennessee provides that.., children [of the vagrant
Negro] may be bound out against his wish to a master by the county court .... " CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., Ist Sess. 589 (1865). Similar apprenticeship arrangements were held, in an opinion
by Chief Justice Chase, sitting in the Circuit of Maryland, to violate the thirteenth amendment.
In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D.Md. 1867) (No. 14,247). Turner has been incorrectly cited
as an opinion of the Supreme Court abolishing these apprenticeship practices. See, e.g., H. GuTMAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM 410 (1976). The effect of Turner is not
entirely misperceived as a result of this error. An excerpt from a subsequent district court opinion, transmitted to Congress in 1868, says of the case, "This decision ... will govern me in all
future applications of a similar character, unless a different opinion shall be pronounced by the
Supreme Court." S. Misc. Doc. No. 24, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1868).
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home.76
The first version of the Civil Rights Act spoke in terms of discrimination, prohibiting "any inequality of civil rights and immunities
among the inhabitants of [former Confederate] States."' 77 Senator
Sherman proposed that the Act be amended to "secure to the freedmen of the southern States certain rights, naming them, defining precisely what they should be, [and including] the right . . . to be
protected in their homes and family [as a] ...natural right[ ] of free
men."'7 8 Senator Sumner also urged specification of the rights of freedmen, including among them the rights "to contract marriage, and to
make any arrangement whatever concerning their family affairs. ....,,79
The Act was amended to specify rights to which freedmen were
entitled. The specification included the rights
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property, as it is enjoyed by white citizens, and...
[to] be80 subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none
other.
It was understood that the rights of contract,8 1 of property 82 and of
equal benefit of law8 3 encompassed rights of marriage 84 and family
76. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2779 (1866) (statement of Rep. Eliot, speaking with
respect to the homestead provisions of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill).
77. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., IstSess. 39 (1865).
78. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., IstSess. 42 (1865).
79. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1865) (quoting regulations accompanying the
1861 Proclamation emancipating the serfs of Prussia).
80. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1865).
81. The deprivation of all slave family rights was traced to denial of the right to enter the
contract of marriage. See note 50 supra.
82. Rights of family were, in the nineteenth century, regarded as aspects of the property
rights of men. The language of Representative Wood, speaking in opposition to the thirteenth
amendment, illustrates the point. "The social and domestic relations are equally matters of individual ownership with flocks and herds, houses and lands. The affections of a man's wife and
children are among the dearest of his possessions, and as such are under the protection of the
law." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2941 (1864).
83. The application of the equal protection concept to family rights is illustrated in the full
text of the debates cited at note 84 infra.
84. The understanding that the thirteenth amendment and enforcing legislation affected the
right to marry sparked heated controversy in the Freedmens' Bureau Bill debates over the prospect of miscegenation. In this context, we find two congressmen denying that the right to marry
was conferred by the language of the bill. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 632 (1866)
(statement of Rep. Moulton, denying that the right of marriage was a civil right within the
meaning of the Freedmens' Bureau Bill); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., IstSess., Appendix at 75
(1866) (statement of Rep. Phelps, denying that the Bill encompassed a right to marry). But most
who spoke on the subject argued or acknowledged that the bill affected marriage rights. Opponents of the bill complained against its scope. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 318
(1866) (statement of Sen. Hendricks, arguing that "[m]arriage is a civil contract, and to marry
according to one's choice is a civil right"); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1866)
(statement of Sen. Johnson, arguing that the right to make and enforce contracts encompasses
the right of interracial marriage); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 418 (1866) (statement of
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integrity.8 5
The thirty-ninth Congress went beyond assuring former slaves the
enumerated fights set forth in the Civil Rights Act (and, in slightly
modified form, in the fourteenth amendment). It made them citizens.
Rights of family were understood not only as components of rights of
property, contract, and equal protection, but also as components of
the liberty interests inherent in citizenship status. Senator Trumbull
offered the amendment to the Civil Rights Act that conferred citizenship rights upon freedmen.8 6 His subsequent remarks describe the intended scope of the rights to be conferred:
It is difficult, perhaps, to define accurately what slavery is and what liberty is. Liberty and slavery are opposite terms; one is opposed to the
other.
...Civil liberty.., is thus defined by Blackstone:
"Civil liberty is no other than natural liberty, so far restrained by
human laws and no further, as is necessary and expedient for the general
advantage of the public." That is the liberty to which every citizen is
entitled .... 17
When consideration of the Trumbull amendment resumed on the following day, Senator Howard responded to those who argued that Congress lacked the authority to enforce general citizenship rights in
behalf of freedmen; he spoke specifically of rights of family:
[The slave] had no rights, nor nothing which he could call his own. He
had not the right to become a husband or a father in the eye of the law,
he had no child, he was not at liberty to indulge the natural affections of
the human heart for children, for wife, or even for friend.
... Is a free man to be deprived of the right of acquiring property, of
the right of having a family, a wife, children, home? What definition will
you attach to the word "freeman" that does not include these ideas? The
once slave is no longer a slave; he has become, by means of emancipation, a free man. If such be the case, then in all common sense is88he not
entitled to those rights which we concede to a man who is free?

Sen. Davis, arguing that the right of interracial marriage is a consequence of the law). Supporters of the bill acknowledged that the right to marry was implicated, and addressed the miscegenation fear by positing a "separate-but-equal" approach to marriage rights. CONG. GLOBE, 39th

Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1866) (statement of Sen. Fessenden, arguing that "[the black man] has the
same right to make a contract of marriage with a white woman that a white man has with a black
woman"); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322, 420 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull,
arguing that the right of marriage, encompassed by the bill, did not include the right of interracial marriage).
85. Rights of family integrity were understood to flow from the right to create a family by
marriage. See note 50 supra.
86. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
87. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (emphasis added).
88. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 504 (1866).

May 1988]

Best Interests of the Child

1119

3. The Fourteenth Amendment - A Third Force in Law-Science
InteractionsTouching Family Life
In this country, the meaning of citizenship developed with reference to the experience of slavery. It was in the process of abolition
that rights of national citizenship were articulated and given protection against encroachment by the states. The fourteenth amendment
assured the constitutional status of fundamental rights that were identified in the thirteenth amendment debates as having been trampled by
slavery, and decreed by the civil rights legislation of 1866 to be the
entitlement of free people.8 9
The debates of the thirty-eighth Congress have prompted the observation that "[t]he opposite of slavery is liberty." 90 Denial of rights
of family is of the essence of slavery. It was a prominent and uniquely
detestable feature of American slavery. 9 1 Appreciation of the need to
protect rights of family is a legacy of the progression from a slaveholding nation to a nation in which citizenship is a human birthright.
The fourteenth amendment, understood as an embodiment of that
legacy, serves to insulate rights of family. When claims of science
seem to justify curtailment of those rights, special scrutiny is required
to test the objectivity and accuracy of the scientific judgment and the
balance between liberty lost and public policy advanced. Scrutiny of
this sort would have heightened judicial appreciation of the value to
Carrie Buck of the liberty to bear children and the value to Malcolm
X's family of the right to survive as a family. Scrutiny of this sort
would have encouraged critical judicial examination of scientific prognoses with respect to the unborn children of Carrie Buck and the uprooted children of Malcolm X's mother.
Goldstein, Freud, Solnit, and Goldstein have enriched the store of
scientific knowledge upon which lawmakers may draw in advancing
the public good and promoting the interests of children. Their unexplained offering of the stories of Carrie Buck and Malcolm X suggests
that they sense the dangers of uncritical reliance upon that knowledge.
Both the science and the dangers must be appreciated. Law-science
collaborations that affect fundamental rights require more than that
89. See notes 73-88 supra and accompanying text.

90. tenBroek, supra note 65, at 179.
91. The legacy of this feature of slavery is described from the perspective of a principal character in Toni Morrison's novel of motherhood and slavery:
Anybody Baby Suggs knew, let alone loved, who hadn't run off or been hanged, got rented
out, loaned out, bought up, brought back, stored up, mortgaged, won, stolen or seized....
What she called the nastiness of life was the shock she received upon learning that nobody
stopped playing checkers just because the pieces included her children. Halle she was able
to keep the longest. Twenty years. A lifetime. Given to her, no doubt, to make up for
hearing that her two girls, neither of whom had their adult teeth, were sold and gone and
she had not been able to wave goodbye .... God take what He would," she said. And He
did, and He did, and He did ..
T. MORRISON, BELOVED 23 (1987).
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lawyers and scientists know their respective places. They require critical analysis of the competing claims of science and law; humble evaluation of the power of scientists to know; and cautious delineation of
the rights and responsibilities of individuals, functioning within the
"private realm of family life" 92 and of the collective, acting upon scientific knowledge to assure or enhance the well-being of its members.

92. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1943).

LEGISLATURES AND LEGAL CHANGE: THE

REFORM OF DIVORCE LAW
Carl E. Schneider*
A

ROUTINE POLICY MAKING AND THE
SILENT REVOLUTION:
TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES. By

HerbertJacob. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1988. Pp. 184.
$19.95.
It is now widely understood that in the last two decades American
family law has been transformed. What is not widely understood is
how that transformation occurred. It is a transformation of remarkable scope, a scope yet more striking for having been made not in one
national decision, but in fifty state legislatures. And the obvious explanations do not fully account for the transformation. True, social attitudes and social behavior have shifted dramatically; but to say that is
not to explain why the law changed. No bureaucracy made divorce
reform its business. No interest group on the model of the civil rights
or ecology movements demanded changes. Indeed, far from being politically controverted, much of the transformation went almost unnoticed. In A Silent Revolution, a political scientist, Professor Herbert
Jacob, contributes notably to our understanding of this puzzling transformation. The purpose of this review is to make the fact, the substance, and the quality of that contribution better known among
lawyers and legal academics.
Professor Jacob's book examines perhaps the central aspect of the
transformation of American family law - the reworking in the last
two decades of the law surrounding divorce. Until the mid-1960s,
America thought of itself as having "fault-based" divorce. Divorce
was an adversary proceeding in which one spouse alleged that the
other had violated a basic obligation of marriage in some serious way,
usually by committing adultery, by deserting his or her family, or by
treating his or her spouse cruelly. By the mid-1970s, however,
America could think of itself as having "no-fault" divorce. To obtain
a divorce a spouse had only to allege, in some form, that the marriage
had broken down. This triumph of no-fault divorce alone was impressive, and it was made more so by accompanying revisions of the principles of the law governing alimony, the division of marital property,
and child custody.
* Professor, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1972, Harvard University; J.D. 1979,
University of Michigan. - Ed.
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Reforms of such magnitude are likely to rest on large-scale social
changes, and, as Professor Jacob notes, twentieth-century America has
been prolific of changes in family life. Longer life-spans and smaller
families have meant that couples generally live together longer, and
particularly live together longer after their children have left them.
Women have increasingly entered the workforce, not just before they
have children and after their children have left home, but while their
children are young. Further, women have increasingly found betterpaying jobs. These economic changes, Professor Jacob suggests, have
both worsened tensions within marriages and made it easier - economically, socially, and psychologically - for women to leave them.
The revival of feminism in the early 1960s heightened these effects.
And social and personal expectations of marriage - that it be intensely rewarding, that it be a partnership of equals - grew at the
same time that divorce came to seem less wrong and even less harmful
personally and socially. These movements in social attitudes and
structure were reflected in changing views about divorce laws: in
1966, only thirteen percent of the population believed divorce laws
were too strict; in 1974, after no-fault divorce had become widely
available, one-third of the population thought so.
Changing social facts, and even changing opinions about law, do
not by themselves change law. What transformed new attitudes toward divorce into new law? Professor Jacob begins that story in New
York. New York notoriously had the most restrictive divorce law in
the country; adultery was the only ground for divorce. And New
York notoriously had the most flouted divorce law in the country; the
same kind of fraudulent adultery that was long the stuff of English
novels and life was regularly confected in New York. The delicateminded (and well-to-do) New Yorker went to Reno, for Nevada had a
short residency requirement and a liberal divorce statute. The gap between the law on the books and the law in action distressed many who
knew about it and particularly distressed the lawyers and judges who
collaborated in or countenanced the hypocrisy and perjury which
made the system work.
The catalyst of divorce reform in New York was a public relations
man and law student who was a Democratic member of the New York
legislature. Quite by chance, he came upon the issue and, in the hope
of attracting attention and promoting his career, embraced it. He
found that divorce reform won him little attention. But he did find an
ally in an admiralty lawyer who was chairman of a special committee
on family law of the elite Bar Association of the City of New York,
which was concerned about the fraud that suffused New York divorce
law. The legislator and the lawyer went to Professor Henry Foster, of
the New York University Law School, an expert in family law. Professor Foster drafted both a bill and a legislative committee's report on
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the bill, a report which emphasized the problem of fraud and of public
confidence in the law.
In the legislature, the bill attracted bipartisan support and little
opposition, even from the Catholic Church. The Church's power had
long been feared by proponents of divorce reform in New York, but its
political strength had recently been eroded and its efforts were directed to battles over abortion and parochial school aid. Legislators
who disliked the bill because it made divorce easier were accorded an
amendment providing for compulsory conciliation proceedings. The
press ignored the issue. Thus, even though the Bar Association of the
City of New York was the only interest group actively backing the bill,
it became law in 1966. The statute was justified as improving the honesty of divorce proceedings, not as introducing no-fault divorce. But
when, a few years later, the waiting period for divorce after separation
was reduced to one year, it was widely said that no-fault divorce had
come to New York.
While New York had had perhaps the most conservative divorce
law in the country, California had, at least in practice, one of the most
liberal. Nevertheless, California's was a fault-based statute. In the
early 1960s, a group of elite matrimonial lawyers from the San Francisco Bay area who felt that the law invited dishonesty and exacerbated the hostility between divorcing spouses began to work toward
reform. They were joined by a similar group from Los Angeles. They
testified before a legislative committee to advocate reforms, including
no-fault divorce. In 1966, Governor Edmund Brown appointed a
Commission on the Family which included members of both the San
Francisco and Los Angeles groups. Arguing that no-fault divorce was
already effectively available, the Commission (in the most conservative
of terms and tones) advocated eliminating fault grounds altogether
and altering a number of other aspects of California's divorce law. In
1967, these proposals were in their essentials introduced into the legislature by a conservative Republican. As in New York, the bill was
presented as primarily a technical and limited reform of the law, and it
attracted little notice and little opposition. The bill passed and was
signed into law by Governor Ronald Reagan.
The next stage of the transformation of divorce law involved the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The
NCCUSL was founded in 1892 as a quasi-public group of law professors, elite lawyers, and legislators funded by appropriations from the
states and by grants from private sources. It was intended to promote
uniform state laws by proposing (in conjunction with the American
Bar Association) drafts of laws in areas in which uniformity among
the states might be desirable. The NCCUSL had been interested in
divorce law since its inception, and by the mid-1960s a group of elite
divorce lawyers and law professors had convinced the Conference that
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the widespread dishonesty in divorce proceedings, the unduly adversarial nature of divorce proceedings, and the great diversity of divorce
standards among the states justified another try at formulating a uniform statute. Once again, in other words, the problem was formulated
by lawyers in relatively technical lawyer's terms.
Elite law-reform organizations like the NCCUSL and the American Law Institute usually work through a committee staffed by a "reporter" who is commonly a law professor expert in the relevant field.
In this case, the co-reporters were Professor Robert Levy, who was
and is a family law specialist at the University of Minnesota Law
School, and Professor Herma Hill Kay, who taught and teaches family
law at Boalt Hall and who had been prominent in the reform of California divorce law. The reporters drafted, and the committee and the
Conference adopted, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. The
UMDA not only offered states a model no-fault divorce statute, it proposed an entire body of family law, one including reforms of the law of
marital property, alimony, and child custody. Yet despite the
UMDA's sweep, debate over it was primarily technical and ignored
the many difficult social issues the UMDA implicated. Approval by
the ABA's House of Delegates, while inhibited by institutional and
personal conflicts, came in 1973, reasonably easily and without discussion of any underlying social issues.
It is hard to say how much influence the UMDA had and how
much its advocacy of no-fault divorce simply reflected the temper of
the times. The endorsement of no-fault divorce by such respectable
and conservative institutions as the NCCUSL and the ABA at least
promoted a trend toward reform that had already gathered considerable momentum: By 1974, forty-five states had what could be described
as no-fault divorce. By 1985, every state had no-fault divorce grounds,
although many states also retained fault grounds. This description of
reform's extent is somewhat misleading, however, since "no-fault" is
an ambiguous term. Pure no-fault statutes permit divorce if the marriage has irretrievably broken down, but statutes allowing divorce after separation for a defined period are also often considered no-fault
statutes. By the latter standard, a number of states had had no-fault
divorce well before the 1960s. Even in those states, however, the
1960s and 1970s brought an increased receptivity to rapid divorce on
demand.
The UMDA also contributed to the reform of the other significant
components of divorce law: the law of marital property, alimony, and
child support. Except in a few community property states, property
had traditionally been allocated to the spouse who owned it at the time
of the divorce, an allocation heavily influenced by the name in which
the property was held. In the 1970s, this rule was increasingly abandoned in favor of systems that were more inclined to treat property as
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marital rather than as the property of individuals, that explicitly recognized in economic terms nonfinancial contributions to a family's
well-being, that ignored marital fault in allocating property, and that
gave judges discretion to divide property "equitably." Alimony had,
in principle, traditionally been available to wives innocent of marital
fault until they remarried. This rule was increasingly abandoned in
favor of rehabilitative alimony - alimony designed only to help a
spouse (whether maritally at fault or not) regain the ability to support
himself or herself. Finally, custody of children had traditionally gone
to the mother. In the 1970s and 1980s, this maternal presumption
weakened and various forms of joint custody grew more appealing.
How, then, does Professor Jacob explain the transformation of divorce law? First, it is worth noting several forces that played a smaller
part than might be expected. The Roman Catholic Church, whose
opposition to divorce was well-established and well-known, had little
effect on the legislative debates of most states. Feminism had a somewhat greater impact, but the feminist position on these issues was undeveloped, and there were feminists on both sides. Further, the
women's movement was absorbed in other issues, like the Equal
Rights Amendment. Indeed, no interest group, to say nothing of any
mass movement, was deeply committed to reforming divorce law. Bar
associations were involved in every state's reform effort, but not intensively: divorce law is a relatively low-status practice, and not all divorce lawyers favored no-fault divorce. Even the press widely ignored
the reform. And because of the low visibility of divorce reform, it was
not an issue which legislators could use to advance their careers.
So let us repeat the question. How does Professor Jacob believe
the transformation was worked? Changes in social structure and social attitudes made the transformation certainly less controversial and
perhaps plainly desirable. Reform cost the fise nothing and gained in
respectability and even in appeal as more and more states adopted it.
Reform cost almost nothing politically too, since the absence of publicity about it helped ensure the absence of opposition to it. All these
factors allowed a minute number of reformers, often lawyers with professional interests in divorce law, to work with a small number of legislators to achieve their goals. They succeeded because they did nothing
to alter the conditions I have just described: they carefully defined
their proposals as conservative, incremental, and technical changes in
the law; they denied they were dealing with any significant social
problems; they strove not to stir up interest-group opposition and
worked assiduously to propitiate the likeliest powerful opponent, the
Catholic Church; and they asserted their special expertise against the
claims of laymen.
In sum, Professor Jacob argues, the transformation of American
divorce law exemplifies "routine policymaking." Professor Jacob
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notes that we ordinarily think of policy as created in a fierce conflict
between deeply motivated interest groups. But legislatures could not
accomplish all they need to if all policy were made that way. In fact,
much policy is made quite routinely-reforms are drawn narrowly
and described as conservative, experts are prominently relied on, the
costs of reforms are kept low, and public attention is avoided.
But even if divorce reform was achieved through routine policymaking, its effects were not trivial: no-fault divorce was universalized, the common law principles for dividing property on divorce were
widely abandoned, alimony became rarer and shorter, and joint custody of the children of divorced parents made maternal custody less
automatic. A Silent Revolution thus closes by evaluating these reforms. Professor Jacob observes that assessments of divorce reform
depend on who you ask and what they thought the reforms were
meant to do. The kind of lawyers who advocated no-fault divorce
have not systematically evaluated divorce reform, but their general impression is that no-fault has reduced fraud and acrimony in divorce
proceedings. The most extensive and best publicized consideration of
the new laws by a social scientist has been Lenore Weitzman's The
Divorce Revolution (1985). Professor Weitzman argued that reform
has generally disserved women by reducing the sense that marriage is
for life, by depriving wives of the bargaining chip that fault-based divorce often provided, and by eliminating the advantages that the innocent wife had under no-fault divorce. Professor Weitzman also
reported that rehabilitative alimony terminates sooner than traditional
alimony and that it often fails of its rehabilitative purpose. Finally,
she noted that the weakening of the presumption that mothers get custody gave fathers a bargaining chip they had not had before. Professor
Weitzman's figures suggested that, one year after a divorce, men's
standard of living had risen forty-two percent, while women's had
fallen seventy-three percent. Professor Jacob is skeptical of Professor
Weitzman's conclusions. He observes that her data are from California, whose laws are less favorable to women than those of many other
states, and that other studies reach different results. He sketches national data he has examined which indicate that any difference that
no-fault divorce has made is slight and is in women's favor.
I hope that this all-too-abbreviated survey of Professor Jacob's
book has convinced you that it warrants reading. The book is not, of
course, without faults. But its faults are largely amiable ones, often
the product of its admirable ambition. Professor Jacob has, after all,
not only undertaken to investigate three major reforms - those of nofault divorce, of marital property and alimony, and of child custody each with a different legislative career, but also to develop an analysis
of "routine policymaking." The book's scope deters some of its parts
from being as fully developed as the reader might wish. For instance,
Professor Jacob describes the legislative adoption of no-fault divorce
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with uncommon efficiency (such stories are usually related in such stupefying detail that their structure is wholly obscured). But he does not
attempt an equally enlightening account of how marital-property and
child-custody law were rewritten.
Professor Jacob's exploration of whether the changes he describes
can aptly be called a "revolution" is also somewhat limited. This
question is important because it speaks to his suggestion that revolutionary change can be achieved through routine policymaking. As he
notes, many features of the reform were part of the law of some jurisdictions well before the 1960s. Some of the "revolution" in divorce
grounds, for example, was accomplished by simply relabelling as "nofault" statutes which permitted divorce where couples had been living
apart. This prefiguring of reforms is, after all, what made it possible to
describe them as merely incremental. Furthermore, a great deal of old
doctrine still persists - some states did not abolish fault grounds
when they adopted no-fault grounds, and many states have not drastically revised their law of marital property and child custody. Even
where doctrine has clearly changed, judicial behavior may not have.
Judicial resistance is always a.possible impediment to reform, particularly where, as in family law, judges are accorded wide discretion.
Most of the reform statutes are notably undirective. For example, the
UMDA's marital property and child custody provisions offer judges
only a long list of criteria, without explaining a criterion's intended
effect or weight. With statutes so vague, and with the circumstances
of families varying so much, appellate courts cannot readily supervise
trial courts or develop systematic standards which might guide them.
Further, most families do not have enough property for courts to divide and do not dispute who is to have custody of the children. And
most of the post-divorce relations between parties are negotiated, not
set by courts, although legal rules presumably affect negotiations. In
sum, we are left wondering how effective the revolution Professor Jacob describes can be and thus what the scope of routine policymaking
is.
My own sense is that the changes in family law have been greater
than these considerations would suggest. The revolution is, I think,
sparked and sustained by a set of ideological assumptions which are
widely shared among many elite segments of society, assumptions having to do with egalitarianism and with psychologically derived views
of human nature. Professor Jacob tends to neglect such factors.
While he is sensitive to the broad social changes that underlay the
legislative reforms, he only hints at the process by which particular
groups of people perceived those social changes, conceptualized them,
brought them into social discourse, and proposed legislative responses
to them. For instance, we are told that experts in family law were
central in the reform process, but we are not told about the law review
literature that preceded the reforms. I suspect that had Professor Ja-
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cob pursued these questions further, both his explanation of the reforms and his description of their scope would have been more fully
textured and convincing.
The reader is also left tantalized by the chapter which evaluates the
various reforms. Professor Jacob, of course, is hampered by the fact
that the reforms are so recent. This has meant, for example, that studies of joint custody are largely meaningless, since parents pioneering
joint custody have tended to be self-selected enthusiasts, since the social scientists studying them have tended to be partisan, and since it is
too early to measure the long-term effects on children. Similarly, studies of the financial consequences of divorce reform have generally been
of single jurisdictions, and it is too early to tell yet, for example, which
effects are the effects of no-fault divorce and which are the effects of
changes in marital property law. Professor Jacob does give us a
glimpse of his own intriguing study, which uses national data, but it is
only a glimpse.
Finally, the reader is left hungry for a more extensive discussion of
Professor Jacob's intriguing ideas about routine policymaking. Perhaps because the case-study format is limiting, many questions are not
fully addressed: What are other examples of routine policymaking?
When is it likely to occur? What are its strengths? What are its limits? I particularly wonder whether "routine policymaking" is not a
somewhat inaccurate label and one that covers too many different
ways of making policy. Consider the example of divorce reform. The
move to no-fault divorce can in some ways be called routine. The issue of how easy divorce should be had long and widely been controverted. By mid-century, those in favor of easier divorce clearly
predominated, if only because it had become plain that the enforcement problems of strict divorce were unmanageable. The divorce rate
rose inexorably despite all attempts to stem it. States like Nevada undercut the restrictive statutes of states like New York. Perjury became
common in states like New York. Courts acceded to pressure for easier divorce by manipulating divorce grounds like mental cruelty. By
the time of the social and ideological changes of the 1960s, the way
had been well prepared for no-fault divorce, and its adoption can reasonably be called the routine political implementation of a social decision. On the other hand, no such preparation paved the way for
changes in marital property and child custody law. Neither aspect of
the law had been debated on any broad scale since the nineteenth century. Thus legislatures seem to have had a more active role in actually
developing policy, and the changes they made seem correspondingly
more vulnerable. Professor Jacob apparently denominates the latter
role "routine" because it did not involve conflict. But if "routine"
policymaking is simply any nonconflictual policymaking, the category
is so broad that it needs further development.
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To criticize a book for not doing more of what it already does well
is surely to praise with faint damns. And praise is the note on which I
wish to close. Professor Jacob has provided us with a fair-minded, and
illuminating book which much needed to be written. Students of family law will find it a valuable history of the recent transformation of
their subject. They will also find it an admirable corrective to the two
heroic views of how legal change can and should occur. The first such
view is that legislative change happens only at the behest of aroused
interest groups. The second is that legislative change happens only at
the behest of aroused courts. Professor Jacob shows us that a third, if
less heroic, view is possible and demands our attention.

AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUS-

By Derrick A. Bell. New York: Basic Books. 1987. Pp. xii,
288. $19.95.
TICE.

If a book could be said to have a personality, then Derrick Bell's
And We Are Not Saved could certainly be classified as a schizophrenic.
Part fable, part legal scholarship, combining a pessimistic diagnosis of
American race relations and a more optimistic prognosis for the eventual attainment of racial justice, Bell's latest work is simultaneously a
frightening, objective demythologization of American civil rights law,
and a brave and awful personal search "for completeness by allowing a
dialogue with opposites within himself."' It is a search that is not
entirely successful but one which yields provocative insights
into the
2
often contradictory thinking of a renowned legal scholar.
And We Are Not Saved is an expanded version of the author's foreword to the HarvardLaw Review's 1985 Supreme Court issue. 3 There,
Bell, long known as an innovative legal writer,4 created the character
of Geneva Crenshaw, narrator of the Civil Rights Chronicles and foil
to Bell's rapier-sharp dissection of current civil rights litigation strategies and their prospects for success. Through the telling of her chronicles, Geneva deftly decorticates the layers of myth and fantasy which
envelop American civil rights law and proposes radical alternatives to
traditional litigation strategies, thus allowing Bell to reconstruct the
quest for racial justice from his vantage point as a disappointed and
disillusioned veteran of that long march. Although Geneva eventually
(and unconvincingly) converts to Bell's point of view, it is from the
interplay of her cynical observations and Bell's tempered optimism
that the book derives much of its dynamism.
The book-length version of the Chronicles is divided into three
parts: The Legal Hurdles to Racial Justice, The Social Affliction of
Racism, and Divining a Nation's Salvation. These are further subdivided into ten chronicles addressing the subjects of the constitutional
foundations of racism (in The Chronicle of the Constitutional Contradiction), the limitations of civil rights litigation as a means of obtaining
1. De Gidio, Remarks on the Civil Rights Chronicles, 3 HARV. BLACKLETrER J. 56, 56
(1986).
2. Bell is a professor at the Harvard Law School and former dean and professor at the University of Oregon School of Law. He has served in a number of governmental and public organizations including the United States Department of Justice and the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).
3. Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term - Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV.
L. REv.4 (1985).
4. See, e.g., Brittain, Book Review, 14 CONN. L. REv.457 (1982); Freeman, Book Review,
90 YALE L.J. 1880 (1981); Willhelm, Book Review, 79 MICH. L. REV. 847 (1981).
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racial justice (in The Chronicle of the Celestial Curia), the dilution of
black voting power (in The Chronicle of the Ultimate Voting Rights
Act), the fallacy that desegregation promotes educational equality (in
The Chronicle of the Sacrificed Black Schoolchildren), the economic
barriers to racial equality (in The Chronicle of the Black Reparations
Foundation),the dangers of affirmative action (in The Chronicle of the
De Vine Gift), the potential for inter-racial cooperation (in The Chronicle of the Amber Cloud), relations between black men and black
women (in The Chronicle of the Twenty-Seventh-Year Syndrome),
black cultural autonomy and white cultural domination (in The
Chronicle of the Slave Scrolls), and the ultimate emptiness of any racial
reforms which are unaccompanied by fundamental changes in social
and cultural values (in The Chronicle of the Black Crime Cure).
This sprawling, patulous approach to civil rights issues gains thematic strength and coherence from Bell's radicular belief that because
of the inherent limitations of litigation, past attempts to obtain racial
equality have had but limited success and current strategies promise
little more than the alleviation of isolated inequalities, leaving the
overall situation of racial injustice unaltered. 5 Indeed, according to
Bell, many of the solutions sought by civil rights groups exacerbate the
misery of the victims of racial discrimination, rendering them more
vulnerable to the injustices of a racist society.
This viewpoint is most powerfully expressed by Bell in his discussions of school desegregation and affirmative action. 6 Bell has previously7 analyzed and critiqued the litigation strategies leading up to,
and policies flowing from the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Education.8 The Chronicle of the Sacrificed Black Schoolchildren, in addition to developing these arguments, is a particularly stirring indictment of school desegregation and a poignant description of
the plight of "invisible" 9 black schoolchildren who, more than a quarter-century after Brown, await, with the "[p]atience... necessary...
for those who rely on the law" 10 the harvest of educational equality
allegedly sown by the decision.
School desegregation, argues Bell, must be viewed as just one part
of the civil rights litigation of the 1950s. Schools were seen as "the
weak link in the 'separate but equal' chain" (p. 111). In their determi5. See also Bell, Private Clubs and Public Judges: A Nonsubstantive Debate About Symbols,
59 TEXAS L. REV. 733 (1981).
6. These topics are addressed in chapters 2; 4, and 6.
7. See SHADES OF BROWN, NEw PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (D. Bell ed.
1980); Bell, The Dialectics ofSchool Desegregation, 32 ALA. L. REv. 281 (1981); Bell, Brown v.
Board of Education and the Interest-ConvergenceDilemma, (Comment), 93 HARV. L. REv. 518
(1980).
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. P. 110 (citing R. RisT, THE INVISIBLE CHILDREN (1978)).
10. Bell, An Issue On Race Relations- Foreword, 61 OR. L. REV. 151 (1982).
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nation to overturn that doctrine as it applied to a broad array of activities, civil rights litigators failed to consider the possibility that equality
in education might best be accomplished through means other than
desegregation. Experience suggests that, rather than depend on social
science data demonstrating the adverse effects of segregation, civil
rights activists should have persuaded the Court that "equal education
in its constitutional dimensions must, at the very least, conform to the
contours of equal education as defined by the educators." II A segregated school provided with adequate resources, sympathetic teachers,
and a commitment to preserving and enriching black culture might
better obtain the educational equality sought by Brown. Citing W.E.B.
DuBois, Bell notes, "Other things being equal, the mixed school is the
broader, more natural basis for the education of all youth.... But
other things seldom are equal, and in that case, Sympathy, Knowledge, and Truth, outweigh all that the mixed school can offer" (p.
121).
Although Bell does not expressly reject desegregation and racial
balance as appropriate goals for school systems, his description of the
aleatory effects of school desegregation - the closure of black schools,
the firing of black teachers and demotion of black school administrators, the disruption of black student life, and the disappearance of
black community and cultural values which black schools served to
protect (pp. 109-10) - casts into doubt the contention that desegregation is an unalloyedly correct method of rectifying educational inequalities. Moreover, desegregation serves other purposes for white
elites who fear the potential rebelliousness of discontented black
masses (pp. 60-62) and who employ desegregation programs to achieve
their own agendas (pp. 107-11).
Affirmative action programs have similarly resulted in only limited
benefits for blacks, benefits which again accrue to white elites as well.
These programs tend to benefit only a small number of blacks, usually
those with greater degrees of education and skill. Noting William J.
Wilson's argument that "affirmative action programs are not designed
to deal with the problem of the disproportionate concentration of
blacks in the low-wage labor market" (p. 48), Bell contends that affirmative action creates economic schisms within the black community, dilutes the achievements of successful blacks, and denies society's
sympathy to that segment of the black community most deserving of
support (p. 49).

Furthermore, the unspoken limits on affirmative action (i.e., tokenism) create problems not amenable to court-ordered remediation.
This is especially true, Bell ironically points out, in just those professional fields where blacks have made their greatest gains. For examI1. P. 110 (quoting Carter, A Reassessment of Brown v. Board, in SHADES
27 (D. Bell ed. 1980)).

PERSPECTIVES IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

OF BROWN: NEW
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ple, Bell describes the dilemmas faced by black law professors who see
the rejection of other qualified minorities as silent criticism of their
own performances (p. 148). As token minorities on law school faculties, black professors must confront the possibility that their presence
confers legitimacy and respectability upon racist institutions (p. 146).
Even where they are able to overcome the judicial system's reluctance
to impose affirmative action requirements on elite professions (p. 149),
blacks must fear the gradual attainment of employment levels beyond
the "tipping point," 12 that is, beyond some theoretical point at which
the white institution begins to lose its identity as "white," thus justifying, in the minds of white administrators, purposeful racial discrimination (pp. 151-56).
The limited success of desegregation and affirmative action, as well
as the denial of even the meager benefits of such programs to the black
underclass, is what leads Geneva or, more accurately, Bell to consider
the alternatives to "the leaky boat of litigation" (p. 71). Yet aside
from some casual references to Frances Fox Piven and Richard
Cloward (who believe that mass protest is a better strategy than reform politics for empowering blacks) (p. 58) and an altogether unsatisfying discussion of Marcus Garvey's "back to Africa" movement (p.
187), these alternatives remain largely unexamined. Piven and
Cloward are only two of a significant number of scholars, whose ranks
include Paolo Freire and John Gaventa, 13 who argue that only rebellion can empower the large masses of poor, disenfranchised citizens of
Western and Third World countries. Bell's treatment of these theories
has the quality of a "straw man" argument, superficially presented in
order to assert the ultimate correctness of his own preference for continued litigation. Similarly, Garvey's emigration proposals, while
hardly a panacea for American racism, could have been more effectively employed to illustrate the depth of frustration and disillusionment now confronting civil rights activists.
The superficial examination of these alternatives to continued litigation lends Geneva's final conversion to Bell's viewpoint a somewhat
shallow and unconvincing character. The tension between her desire
for violent change and Bell's commitment to legal reform is a simmering conflict which remains unresolved until the final paragraphs of the
book. Then, in a divine revelation which concludes her tales, Geneva
discovers a "Third Way" (p. 251). She accepts that racial equality
must be pursued through the traditional means of litigation but insists
that economic equality be recognized as a concurrently achievable
goal. Just as the civil rights movement has transformed the Constitu12. See also Bell, Application of the "Tipping Point" Principleto Law Faculty Hiring Policies,
10 NOVA L.J. 319 (1986).
13. See, e.g., P. FREIRE, THE PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (1972); J. GAVENTA, POWER
AND POWERLESSNESS (1980).
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tion from a document concerned with property rights into a document
concerned with human rights (p. 252), the "Third Way" must now
force the courts to develop a perspective emphasizing economic as well
as political equality.
Just why the creation of such novel legal rights and remedies will
have greater success than previous attempts to achieve racial justice is
left unclear. But Bell is obviously optimistic. For him, the struggle
against all forms of inequality - racial, sexual, and economic - is a
battle from which "I never will turn back. Oh, I will go. I shall go.
To see what the end will be" (p. 258).
This final outburst of unrestrained optimism stands in dire contrast
to the bleak despair of the titular epigram 14 and is but one of the contradictory or ambivalent qualities in Bell's writing. While the use of
Geneva as a noetic antithesis to the author's defense of litigation serves
to illuminate and enucleate the tensions at the core of Bell's thought,
the dramatized internal dialogue is often distracting. The conversations between Bell and Geneva are frequently strained, the prose often
stilted and unnatural.' 5
Moreover, the artificial bifurcation of "Geneva" and "Bell" allows
Bell to enjoy the luxury of not confronting the contradictory arguments in his analyses. It sometimes seems that where those contradictions are hard to resolve, Bell simply has his characters move on to a
new topic of conversation or part company. Bell must have reveled in
this freedom from the rigors of scholasticism, but he has gained that
freedom at a cost to some of his arguments' clarity and cogency.
Finally, the diatribes in which Geneva and Bell engage occasionally do more to obfuscate than to elucidate current judicial policy.
This is especially true in Bell's analysis of voting rights. This complex
area of litigation is not well served by Bell's cursory and dramatized
presentation. Nor do his footnotes sufficiently expand upon the fictionalized material. (In fact, Bell's footnotes are generally too pithy to
be of great value.) It would be interesting and fruitful scholarship
were Bell to bring his considerable analytical skills to bear on this issue in a more rigorous and methodical manner.
Yet, despite these flaws, perhaps because of them, And We Are Not
Saved offers much that is thought-provoking, penetrating, and
profound. Bell's apparent ambivalence towards and qualified acceptance of the wisdom of continued legal reforms represents a deepseated frustration that many civil rights activists must experience in
attempting to push America away from its racist roots and in the direction of a just society. Still, his ultimate faith is that of a man "with
14. Jeremiah 8:20: "The harvest is past, the summer is ended, and we are not saved."
15. Bell himself seems to recognize this. See, eg., Bell, The Civil Rights ChroniclesRevisited:
Comments and Introduction, 3 HARv.BLACKLEarrER J. 46, 48 (1986) (where Bell describes his
prose as "courageous legalese").
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[his] mind set on freedom."'
nation's salvation.

6

Such faith may well prove to be our

-

Kevin Edward Kennedy

THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: How HIGHER EDUCATION
HAS FAILED DEMOCRACY AND IMPOVERISHED THE SOULS OF To-

DAY'S STUDENTS.

By Allan Bloom. New York: Simon and Schuster.

1987. Pp. 392. $18.95.
Bacon, Descartes, T.S. Eliot, Hobbes, Leibniz, Locke, Machiavelli,
Jacques Maritain, Christopher Marlowe, Montesquieu, Newton,
Rousseau, Socrates, and Voltaire... Readers should be forewarned
that they will encounter the teachings of such great thinkers when
they pick up Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind. In
fact, they will encounter all of these on one page, 292. And this is not
an atypical page - except for the omission of Nietzsche, whose influ2
ence permeates the book.
If American education has really reached the depths Bloom depicts, such a difficult book should have no audience. After all, a
reader needs a good foundation in both Greek literature and European
especially German - philosophy in order to appreciate Bloom's
insights. Yet the book has stayed on the New York Times best-seller
list for many months. Can Bloom be mistaken about the lack of culture in America? How has the book found so many readers?
Perhaps the answer is that it appeals to several audiences for different reasons. Although the circle of Bloom's soulmates may be growing older and narrower daily, there are many others who will read or at least buy - his book:
16. Bell, A Hurdle Too High: Class-basedRoadblocks to RacialRemediation, 33 BUFFALO
L. REv. 1, 2 (1984).
1. Bloom, the author of critiques of Rousseau and Shakespeare, is a professor of social
thought at the University of Chicago.
2. Nietzsche's influence is typified in this quote:
At the very best, it is clear to me now that nature needs the cooperation of convention, just
as man's art is needed to found the political order that is the condition of his natural completeness. At worst, I fear that spiritual entropy or an evaporation of the soul's boiling
blood is taking place, a fear that Nietzsche thought justified and made the center of all his
thought. He argued that the spirit's bow was being unbent and risked being permanently
unstrung. Its activity, he believed, comes from culture, and the decay of culture meant not
only the decay of man in this culture but the decay of man simply. This is the crisis he tried
to face resolutely: the very existence of man as man, as a noble being, depended on him and
on men like him - so he thought. He may not have been right, but his case looks stronger
all the time.
P. 51. Other notable names omitted from page 292 that dot the pages elsewhere in the book are
Woody Allen, Aristotle, Freud, Hegel, Heidegger, Plato, Shakespeare, Swift, and Tocqueville.

1136

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 86:1135

* College administrators and faculty leaders who see the subtitle
and feel compelled to read it in order to keep abreast of the latest
attacks on their livelihood.
* Feminists who have heard that Bloom calls feminism "[t]he latest enemy of the vitality of the classic texts" (p. 65) and says that
women no longer need the National Organization for Women (p. 107).
* Would-be censors of music and other diversions of the youth
culture who can bolster their arguments with passages such as this:
Picture a thirteen-year-old boy sitting in the living room of his family
home doing his math assignment while wearing his Walkman headphones or watching MTV. He enjoys the liberties hard won over centuries by the alliance of philosophic genius and political heroism,
consecrated by the blood of martyrs; he is provided with comfort and
leisure by the most productive economy ever known to mankind; science
has penetrated the secrets of nature in order to provide him with the
marvelous, lifelike, electronic sound and image reproduction he is enjoying. And in what does progress culminate? A pubescent child whose
body throbs with orgasmic rhythms; whose feelings are made articulate
in hymns to the joys of onanism or the killing of parents; whose ambition
is to win fame and wealth in imitating the drag-queen who makes the
music. In short, life is made into a nonstop, commercially prepackaged
masturbational fantasy. [pp. 74-75]
* Those who yearn for a kind of erudition they lack but who can
fantasize that they are members of a dying elite while they turn page
after page with little comprehension.
* Name-droppers who will read just enough of the first third of
the book 3 to impress people at cocktail parties.
* Ostentatious social climbers who frankly have no intention of
reading the book but who like to decorate their coffee tables with the
most impressive ornaments from the best-seller lists.
Those who actually read The Closing of the American Mind will
find it by turns stimulating, erudite, provocative, quotable, dated, simplistic, and boring. Bloom has taught for nearly three decades in some
of the "best" colleges in this country as well as abroad, 4 and he has
observed students closely. The book's strongest section is the first,
where he describes the students he has seen over the years. Part 2,
Nihilism, American Style, is the most demanding and will probably
find the fewest readers. Part 3 is entitled The University; its final two
chapters (The Sixties and The Student and the University) are also
3. Part 1, Students, covers pages 47-137 and is by far the most concrete - and therefore
readable - section.
4. Many of the references are to Bloom's experiences at Cornell, where he taught during the
1969 student takeover. This incident appears to have had a profound effect on Bloom that pervades his writings. He has also taught at Yale and at the University of Chicago - where he is
currently codirector of the John M. Olin Center for Inquiry into the Theory and Practice of
Democracy - as well as at the University of Toronto, the University of Paris, and Tel Aviv

University.
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closely tied to Bloom's experiences, and their concreteness makes
them readable. Those who merely want to learn what is wrong with
American colleges may be unprepared for a seminar in European philosophy before they can discover the answer. If they are unwilling to
plod through the lengthy middle section, they may just skip to the last
two chapters.
So who is to blame for the failure of higher education? The usual
suspects are the faculty, the students, and society, and Bloom distributes blame among all three. The faculty, for example, shamed itself in
the sixties by capitulating to demands for relevance and by letting militant students run the schools. 5 But he devotes more time to analyzing
the failures of the students and the society that has spawned them.
His summation of today's students may strike many readers as apt:
Students these days are, in general, nice. I choose the word carefully.
They are not particularly moral or noble. Such niceness is a facet of
democratic character when times are good. Neither war nor tyranny nor
want has hardened them or made demands on them. The wounds and
rivalries caused by class distinction have disappeared along with any
strong sense of class (as it once existed in universities in America and as
it still does, poisonously, in England). Students are free of most constraints, and their families make sacrifices for them without asking for
much in the way of obedience or respect.... The drugs and the sex once
thought to be forbidden are available in the quantities required for sensible use. A few radical feminists still feel the old-time religion, but most
of the women are comfortably assured that not much stands in the way
of their careers.... Students these days are pleasant, friendly and, if not
great-souled, at least not particularly mean-spirited. Their primary preoccupation is themselves, understood in the narrowest sense. [pp. 82-83]
Students come to college with no values, have no sense of right and
wrong, view everything as relative, and feel no urge to judge others.
They come to college sexually sated, with no innocence. 6 They are
self-centered and self-satisfied. Indeed, "the self is the modem substitute for the soul" (p. 173). Their self-satisfaction extends to their
country. "The longing for Europe has been all but extinguished in the
young" (p. 320), according to Bloom. Students are the products of
their society, a society destroyed by the effects of feminism, divorce,
and a retreat from the liberal
two-career families, a polluted language,
7
arts in favor of professional training.
5. For Bloom, the late sixties were the Dark Ages of education, and universities have yet to
recover. P. 319.
6. Bloom's favorite students are the few remaining virgins:
I believe that the most interesting students are those who have not settled the sexual problem, who are still young, even look young for their age, who think there is much to look
forward to and much they must yet grow up to, fresh and naive, excited by the mysteries to
which they have not yet been fully initiated.

P. 134.
7. Bloom's discussion of many of these problems can be found in sections entitled "Divorce"
and "Love" that span pages 118 to 132.
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Bloom finds students disappointing because they are bland, homogenized, without "cultural baggage" (p. 89), prejudices, or any real
fears. 8 Are these really the typical students of 1987? Perhaps Bloom's
exposure has been limited to the sons and daughters of the rich. Had
he taught in some less elite institutions, he might have seen students
with real prejudices, real fears. Even at the top universities today,
these seem to be resurfacing. Racial unrest is reappearing, and the
sexual revolution has met with at least a temporary obstacle in the
AIDS crisis. 9 Perhaps Bloom is unaware of some of these changes
because, as codirector of the John M. Olin Center for Inquiry into the
Theory and Practice of Democracy at the University of Chicago, he
has fewer chances to get to know undergraduates than he once had.
When these nice but dull students reach the university, what
awaits them? Not, Bloom regrets, the cultural storehouses to which
students of the forties and fifties were exposed. 10 Instead, "[t]he humanists are old maid librarians" (p. 136), and preprofessionalism has
taken over the campus. Particularly heinous examples, in Bloom's
eyes, are the MBA programs:
[A] great disaster has occurred. It is the establishment during the last
decade or so of the MBA as the moral equivalent of the MD or the law
degree, meaning a way of insuring a lucrative living by the mere fact of a
diploma that is not a mark of scholarly achievement. It is a general rule
that the students who have any chance of getting a liberal education are
those who do not have a fixed career goal, or at least those for whom the
university is not merely a training ground for a profession.... The effect
of the MBA is to corral a horde of students who want to get into business school and to put the blinders on them, to legislate an illiberal, officially approved undergraduate program for them at the outset, like
premeds who usually disappear into their required courses and are never
heard from again. 1
8. He pooh-poohs the suggestion that today's students fear nuclear war. See p. 83.
9. A single footnote on page 106 acknowledges this fear: "It remains to be seen what effect
AIDS will have. The wave of publicity about herpes a couple of years ago had almost no discernible psychological fallout."
10. Bloom, who was an undergraduate in the 1940s and 1950s, may be striking a nostalgic
note when he says,
As I reflect on it, the last fertile moment when student and university made a match was the
fling with Freud during the forties and fifties. He advertised a real psychology, a version of
the age-old investigation of the soul's phenomena adjusted to the palate of modern man.
Today one can hardly imagine the excitement. What a thrill it was when my first college
girlfriend told me that the university's bell tower was a phallic symbol. This was a real mix
of my secret obsessions and the high seriousness I expected to get from the university. High
school was never like this. It was hard to tell whether the meaning of it all was that I was
about to lose my virginity or to penetrate the mysteries of being.
P. 136.
11. Pp. 369-70. He is less critical ofprelaw programs: "Prelaw students are more visible in a
variety of liberal courses because law schools are less fixed in their prerequisites; they are only
seeking bright students." P. 370. In general, Bloom fails to acknowledge that students are being
forced into professional and preprofessional programs by an inability to earn a living commensurate with the costs of an undergraduate program otherwise.
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Such an institution is not well-equipped to accomplish what Bloom
sees as its main task: "always to maintain the permanent questions
front and center" (p. 252).
Surprisingly, Bloom does not give up in despair at this point. After a lengthy discussion of Plato, Aristotle, Nietzsche, and Heidegger,
he comes to the unexpected conclusion that there is hope for the future. "For the first time in four hundred years, it seems possible and
imperative to begin all over again, to try to figure out what Plato was
talking about, because it might be the best thing available" (p. 310).
Only if we reassess the university's vocation, returning it to its traditional role, can we avoid a repetition of the destruction of the universities that occurred in Germany in the thirties, according to Bloom (p.

312).
Anyone with influence in the universities who reads Bloom for answers to the question "What should we do to save higher education?"
will probably be disappointed. His solutions are difficult to find and
hard to swallow. They boil down to a Great Books approach designed
for the few students making up the intellectual elite. The university
must
intervene most vigorously in the education of those few who come to the
university with a strong urge for un je ne sais quoi, who fear that they
may fail to discover it, and that the cultivation of their minds is required
for the success of their quest. We are long past the age when a whole
tradition could be stored up in all students, to be fruitfully used later by
some. Only those who are willing to take risks and are ready to believe
the implausible are now fit for a bookish adventure. The desire must
come from within. [pp. 64-65]
12
Bloom acknowledges the objections to a Great Books curriculum
but still concludes that making these readings the core studies will
once again excite students. They will recognize and appreciate the
unique experience the university is providing for them. Students will
rediscover a respect for study as an end in itself (p. 344). He does not
appear to acknowledge that one reason for this success is the self-selection process that matches students with such a curriculum.
Although Bloom's treatise may turn out to be the "bible of a whole
class of righteous intellectuals," 13a it is unlikely that many changes will
occur in the universities because of it. The "back to basics" movement
12. He admits to agreeing with these objections:
It is amateurish; it encourages an autodidact's self-assurance without competence; one can-

not read all of the Great Books carefully; if one only reads Great Books, one can never know
what a great, as opposed to an ordinary, book is; there is no way of determining who is to
decide what a Great Book or what the canon is; books are made the ends and not the means;
the whole movement has a certain coarse evangelistic tone that is the opposite of good taste;
it engenders a spurious intimacy with greatness; and so forth.
P. 344.
13. Pattison, On the Finn Syndrome and the Shakespeare Paradox 244 THE NATION 710,
714 (1987).
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may find some fuel in its pages, and a few more committees may be
appointed to decide what should be done to insure balanced graduation requirements. A handful of schools may reinstitute a foreign language requirement, spurred on by Bloom's enthusiasm for European
culture. A few readers may be stimulated by The Closing of the American Mind and may decide to reread the classics Bloom mentions - or
to read them for the first time. 14 But few readers are likely to be inspired, and many copies of the book will perhaps gather dust on coffee
tables until the best-seller list produces some equally impressive tome.
Will Bloom care?
Bloom is primarily a teacher, and he frequently draws analogies to
the role of a teacher. At various times he describes the teacher as both
pimp and midwife (p. 20), ministering to the needs of the students who
lust for knowledge. In the past, the teacher's "joy was in hearing the
ecstatic 'Oh, yes!' as he dished up Shakespeare and Hegel to minister
to their need. Pimp and midwife really described him well" (p. 136).
Perhaps, like the pimp and midwife, Bloom can perform his service
and then move on. Perhaps the sales that have driven Bloom's book to
the top of the charts are now providing him an ecstatic "Oh, yesl"
-

Maureen P. Taylor

DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION. By Amy Gutmann. Princeton: Princeton
University Press. 1987. Pp. xii, 291. $19.95.
Educational policy is simultaneously a subject of great dispute and
of unparalleled significance. More than preparing children to "function in society," education shapes the attitudes and preferences of future citizens. In a democratic society the views of citizens become the
policies of a nation, and for this reason education has the potential to
determine America's political future. Amy Gutmann' recognizes this
power and in Democratic Education proposes a theory of education
which distributes educational authority in a manner she believes to be
consistent with democratic government.
Gutmann contends that a comprehensive theory of education is
necessary if citizens are to assess and judge policy options. Rather
than arguing in favor of any particular vision of the morally ideal education, Gutmann attempts to answer the following question: Who
14. This task could easily occupy most of a lifetime, as the authors he reveres could fill a
library.
1. Amy Gutmann is an Associate Professor of Politics at Princeton University and the author of LIBERAL EQUALITY (1980).
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should make educational policy? She asserts that these policy decisions should be the result of democratic consensus. Educational practices must reconcile the competing claims of parental authority,
responsible citizenship, and individual liberty. She concludes that
political majorities should decide educational policy as long as that
policy is not repressive or discriminatory. Gutmann's theory of education additionally requires that future citizens be taught the skills and
values necessary to democratic processes. Schools must teach these
abilities not only because our society values democratic methods, but
also because future citizens will have to make democratic decisions
about the education of the next generation.
Chapter 1 explains and defends the theory against more traditional
views. Gutmann goes on to consider the implications of her principles
and to refine them by evaluating their practical consequences. She accomplishes this "translation of political principles into practice" (p.
17) through a discussion of the democratic purposes of primary
schooling (ch. 2). Gutmann uses this "groundwork" for consideration
of the dimensions of democratic participation (ch. 3), the limits of
democratic authority (ch. 4), and the distribution of primary schooling
(ch. 5). She then applies democratic principles to higher education
(chs. 6 and 7), educational institutions other than schools (ch. 8), and
adult education (ch. 9). She concludes by showing how democratic
education is consistent with the assertion that politics is a form of education. While Gutmann provides a comprehensive discussion of educational policy, her conclusions are not always consistent with the
democratic theory she advocates. A detailed explanation of her theoretical development and an analysis of her conclusions demonstrate
this weakness.
In chapter 1 Gutmann begins her explication of democratic education by considering three traditional views of the control of education.
She rejects each in turn but takes principles from each which help
forge her democratic theory. She describes these alternatives as the
family state, the state of families, and the state of individuals (p. 22).
The family state seeks to foster a "like-mindedness and camaraderie
among citizens that most of us expect to find only within families" (p.
23). All members are educated to accept the single, "correct" vision
of the good life. 2 State control over education is absolute and its aim is
to inculcate in children a desire to pursue the true good life rather
than other inferior alternatives. Gutmann rejects the family state because, even if there is such a thing as the good life (which she doubts)
(pp. 28, 44), parents and citizens have differing conceptions as to what
2. For discussion of the "family state" approach see PLATO, Crito, in THE LAST DAYS OF
SOCRATES (H. Tredennick trans. 1969); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (B. Jowett trans. 1941); B. WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985); B. WILLIAMS, The Truth in Relativism, in MORAL LUCK (1981); K. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (5th ed. 1966).
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constitutes a just society for them and their children. Adult citizens
who have not yet discovered the good life, have a right to try to perpet-

uate their vision. For this reason they are entitled to a share of educational authority which undermines the state's claim to total control.
The state of families is at the opposite extreme. 3 It places exclusive
responsibility for education in the hands of parents. They may thus

predispose their children to choose a way of life consistent with their
preferences. Gutmann condemns the insulation of children from exposure to different attitudes and preferences. Rather, an education

must develop the ability to choose among competing conceptions of
the good life. Since children are members of both
families and the
4
state, both have a claim to educational authority.
While the family state and the state of families justify instruction

that biases children towards some conceptions of the good life, the
state of individuals demands absolute neutrality in the teaching of values.5 It supposes that all understandings of the good life are valid and6
that education should not bias children toward any particular view.
Educational authority in the state of individuals should be exercised
exclusively by professional educators who not only must avoid bias,

but also must teach the skills necessary to individual choice among
differing conceptions. Gutmann's criticism of this view of educational

control is that we value education not just for the liberty of choice that
it encourages, but for the virtue that it bestows on children. Society
has an interest in predisposing children to only a select range of

choices that will allow them to flourish and function in a democratic
society. Additionally, she notes that neutrality among virtues is itself
controversial. Indifference among virtues offends supporters of moral

education as much as instruction in only 7one view of the good life
represses those who favor a different view.
3. For discussion of the "state of families," see M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM
(1962); J. COONS & S. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAMILY CONTROL
(1978); Schrag, The Right to Educate, 79 SCH. REV. 359 (1971); C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONO
(1978); J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Second Treatise) (P. Laslett rev. ed.
1963); N. TARCOV, LOCKE'S EDUCATION FOR LIBERTY (1984).
4. But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder, the Supreme Court considered the state's interest in having all of its citizens reasonably well educated so that they could
participate in political affairs and become economically self-sufficient. However, that interest
was not sufficient to deny the rights of the Amish to the free exercise of their religion. Thus the
parent's claim to educational authority overrode the state's interests.
5. See B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980), for a defense of
liberal neutrality.
6. For discussion of the "state of individuals" see J.S. MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM,
LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (E.P. Dutton ed. 1951); I. KANT, THE EDUCATIONAL THEORY OF IMMANUEL KANT (E.F. Buchner trans. 1904); B. ACKERMAN, supra
note 5.
7. Gutmann has changed her views on this approach to education. At one time she favored
only those educational techniques that maximized the future freedom of children. See Gutmann,

Children, Paternalism, and Education: A Liberal Argument, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 338 (1980).
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Gutmann finds none of the three traditional views satisfying. The
problem remains: education cannot and should not be morally neutral. How then should society determine which values to teach future
citizens? Gutmann first defines an inclusive ground on which to justify non-neutral education - a commonly held virtue broad enough to
permit differing views of the good life to flourish. That virtue is a
commitment to "conscious social reproduction." She states, "We are
committed to collectively re-creating the society that we share.
Although we are not collectively committed to any particular set of
educational aims, we are committed to arriving at an agreement on
our educational aims .... " (p. 39). Therefore, while education cannot
avoid biases towards some conceptions, differing views of virtue, the
good life, and moral character can coexist within the notion of conscious social reproduction. The principle leaves room for citizens collectively to shape education in their society. Each view may be put
forward in the democratic process, and while those preferred by the
majority will be favored in our schools, no view may be repressed. At
the same time all children must be educated so that they can share in
consciously reproducing their society when they become adults. Future citizens must learn the skills that allow them to represent their
views in the democratic process and the attitudes that make them tolerant of differences as well as democratic outcomes.
Democratic education combines many aspects of the three traditional approaches which Gutmann rejects. Educational authority is
shared by the state, parents and professional educators. Like the family state a democratic state seeks to teach a societal virtue - the democratic virtue of conscious social reproduction, which aims to
predispose children towards those values consistent with the sharing
of rights and responsibilities in a democratic society. Like the state of
families, the democratic state recognizes that parents have an interest
in shaping the education of their children, but only within the limits
set by democracy. Like the state of individuals, a democratic state
favors participation of professional educators in developing choice
among "good lives." But it is the ability to evaluate these choices and
to appreciate moral values common to this society that democracy respects, not the neutrality among all moral views that is the basis of the
state of individuals.
The primary purpose of democratic education is to develop what
Gutmann calls "deliberative" or "democratic" character. Nurturing
democratic character involves two crucial components. First, schools
must teach moral reasoning; second, they must inculcate moral character. Moral reasoning includes thinking critically about authority
and permits future citizens to evaluate competing moral claims and
choose among them. Consequently they can understand their own
preferences and participate in developing social preferences. Moral
character, on the other hand, fosters behavior in accordance with an-
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thority (p. 51). Society has an interest in perpetuating certain moral
values. Schools must teach these values, but only in conjunction with
instilling the ability to think critically about the moral appropriateness
of authority.
While Gutmann favors a democratic procedure for choosing
among programs of moral education, there are two limits on the democratic authority that she advocates. The first, nonrepression, prevents society from restricting rational deliberation among competing
conceptions of the good life. The second, nondiscrimination, prohibits
society from excluding educable citizens from adequate education.
Both are essential to conscious social reproduction and both prevent
the majority from implementing educational policies that are
undemocratic.
Throughout the work, Gutmann uses her democratic theory to
consider numerous contemporary educational controversies. For example, in chapter 5 she considers the distribution of primary education and the funding of public schools. Her funding formula calls on
the state to identify schools that provide an adequate education. In
order for demacratic education to be adequate, it must do more than
produce functionally literate students who can find employment; it
must also demand from students the ability to think about democratic
politics, and must develop deliberative skills so that future citizens can
effectively participate in conscious social reproduction. Gutmann defines this level of education as the "democratic threshold." Once the
state identifies schools which produce children at the democratic
threshold, it must then increase funding to inadequate schools such
that they can meet this level of education. All funding above the democratic threshold is a matter of democratic discretion. But she also
envisions a nondiscretionary element to funding decisions. Implicit,
but never defended, is the assumption that increased funds will permit
all schools to provide a democratically satisfactory education.
Gutmann considers additional controversies through her democratic analysis including bilingualism (cl. 3), book banning (ch. 4), sex
education and sexist education (ch. 4), the role of private schools (ch.
4), school desegregation (ch. 5), the purpose, funding, and admissions
practices of institutions of higher education (chs. 6 and 7), the educational role and permissibility of government regulation of libraries and
television (ch. 8) and adult education (ch. 9). The theory comfortably
answers many of the vexing, current educational problems. However,
her answers do not always appear consistent with her democratic theory; ultimately they may only justify her own moral preferences.
The incongruity between theory and application may follow from
the fact that while Gutmann proposes a procedure to make educational policy, her procedure is not principle-neutral. The biases of her
theory result from the contention that one of the purposes of educa-
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tion is to instill certain moral attitudes. Evidently these attitudes
should be democratically determined. But while education can be
biased towards values favored by the majority, it should follow from
her theory that the process itself should be morally neutral and should
permit the teaching of any values which are not repressive or discriminatory. The difficulty is that the bases of her democratic analysis are
the "deepest, shared moral commitments" of American society., For
Gutmann these appear to involve adherence to traditional liberal values. 9 Yet she is unable to separate the kind of education her theory
would produce from the values of her theory of educational authority.
Although her theory of decisionmaking should permit a broad range
of outcomes, her values infect the process. In essence Gutmann uses
notions of our "deepest, shared moral commitments" manifested
through the principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination to support her own moral preferences.
Her preferences are most noticeable in the case she makes against
the teaching of creationism in public schools. She contends that
schools are prevented by the principle of nonrepression from teaching
creationism even if the subject is favored by a democratic majority.
The principle is violated by the indirect imposition of the religious
views of some on all children in the guise of science (p. 103). She finds
that the indirect "result of establishing religion in public schools
would be to restrict rational deliberation among competing ways of
life" (p. 104). She assumes that religious attitudes are intolerant of
differences and that the idea of creationism cannot be taught without
restricting opposite views. But this does not on its face appear to be
the case. It seems possible at least that creationism could be taught as
an alternative, even if unconvincing, view in addition to the theory of
evolution. Of course, schools would also have to develop the reasoning skills necessary for each child to make a choice, but it does not
follow that the choice is restricted by the introduction of a competing
conception of human origin. Gutmann lets her biases show when she
suggests that schools are bound not "to teach false doctrines that
threaten to undermine the future prospects of a common democratic
education" (p. 103; emphasis added). She thus would prevent the
teaching of a doctrine with which she disagrees on the grounds of
"nonrepression."
Her probable response to this suggestion would demonstrate the
problems discussed above. She states, the case against the teaching of
creationism "rests instead on the claim that secular standards consti8. P. 21. Gutmann looks to "the most commonly held theories concerning educational purposes, authorities and distributions" in order to develop her own theory.
9. Gutmann admits the need to "use some form of philosophical analysis to defend a set of
principles or to determine which set of principles and whose interpretation of them ought to
rule." P. 21.
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tute a better basis upon which to build a common education for citizenship than any set of sectarian religious beliefs - better because
secular standards are both fairer and a firmer basis for peacefully reconciling our differences" (p. 103). Her prohibition of religious instruction is consistent with the admission that her theory rests on principles
drawn from our deeply held common values. America has a long history of the separation of church and state. However, if democratic
authority is limited only by nonrepression and nondiscrimination, it is
difficult to resist a majority decision to teach creationism in the
schools. It appears at least possible to teach creationism in a manner
which does not limit consideration of other views of the good life. If
educational authority truly conformed to the theory Gutmann proposes, it would have to allow creationism in schools if favored by a
majority. But as it appears that deeply held common values can also
trump democratic decisions, how these "values" are defined determines educational content. The problem for Gutmann is that these
values are not set by democratic process.
It is because many will find Gutmann's version of our deeply held
common values intuitively satisfying that Democratic Education will
be most appealing to an American audience.' 0 Gutmann's principle of
conscious social reproduction justifies democratic control over educational authority, limited only by the principles of nonrepression and
nondiscrimination. Gutmann would claim that by "conscious social
reproduction" she means the fostering of the ability in future citizens
to deliberate about moral alternatives and arrive at a societal consensus. However, given the extent to which her theory is shaped by current, American, liberal values (which, for her, represent our deeply
held common values), Gutmann underestimates the significance of the
"reproduction" component. Future citizens who have had democratic
educations will favor the reproduction of the society of the previous
generation. Although Gutmann's theory permits the teaching of radical visions of the good life, it appears unlikely to create future citizens
who will desire to implement those visions. While one may not find
10. Indeed, Gutmann finds American federalism particularly well suited to fostering democratic participation in the making of education policy. Local public schools under the control of
elected school boards can respond to the collective preferences of local communities. Such authority permits more effective control, allows content to vary with area preferences, and facilitates citizen participation. At the same time higher levels of government can set limits on local
authority in order to cultivate a common societal culture, teach democratic values, and insure
that local preferences are nonrepressive and nondiscriminatory. Professional authority may be
exercised through the pressure of teacher's unions. Unions can demand conditions under which
teachers are better able to develop democratic character. There is room as well for student participation which itself can foster the participatory virtues of democratic character.

May 1988]

1147

Law and Society

such a consequence troubling, it is naive to assume that such a result
would be the product of a neutral process.
-

JonathanMarks

THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, BuREAUCRACY. By Joel F Handler. New York: Russell Sage Founda-

tion. 1986.

Pp. xi, 327. $27.50.

There have been profound changes in our legal culture over the
past several decades. One of the most important developments has
been the proliferation of statutory entitlements and due process remedies.' However, Joel F. Handler 2 argues that the American system of
rights and procedural remedies has not worked, and that "despite the
impressive changes in our legal culture, justice remains largely unavailable to large sections of the population" (p. 2).
Handler is concerned with justice in administrative decisionmaking. He argues that in certain contexts administrative decisionmaking
necessarily involves a great deal of uncertainty, both in the factual determinations made and the legal standards applied. In such situations,
the adversary system of procedural due process is inadequate because
it fails to appreciate the uncertainty inherent in the decision and tends
to cut off much needed communication between the client and the
agency.
In Critique, the first part of Handler's book, he focuses upon the
interaction between a large-scale public agency and an individual,
where the decisions to be made are largely discretionary, i.e., not subject to solution by rule. Handler argues that such decisions require a
system based on communication and cooperation (p. 7). In the second
part, Construction, Handler proposes such a system, using the special
education program of the Madison, Wisconsin School District as a
model (p. 9). He uses special education as his primary example because it involves relationships between individuals and agencies which
1. P. 1. As Handler notes, Professor Charles A. Reich referred to these entitlements and
remedies as "The New Property." Handler summarizes Reich's argument that "[i]n the modem
social welfare state, relations with government in regard to welfare, education, health, and so
forth, involve new forms of property, and government ought to be held to the same standards of
law as with conventional or traditional property." P. 1. See Reich, The New Property,73 YALE
L.J. 733 (1964).
2. Professor of Law, U.C.L.A. School of Law. A.B. 1954, Princeton University; J.D. 1957,
Harvard Law School. Professor Handler's recent works include: POOR CLIENTS WITHOUT
LAWYERS: WHAT CAN BE DONE? (1985) (edited with Louise Trubek); and LAST RESORTS:
EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE AND SPECIAL NEEDS PROGRAMS IN PUBLIC WELFARE (1983) (with

Michael Sosin).
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are characterized by high amounts of discretion and continuity (pp. 2-

3).
Handler's criticism of the adversary system of due process is reasonable and convincing. At its best, the system is flawed by maldistributions of resources and by its dependence upon the relative
knowledge and experience of the participants. These problems are exacerbated by the ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in discretionary
decisionmaking. Handler purports to address these weaknesses with
his alternative system of justice. However, his system also has its
weaknesses, some of which Handler fails to recognize.
In Critique,Handler argues that administrative justice requires the
sharing of power: the individual and the official must reach a mutual
agreement on important decisions affecting the individual (p. 4). In
fact, Handler's concept of justice is analogous to informed consent (as
it exists in theory, rather than in its flawed application to medical decisionmaking). Informed consent is itself based upon two ideas: individuality and social relationships (pp. 4-5). Handler argues that the
adversary system fails to resolve the tension between these two ideas.
He views the adversary system of due process as the embodiment of
liberal legalism, the objective of which is the protection of the rights of
the individual. However, Handler asserts that the system fails to respond adequately to the role and responsibilities of the individual as a
member of society (pp. 4-5).
In discussing the flaws of the adversary system and the general
weaknesses of liberalism, Handler notes with some approval the work
of dignitary theorists.3 According to dignitary theory, justice requires
that certain dignitary values be maintained in procedural due process
remedies. In other words, the effects of the process upon the participants, rather than just the outcome must be considered. Although
Handler apparently draws upon this concept to some extent in developing his alternative approach, he asserts that dignitary theorists also
ultimately fail to resolve the conflicts between the individual and society (p. 129).
Despite the weaknesses of liberalism, and the flaws of the adversary system, as Handler acknowledges, the system does work well in
deciding factual questions and enforcing legal norms or claims of
right. The system "contemplates a definitive decision that either ends
the controversy or alters it significantly" (pp. 43-44). Thus, the adversary system is an effective means of establishing liability, assessing
damages, and determining criminal liability.
3. Pp. 124-29. Handler asserts that the "most thoughtful work so far dealing with dignitary
values" is by Professor Jerry L. Mashaw. Handler states that the "'unifying thread' among the
dignitary theorists [is] a perception that the 'effects of process on participants, not just the rationality of substantive results, must be considered in judging the legitimacy of public decisionmaking.'" P. 125 (quoting Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Questfor a Dignitary Theory,
61 B.U. L. REv. 885, 886 (1981).
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However, special education decisions present the worst possible
conditions for the functioning of the adversary system. The substantive questions for each case are: (1) what is the nature of the problem
with the child; and (2) what should be done about the problem? The
answers to these questions are fraught with ambiguity and uncertainty. The legal standard is also indeterminate. A handicapped child
has a right to an "appropriate education."'4 Given the ambiguity and
uncertainty as to the causes of and proper responses to poor academic
performance, the decision as to what constitutes an "appropriate education" necessarily involves the exercise of discretion. Handler argues
that where the relations between the citizen and the state are discretionary and continuous, as in special education, the adversary system
often "exacerbates rather than settles" disputes and tends to cut off
ongoing communication (p. 44).
The system's failure is due, in part, to the reluctance of officials to
allow participation and, in part, to their ability to thwart the intent of
the law. 5 In special education, a due process hearing is seen as a challenge to the decisionmaker. Parents who seek hearings are viewed as
malcontents or troublemakers. Furthermore, even if school officials
make a good faith effort to encourage parental participation, the system depends upon the ability of the parents to take advantage of procedural remedies (pp. 62-63). The likelihood that parents will be able
to overcome the6 system's barriers and to be "rights bearing" citizens is
extremely low.
Handler argues that the adversary system fails to appreciate both
the social context within which decisions are made and how that context fatally undermines the procedure (p. 43). The system assumes
that parties have adequate resources and that the judge is independent,
contemplative, and deliberative. In fact, individuals often lack the
knowledge and resources necessary to avail themselves of the procedural remedies. Furthermore, administrative hearing procedures are
actually parts of larger bureaucratic systems, within which the hear4. P. 44. See The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142,
89 Stat. 773 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) [hereinafter P.L. 94-142].
5. Extensive procedural remedies are provided by P.L. 94-142. Informed parental consent
and participation is required throughout the process. Pp. 60-61. However, research indicates
that, although P.L. 94-142 seems to have resulted in more parental contact with school authorities, there has not been much change in parental involvement in the actual decisionmaking process. The most important decisions are typically made by school personnel prior to the required
"participation and consultation" with parents. In large school districts, committees spend an
average of only 2.5 minutes per decision. Pp. 66-69.
6. Handler notes that in order for the due process system to work, the following conditions

must be present:
[C]lients have to be aware that an injury has occurred; they have to think that the agency is
at fault; they have to be aware of the existence of a remedy; they have to have the resources
with which to pursue that remedy; and finally, they have to make a calculation that the
benefits of pursuing the remedy outweigh its costs.
P. 22.
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ings are only incidental. Consequently, agencies will attempt to alter
the due process model to fit their institutional goals (pp. 34-36).
Handler does not advocate the complete abandonment of the adversary system of due process. He recognizes that, despite its faults, it
may still be useful in particular situations when more informal procedures have failed. However, he believes that formal adversary proceedings should recede in importance and no longer dominate the
relationship between the agency and the client (p. 20).
In Construction, Handler proposes, as an alternative to the adversary system of procedural due process, an approach which takes account of context and fosters cooperation and increased
communication between agency and client. Handler bases his approach upon his observations of the special education program of the
Madison, Wisconsin School District. As Handler describes that program, parents are viewed by the school district as part of the solution,
rather than as the problem. Flexibility is maintained in performing
evaluations and developing programs. Additionally, the system requires communicative conflict. In other words, parents communicate
and cooperate with school officials while maintaining their autonomy
and without sacrificing their own interests (p. 9).
Handler observes that the Madison system has been very successful. He attributes its success to four basic factors, represented by his
"conditions of discretion," which are the embodiment of his alternative approach. He explains, "[b]y conditions of discretion, I mean justice, the sharing of power, in the context of the discretionary decision"
(p. 160). Handler's four conditions of discretion are actually descriptions of environmental and systemic factors requisite to the facilitation
and effective use of discretionary decisionmaking. Although phrased
in terms of their application to a special education program, they are
not limited to the special education context.
The first condition requires organizational change within the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy must want the participation of clients in
deciding substantive issues. Handler's approach cannot succeed without the cooperation of the bureaucracy (p. 12).
The second condition requires a decentralized system. Handler argues that the Weberian model does not describe reality. "Organizations are not hierarchical, formalized, rational, efficient collectivities;
rather, they are loose collections of multiple centers of power, shifting
coalitions, adapting and readapting to environmental influences" (p.
195). Handler asserts that the "loosely coupled open system" is the
appropriate form of organization to accomplish the goals of justice in
the context of the discretionary decision (p. 195). Handler's goal is to
strengthen the exercise of discretion, but in ways that preserve and
enhance the protection of individual rights in the relationship between
the client and the agency (p. 195).
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The third condition, the activity of social movement groups, is essential to changing the environmental influences upon the organization at both the societal and local levels. Social movement groups are
independent organizations that have two primary and potentially conflicting functions. Under Handler's system, these organizations participate in the formation of policy and the implementation process.
However, at the same time, they represent individuals in their relations with the agency. For example, in the Madison School District
such groups provide advocates to represent parents and to aid them in
understanding and in working with the special education program.
Social movement groups are required to create demands for change
and to work for organizational and institutional support (pp. 217-18).
The fourth condition is social autonomy. Handler describes this
condition in terms of Kant's categorical imperative: each person is to
be treated as an end, never as a means. 7 However, Handler argues
that the classic concepts of individualism are incomplete. Handler
states, "I begin not with the independent, free-standing person, but
rather with a person in a social relationship. The concern is not with
the conditions of independence but with the conditions of interdependence" (p. 265; emphasis in original).
Handler's criticisms of the adversary system of procedural due
process are valid and timely. The adversary system is certainly imperfect. But Handler goes beyond the familiar complaints, such as the
maldistribution of resources and the excessive costs of litigation. He
argues that the system is structurally unsound in the context of administrative decisionmaking, as it fails to consider the individual as a
member of society. Handler purports to remedy these weaknesses
with his alternative system of justice. However, Handler's system has
its own weaknesses.
Handler recognizes several problems with his approach. The most
paradoxical problem is that the system's own success may ultimately.
undermine its performance. Handler's system relies on informed consent: parties must reach a mutual agreement on important decisions.
However, as school officials disclose more information and increasingly encourage parental participation, parents may come to trust the
school officials and to rely upon their opinions, thus effectively defeating the goals of the system. Furthermore, as the organization acquires
a reputation for success, it may be perceived as unacceptable within
the community to question its decisions (pp. 108-09).
Additionally, the threat of cooptation is a primary risk running
throughout the system (pp. 243-44). Assuming that the bureaucracy
7. P. 123. See also p. 264 ("To treat a person merely as a means involves a violation of
autonomy, because the person is then being treated in accordance with a rule not of his own
choosing") (citing T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 58
(1983)).
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wants the participation of the social movement groups, it is easy to
foresee an overzealous bureaucracy actually capturing the groups in its
desire to accommodate them. Furthermore, if the bureaucracy does
not want the participation of the social movement groups, cooptation
is an obvious means of circumventing the system.
Handler also recognizes that additional problems are raised specifically by the use of social movement groups. First, interest group representation is suspect in democratic theory because the group
represents special interests rather than the general interest. However,
Handler reconciles the activities of social movement groups with democratic theory by requiring that the criteria of interest representation
be embedded in the substantive standards of the policy (pp. 256-57).
A second problem is that as a result of the discretion involved in
decisionmaking, public policy is necessarily contingent, i.e., not subject to strict control or prediction. Handler asserts that, within special
education, contingency is both inevitable and desirable. Nevertheless,
discretion should be maintained within certain parameters (p. 257).
Handler argues that the requirement of including interest representation in the substantive standards of the policy will also meet objections
as to the contingency of public policy.
The third problem raised by the use of social movement groups is
that such groups "may suppress dissent; they may coopt or capture
rather than represent." This must be avoided. Handler argues that in
this case the end of group behavior is autonomy, not cooperation. The
basic goal is "to enhance the individual bargaining position" of each
parent (p. 258).
In addition to the problems recognized by Handler, his approach
also suffers from other weaknesses that he fails to address. For instance, his system is completely dependent upon the bureaucracy's
understanding and support. Handler asserts that parental participation will yield "better results" for the agency. This promise of increased success is to serve as an incentive for the agency to maintain
the required degree of communicative conflict and to ensure the autonomy of the social movement group. However, Handler fails to define
"better results" and to give empirical support for the proposition that
parental participation actually will yield such results. As the bureaucracy now effectively disregards the law's requirements that there be
parental participation and informed consent, it is reasonable to question whether the bureaucracy actually believes that such action will
lead to better results (at least as it defines them).
Even if this proposition can be adequately supported to convince
the bureaucracy, there are other factors which may undermine Handler's approach. In times of deficit spending and demands for greater
fiscal accountability, it will be increasingly difficult to maintain decentralization and to tolerate otherwise desirable uncertainty. Addition-
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ally, Handler rejects the Weberian model as not descriptive of reality,
but does not adequately address the concerns of natural systems theorists.8 Bureaucrats intent on ensuring their own survival are not likely

to be enthusiastic about sharing decisionmaking power and accepting
uncertainty as an inevitable and desirable part of the system. In fact,
it is questionable to what extent the bureaucracy is motivated by the
desire to achieve "better results" at all.
Furthermore, given the emphasis on the organizational incentive
of improved results, it is unclear what importance dignitary values ultimately serve in Handler's system. The bureaucracy apparently heeds
such concerns only to encourage parents to participate. Dignitary values are thus used as means and are not "ends in themselves, goals
without regard to substantive outcomes," as dignitary theorists insist
they should be (p. 148).
Handler also fails to address adequately the problems of cooptation. The risk of cooptation runs throughout his system, especially in
Handler's reconciliation of the role of social movement groups with
democratic theory. Interest groups are required to adhere to criteria
specified in the policy. It is questionable whether government could
monitor such adherence or whether deviation could be corrected without cooptation by the bureaucracy.
As Handler acknowledges, his approach is based upon a very optimistic view of humanity, "a conception of people who are capable of
altruism and individuality, trust and autonomy, respect, responsibility,
and morality" (p. 300). It is doubtful that this is an accurate description of the administrative state. Furthermore, his approach is dependent upon the bureaucracy and social movement groups maintaining
an ideal level of both cooperation and conflict. Too much of either
would result in failure. Given the conflicting demands upon both entities and the underlying inequality in their bargaining positions, it is
unlikely that such a tenuous relationship could be achieved and
maintained.
Furthermore, there are great risks involved. Despite the flaws of
the adversary system, many people have won important substantive
rights. Such gains were the result of the aggressive use of a formal
adversary system, based upon the protection of individual rights.
Although the system is not as effective as it should be in addressing the
needs of lower economic classes, it does provide at least some identifiable limitation upon the actions of the bureaucracy. It is possible that
informalism will inevitably lead to increased domination of the lower
economic classes.
Handler's response to this threat is to reserve the adversary system
8. Natural systems theorists view organizations in terms of "self-maintaining systems, whose
one overriding goal is survival as an end in itself rather than achieving agreed upon goals." P.
200.
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for those situations in which it is most needed. However, this merely
distances individuals from their rights and increases the obstacles they
must overcome to be "rights bearing" citizens. Although improvement in substantive decisionmaking is certainly desirable, sweeping
change in the procedures and protections defining the relationships between agencies and clients should be approached with caution.
Handler addresses an important and serious flaw in our system of
administrative justice. His book is worth reading for its discussion of
the issues and its summary of the various theories proposed. However, while his approach offers valuable insight into the weaknesses of
the adversarial system, it is not without weaknesses of its own.

-

FAMILIES IN PERIL.

Steven F. Cherry

By Marian Wright Edelman. Cambridge, Mass.:

Harvard University Press. 1987. Pp. xii, 127. $15.00.
Families in Peril by Marian Wright Edelman 1 deals with one of

this nation's most critical problems, child poverty. What begins as an
empirical, intellectual, relatively uncontroversial, and potentially useful appraisal of the current condition of the American family, however, unfortunately results in little more than Edelman's Last Stand on
the (Ultra) Liberal Platform. This is unfortunate primarily because
Edelman destroys much of the credibility she earns throughout the
book. While chapters 2 and 3 focus on presenting statistical information, the bulk of chapters 4 and 5 plunge head first into the age-old
diatribe on social welfare policy on an emotive rather than cerebral
level. 2 In addition, Edelman's tone wavers throughout the book. She

begins with an impartial analysis and ultimately concludes with an

1. Marian Wright Edelman, Spelman College and Yale Law School graduate, has been President of the Children's Defense Fund since 1973. In 1986, she delivered the W.E.B. Du Bois
Lectures on which this book was based. Her accomplishments include the opening of the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund Office in Jackson, Mississippi and involvement in
the establishment of the Head Start program for pre-school children in that state.
2. For example, in discussing the merits of supporting those whom she deems the "underclass" - that group of families with a parent who is physically able yet unwilling to work - she
offers the following resolution: "[it is more important to our society that every child has enough
to eat than that every parent be forced to work." P. 87. In making such a remark, she ignores
the concerns addressed by many who take a more conservative posture; namely, that it is simply
"unfair" or socialistic to force taxpayers to support those who voluntarily choose not to make an
effort to support themselves.
In addition, in setting the tone of chapter 5, she remarks that "[o]ur political leaders are
turning this nation's plowshares into swords and bringing good news to the rich at the expense of
the poor." P. 95. The following passage captures the essence of the entire book:
Feeding a hungry child or preventing needless infant deaths in a decent, rich society should
not require detailed policy analysis or quantifiable outcome goals or endless commissions.
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impassioned plea to save the family and alleviate the "widespread suffering in our city streets and farmlands" (p. x). The result of this drastic style switch is that runaway, impassioned pleas dilute her analytical
credibility. Edelman's ultimate goal is simple and uncontroversial:
She wishes to eradicate poverty and all of its consequences and to create a society in which every child can live a decent life and possess
realistic hope for the future. Her proposal for achieving this result,
however, is far from simple and further yet from uncontroversial.
The book begins, appropriately, with an essential, although somewhat convoluted, discussion of the facts; more accurately, the discussion sets forth hardcore statistics. Edelman devotes the bulk of the
first chapter to an elaborate presentation and discussion of the statistics relating to the black family in America. She uses these statistics
expertly to accomplish two main goals. First, she carefully attempts
to draw causal connections between certain prevalent characteristics
of black families and their (relatively) bleak condition. She then attempts to use the statistics to eradicate societal myths regarding the
poor generally, and blacks specifically.
With respect to the first of these objectives, the conclusions she
derives from her analysis can be summed up as follows: The primary
reason why the condition of black families, as compared to white families, is so grim is that young black marriages simply fail to form as
easily as white marriages (p. 6). This, coupled with the relatively
higher rate of adolescent pregnancy and births among black females,
results in a disproportionately high number of unmarried black
mothers. The causes and effects of this situation are thus tightly intertwined and often indistinguishable. Edelman urges that the chicken
and egg inquiry be ended, and that efforts be directed at solving the
problem rather than at attaining a theoretically precise evaluation of
the interaction of its components (p. 9).
The ancillary question of why there are so many fatherless black
families is answered by the same conclusion - first marriages among
blacks fail to form easily. Upon examining other factors contributing
to this dilemma (such as the higher rate of institutionalization among
black males, a higher death rate among black males, and the large
number of black males who are apparently "missing" from the census), Edelman concludes that such factors are relatively minor contributions to the problem of fatherless families (p. 12). In addition, she
draws a direct correlation between declining black male employment
and declining marriage rates among young blacks. This correlation
ultimately leads to her proposed solution: "[T]he key to bolstering
black families, alleviating the growth in female-headed households,
They require compassionate action .... [L]et us be careful not to hide behind cost-benefit
analyses when human survival is at issue.
P. 102.
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and reducing black child poverty lies in improved education, training,
and employment opportunities for black males and females" (p. 14).
Therefore, her recommendation, drawing upon that of William Wilson, 3 is that the black unemployment problem be given top priority in
"public policy agendas designed to enhance the status of families" (p.
15).
Another objective Edelman seeks to achieve by application of statistical analysis is the shattering of commonly held myths about the
poor and about blacks. The best example of this is Edelman's use of
facts and statistics to dispel the myths surrounding the social welfare
system, particularly Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) and the motivation and behavior attributed to welfare recipients. For instance, Edelman adeptly illustrates how the contention
that welfare is a huge drain on public resources and that families on
AFDC are living "too well" is an exaggerated, if not unsupported,
statement. Her criticism, through the use of facts and figures, of the
"total-cost" argument-which contends that the combined benefit
levels to a family are extremely high-is convincing, although somewhat unnecessarily accusatory. 4 Some of her statistics are quite illuminating: The bulk (72%) of Medicaid expenditures in 1984 went to
elderly or disabled recipients, none of whom were on AFDC and
many of whom were white; in 1984, more than 50% of the foodstamp
recipients were not in AFDC households; the combined value of
AFDC and food stamps is insufficient to lift families out of poverty; 5
and finally, less than 25% of the families on AFDC receive housing
assistance (pp. 69-70).
In examining the child poverty crisis in America, Edelman
presents several reasons why we should invest in all our children.
First, and foremost, there is a moral obligation on the part of adults to
meet the needs of those who cannot provide for themselves by virtue of
their youth. Second, it is socially desirable to provide opportunities
for children to obtain the education and skills necessary if they are to
be expected to participate in, and contribute to, society during their
adult lives. Third, a reciprocation factor exists by which our self-interest is furthered by ensuring a future pool of supportive adults. Fourth,
society needs the contributions of an increasingly scarce supply of
youth. And finally, the cost to society of not investing in our children
is greater than the cost of investing in them. 6
Edelman's analysis of child poverty, its causes, and alternative so3. Mr. Wilson is a member of the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago and
an analyst of black family and civil rights organizations.
4. "The total-cost argument is a shell game, with the administration betting that it can move
the pea faster than the public eye can follow." P. 69.
5. Poverty in this sense is determined by the designated poverty level of income for a family
of a given size.
6. Pp. 30-31. Edelman illustrates this last point through a series of examples that depict a

May 1988]

Law and Society

1157

lutions, ultimately leads her to place most of the blame on the government for its "misguided budget priorities" (p. 44). Although she
acknowledges from the beginning that efforts from both the public and
private sectors must be made to alleviate the dire circumstances of so
many children (and parents), her examination of causes and solutions
lapses into a blame-the-government mode very quickly. For example,
she condemns the government for decreasing its support to children
and their families during their time of need, when economic recession,
unemployment, low wages, and increased taxes have placed incredible
burdens on families struggling to survive (p. 40). She denounces past
and present budget priorities as indicative of "perverse national values" (p. 37) that essentially lend support to a "make the rich richer
and the poor poorer" public policy. 7 She argues that the government's
role in addressing and adequately responding to the crisis requires that
certain affirmative steps be taken by the public sector and facilitated
by the private sector. She labels essential such affirmative steps as (1)
creating jobs in the public and private sectors through the expansion
of job training programs both for the minority poor and for youth, (2)
raising the minimum wage to a point that would allow a full-time
worker to support a family above the poverty level, (3) guaranteeing
health insurance for all, (4) insuring affordable, quality childcare, (5)
restoring (and increasing) the social welfare benefits cut by the post1980 budget, including an expansion of Medicaid, reformation of the
AFDC programs, and the enactment of a minimum national benefit
level, (6) expanding the Head Start program for comprehensive early
childhood development, (7) relieving the tax burden on the poor by
increasing the value of tax provisions that benefit them the most, such
as the standard deduction, personal exemption, and Earned Income
Tax Credit, and (8) initiating sex education and access to family planning services and counseling in the public schools (pp. 45-46; 54; 85-

86).
But the end of the book digresses further and further into an emotionally-laden, impassioned appeal to human compassion, taking
Edelman further and further away from the goals she initially targets.
It becomes increasingly apparent that this book is Edelman's ideological statement to society. The arguments she makes on behalf of those
she defends fall strictly within the realm of public policy debate. It is
therefore impossible to engage in an objective evaluation of her reasoning without involving oneself as an advocate in the political debate,
albeit unintentionally. There is nothing wrong with making a political
statement, but the problem with evaluating such a statement is that
greater cost to the public over the long run of "curing" rather than "preventing" in areas of
health, education, employment, and family stability. Pp. 31-32.
7. As a result, she observes a "new American apartheid between rich and poor, white and
black, old and young, government and needy, corporation and individual, military and domestic
needs." P. 37.
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there is no "right" answer, no precedent to examine, no statute to interpret. While it is difficult to imagine anyone contending that it is
desirable to raise impoverished, abused, malnourished, unloved, and
uneducated children, ensuring that this does not happen in our society
may create conflicts with other values equally strong or even stronger
than those relating to the condition of children. For example, a capitalistic society values greatly the individual's freedom to determine, in
essence, her own destiny through labor, intellect, and perseverance,
and sees efforts by government to reduce the inequitable, yet inevitable, results of such a system as a threat of socialism. Differences in
fundamental human values are ultimately at the core of the controversy - for some, "unfairness" means allowing those who cannot (for
whatever reason) provide for themselves to suffer; for others, "unfairness" means forcing those who can provide for themselves, to support
those who don't.
With this in mind, the fundamental flaw in Edelman's book is lack
of focus, or more precisely, scattered focus. The messages she conveys
are too numerous, too controversial, and conveyed much too passionately to conform to the documentary style the book initially seems to
adopt. She runs the risk of losing the credibility she attains in the
"informative" chapters by regressing into scathing attacks on the current administration, resorting to an appeal to compassion rather than
to intellect and logic, and circumventing the strongest arguments
against her position. At one level, she purports to engage strictly in a
campaign for children by addressing their rights and needs. On another level, her goal seems to be to convince her audience that the
Reagan administration is the greatest evil the poor have ever had to
contend with, exemplified by its "misguided budget priorities" of increased military spending and decreased spending on social welfare
programs. 8 On yet another level, her goal seems to be to arouse support and sympathy for the predicament of blacks in this country and
to defuse typical stereotypes, prejudices, and biases while at the same
time garnering support for an increased allocation of resources to programs that primarily benefit blacks. There is nothing at all objectionable about any of these goals, but piling them all under the auspices of
a crusade for children leaves the reader feeling as if she has been led
astray.
Edelman's tactics for persuading her audience to support one side
of a traditionally controversial issue, whether deliberate or not, come
across as somewhat dishonest. She realizes that the people she needs
to reach the most, the conservatives, are typically a white, middle8. Ms. Edelman also finds little redeeming value in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings balanced
budget amendment: "This morally bankrupt law seeks mindlessly to lower a $200 billion annual
deficit, which sick and hungry children did not cause and which we cannot solve by hurting
them." P. 96.
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class group of people who have varying suspicions and biases about
the welfare system. She also seems to realize that traditional liberal
arguments regarding a moral duty to provide everyone in this wealthy
society with a decent life have not successfully convinced the steadfast
conservatives. She must overcome the "socialism" stigma associated
with the actions she endorses.
Edelman's tactics for overcoming this incredible barrier focus
upon concerns central to the white, conservative, middle- and upperclass. First, she places children at the forefront of her discussion as a
primary concern. This is not to imply that her concern for children is
anything but genuine. Nonetheless, children make a convenient common denominator that attracts the attention, sympathy, and compassion of everyone, even the white middle-class. And one becomes
suspicious about her professed intent to raise the nation's consciousness regarding the problem of child poverty when she devotes such a
great deal of discussion to other social problems such as racism, discrimination, tax burdens on the poor, and wealth disparity in this
country. Admittedly, anything that affects parents will ultimately affect children. However, Edelman seems to be taking on what is really
a broader objective than merely helping children: She advocates just
as strongly liberal methods for curing the assorted social evils that
accompany poverty, racial discrimination, and unequal opportunity.
Edelman also attempts to persuade her readers that we will all benefit from increasing benefits to the poor, by adopting what she calls a
pro-family policy. However, Edelman completely ignores some very
crucial stumbling blocks to an acceptance of her proposals: The economic costs to many people are not only real but may include a threat
to their perception of a democratic form of government. Edelman's
casual statement that the expanded "Social-Security-like" (p. 84) system she would like to see implemented would leave the economy unharmed is questionable at best. Furthermore, she never addresses
many people's primary objection to the welfare system: its susceptibility to abuse.
In the final two chapters of the book Edelman explodes into action,
attacking everyone and everything that can possibly have an effect on
the situation of the poor. She accuses the "greedy military weasel" (p.
99), the "unfairness weasel" (p. 101), the "bystander weasel" (p. 101),
and the "ineffectiveness weasel" (p. 102), of "gnawing away at the
rights of our children and the moral underpinnings of our democratic
society" (p. 99). As a last resort she appeals to compassion: "We
could act out an old-fashioned notion - one of those traditional notions of which President Reagan is so fond. It is called compassion"
(p. 87).
In the final analysis, Edelman has made a commendable effort to
expose the unpleasant and sobering truth about the state of the Ameri-
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can family today. However, it is disappointing that in the end she
undermines the persuasiveness of her analytical conclusions, the solutions she proposes, and her overall message, by trying to fight too
many battles at the same time.

-

Nellie Pappas

